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GLOSSARY 	  
This research describes a period that initiated with the colonisation of three present-day 
African nations. The length and intensity of the colonial and postcolonial era have created a 
multitude of terms and descriptions for processes, peoples, places, etc., which are often 
bigoted and/or dependent upon the time, context and interpretation of the speaker. My 
research has been conducted with the awareness that many of the sources I had to consult 
are biased. For the sake of clarity, I hereby specify the terminology used in this thesis.  
 
Terms  
I use African or black to refer to the descendants of the indigenous population of Africa. To 
those of European ancestry I refer to as European or white. This is not to deny people of 
European ancestry cannot identify as African, or vice versa. The terms are used not as 
biological categories, but as political and cultural concepts.1  
I use Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi to describe the three countries that were once named, 
respectively, Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland by their coloniser, 
throughout.  
Local words that lack adequate description in English, such as citemene, are explained in the 
text and adhere to the most recent spelling.  
Contested, ambiguous terms that can alter their meaning depending on time, context and/or 
interpretation, such as ‘land-grabbing’, are also clarified in the text.  
Numbers  
Many of the sources consulted use acres instead of hectares to measure land and describe 
the size of land holdings or territories. Throughout this thesis, I have converted acres into 
hectares. A hectare equals 10.000m²; one acre equals 0,404685642 hectares.  
When giving a number to specify population density, this always specifies the amount of 
people per square kilometre (km²).  
	  
 
  
                                                   
1 For an exploration of the terms and the construction of their meaning, see G. Wekker, White innocence. 
Paradoxes of colonialism and race (Durham 2016) 24. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The ownership of land is one of the most contentious issues in Africa. The division and 
appropriation of African soil has busied the mind of many; academics and politicians alike. The 
struggle for land in contemporary Africa has a long and contested history, wherein rights to 
land have been the source of many disputes, the instigators of outright violent clashes, and a 
popular subject on the agenda of those wishing to access or enhance political power.2 Much 
has been written to unravel the grievances surrounding ‘the land question’, in order to 
uncover its roots, lay bare its intricate relation with political strife, and find windows of 
opportunity for change.3 To this very day, the history of land ownership influences social, 
political and economic processes in many African countries.4  
   As opposed to the crucial role of land in present-day Africa, most scholarly works on 
African economic history assert that power in pre-colonial Africa was exercised through the 
ability to control people rather than land: land was abundant, whereas population was scarce 
and thinly dispersed. Based on this observation5, an analytical framework has been built that 
has become highly influential in African economic history.6 Low population density led to the 
institutionalisation of property rights over people, making a system of land rights, let alone the 
private ownership of land, alien and irrelevant in this particular context. Thus, according to the 
literature, the nature of power in the pre-colonial African state was essentially non-territorial.7 
Moreover, the combination of a sheer abundance of land with low population density meant 
that land was used intermittently, and, in line with Boserupian theory, there was little economic 
incentive to improve the agricultural productivity of a plot and/or adopt technology that would 
                                                   
2 P. Shipton and M. Goheen, ‘Understanding African land-holding: Power, wealth, and meaning’, Journal 
of the International African Institute 62 (1992) 307-25, 308.  
3 See. e.g. S. Moyo, ‘The land question in southern Africa: a comparative review’, in: L. Ntsebeza and R. 
Hall (eds.), The land question in South Africa. The challenge of transformation and redistribution (Cape 
Town 2007) 60-86 and S. Berry, ‘Debating the land question in Africa’, Comparative Studies in Society 
and History 44 (2002) 638-68.  
4 Newsweek, ‘Mugabe threatens ‘Gukurahundi’’, via https://www.newsday.co.zw/2016/06/10/mugabe-
threatens-gukurahundi/; All Africa, ‘Land in Africa: property rights needed’, June 3, 2016 via 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201606070002.html; The Herald, ‘Land rights for Zim women, May 25, 2016 
via http://www.herald.co.zw/land-rights-for-zim-women/ all accessed on 10-6-2016. These articles are 
just a fraction of the total amount of recent publications dealing with land in Africa, illustrating how to 
this day land rights continue to dominate the public debate.  
5 This conclusion is rooted in a vast amount of literature. See e.g. W.A. Lewis, Report on industrialisation 
and the Gold Coast (Accra 1953) 3, where the observation is made that “there is an abundance of land, 
and an acute shortage of labour”. 
6 The factor endowment model has also been studied extensively in other areas of the world, see e.g. 
S.L. Engerman and K.L. Sokoloff, ‘Factor endowments, institutions, and differential paths of growth 
among new world economies’, in: S.H. Haber, How Latin America fell behind. Essays on the economic 
history of Brazil and Mexico, 1800-1914 (Stanford 1997) 260-306 and E. Frankema, ‘The colonial roots of 
land inequality: geography, f actor endowments, or institutions?’, Economic history review 63 (2010) 418-
51 for Latin America   
7 J. Herbst, States and power in Africa. Comparative lessons in authority and control (Princeton 2000) 
38. 
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support that cause.8 Ecological and climatic circumstances ensured dependency on rain-fed 
agriculture, which further discouraged investment in a specific piece of territory9, let alone 
legally appropriating it to an individual holder. Pre-colonial African people are described as 
migratory, in some cases pastoralist, and it is argued their societies are better understood 
through patterns of mobility rather than settlement.10 Besides the economic incentive for 
mobility, the large amounts of open land and the absence of incentives to invest in or even 
demarcate tracts of land made it easier for people to escape than to fight possible rulers. The 
elusive nature of people ensured that the control of labour became a powerful topic in politics. 
Hence, according to this “land-surplus, labour-scarcity” analysis11, the demographic situation of 
low population density, in combination with ecological circumstances that support migratory 
agriculture and pastoralism, a socio-economic system arose based on wealth-in-people12 and 
a precarious political context where open land frontiers enabled people to vote with their 
feet.13 How come, when regarding the allegedly superficial role land has played in the pre-
colonial development of African economies, it is today of paramount interest? Motivated to 
understand the complexity of problems surrounding land in present-day Africa, this thesis is 
concerned with that transformation, and more precisely, with the historical construction of land 
ownership in three former British colonies. 
1.1 Theoretical framework  
The development in land-abundant, labour-scare Africa contrasts enormously with other parts 
of the world, such as Europe or South-East Asia. In Europe, for example, a lack of land meant 
difficulty to accommodate dense populations. Here, landownership became a determining 
factor in the way nation-states came to define and develop themselves. High population 
density and systems of intensive agriculture led to a solid institutionalisation of tenure and 
property rights to land. 14 This agricultural revolution and the onset of a commercialised society 
have been extensively studied by economic historians. What were the social factors that 
brought about the major economic transformations and eventually capitalism? For Europe, 
several explanations have been offered – people, land and their interaction play an important 
role in all of them. Postan saw a causal relationship between the way people related to land 
and population pressure: “Behind most economic trends in the middle ages, above all behind 
the advancing and retreating land settlement, it is possible to discern the inexorable effects of 
                                                   
8 E. Boserup, The conditions of agricultural growth. The economics of agrarian change under population 
pressure (New Brunswick 1965).  
9 Herbst, States and power in Africa, 38.  
10 J. Guyer,  Money matters: instability, values and social payments in the modern history of West African 
communities (Chicago 1995) 144.  
11 G. Austin, ‘Resources, techniques, and strategies south of the Sahara: Revising the factor endowments 
perspective on African economic development, 1500-2000’, The Economic History Review 61 (2008) 
587-624, 589.  
12Wealth-in-people is a concept elaborately analysed by Jane Guyer, see  J.I. Guyer, ‘Wealth in people, 
wealth in things – Introduction’, Journal of African History 36 (1995) 83-90, 84. Here, she explains: 
“Wealth embodied in rights in people lies close to the center of African economic and social history 
over the past five hundred years: in the slave trades on the one hand and in political and kinship history 
on the other. The concept of wealth-in-people, as a specifically African mode of accumulation, was 
developed to apply to this perception.” 
13 Herbst, States and power in Africa, 39.  
14 The whole concept of the nation-state (as defined by Weber) relies on the territorial demarcation of 
land. M. Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in sociology (Abingdon 2009 [1946]) 171-9.  
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rising and declining population” 15 . This is a neo-Malthusian viewpoint, focusing on the 
relationship between population and agrarian resources. According to this theoretical 
framework, population growth and decline are impacted by production-determining factors, 
such as soil condition, size of cultivated acreage and agricultural techniques. 16  Another 
important contribution in the debate about what drove economic growth in Europe came from 
Robert Brenner. In two ground-breaking essays (1976, 1982) he stated that demographic 
shocks were absorbed and refracted differently by every society. He based his thesis on a 
comparative study between England and France, where different systems of lordship were in 
place and, consequently, the paths to agricultural development were substantially divergent. 
Rather than population numbers, Brenner insisted that the balances of class forces and 
property structures caused societies to change from a feudal system, to a capitalist one.17 
Property relations play a significant role in two other explanatory frameworks. In line with 
Adam Smith’s commercialisation theory18, scholars such as Douglas North and Hernando de 
Soto defend the stance that enhanced protection of private property rights creates an 
incentive for profitable activity and, in turn, sustains long-term economic growth.19 Another 
defining historical interpretation is offered by Marx, who saw that, through enclosure, 
landlords were able to grant themselves the ownership of the peoples land. This went hand in 
hand with the abolition of communal property rights (decline of the peasantry) to land in the 
15th and 16th century, and ensured a pool of labour to fuel the industrial revolution (rise of the 
proletariat).20 Hence, the ownership of land is key in all these explanations for the various 
routes and speeds by which different European regions adopted capitalist forms of agricultural 
organisation. Whether one adopts a neo-Malthusian, Smithian or Marxist point of view, the 
relationship between people and the land they inhabit is crucial in shaping Western European 
societies and economies. Bas van Bavel tracks the relationship between ‘real’ factors, such as 
demography and availability of land, and social factors, such as systems of tenure and 
property, all the way back to when the first people permanently settled in an area. What 
ecological conditions did they face? What was the ratio between people and the amount of 
agricultural land? And how did they accommodate these challenges into their societies? In a 
study on the Low Countries (1300-1600) van Bavel found that ownership of the land (defined 
as the strongest right to the land as appears from the right to sell it or pass it on to an heir) 
varied sharply from region to region.21 The higher the peasants’ share of land, the higher the 
population density in an area. A firm hold on the land meant partible inheritance, whereby 
peasants divided their property equally among their children. This resulted in smaller farm 
plots compared with areas with scarcer population, where accumulation of land made for large 
                                                   
15 M.M. Postan, Medieval economy and society: an economic history of Britain in the Middle Ages 
(Berkeley 1972) 72.  
16 B.J.P. van Bavel, ‘People and land: rural population and poverty structures in the Low Countries, c. 
1300-c. 1600’, Continuity and Change 17 (2002) 9-37, 10.  
17 R. Brenner, ‘Agrarian class structure and economic development in pre-industrial Europe’, Past and 
Present 70 (1976) 30-75 and R. Brenner, ‘The agrarian roots of European capitalism’, Past and Present 
97 (1982) 16-113, 16-17.  
18 J. Hatcher and M. Bailey, Modeling the Middle Ages. The history and theory of England’s economic 
development (Oxford 2001) 158.  
19 H. de Soto, The mystery of capital. Why capitalism triumphs in the West and fails everywhere else 
(London 2000) and D.C. North, Structure and Change in economic history (London 1981).  
20 K. Marx, Capital: a critique of political economy vol. I (2015 [1859]).  
21 Van Bavel, ‘People and land’, 15.  
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landholdings. This pattern of inheritance ensured access to land for all family members, 
securing subsistence and paving the way for early marriage. In turn, this led to a continuation 
of population growth or at least stability, ensuing pressure on the land.  Van Bavel thus found 
that population pressure and systems of tenure are intricately related: the denser the 
population, the stronger the rights to land. 
1.2 Thesis Question  
So far, two points have been made: 1) today, agricultural land in Africa is scarce and its 
ownership contested by its growing population whilst it used to be abundant  and 2) according 
to scholars who have studied the historical development of societies, the ratio between 
people and land matter for the development of property rights. Most of the insights that fuel 
this theoretical framework are however inspired by a European context, whilst little has been 
written with regards to the historical development of property rights to land in Africa. How did 
the role of land transform over the years into the role it has now, and does the literature on the 
distribution of factor endowments offer a satisfying explanation for this?   
  There is a case that can offer insight into these questions. In 1888, Cecil Rhodes and 
his British South Africa Company (BSAC) obtained the rights to exploit minerals in the Zambezi 
Delta. In 1891 the present-day Malawi became the British Central Africa Protectorate, and in 
1911 Zambia and Zimbabwe were united as Rhodesia. This combined territory was subject to 
the BSAC, until its deficit in 1923.22 The British government took control of these territories, 
then known as Nyasaland and (Northern and Southern) Rhodesia. In 1953, they were merged 
into the Central African Federation (CAF), only to separate again in 1964, with the onset of 
Zambian independence.23 In all, the countries that today are Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi, 
have had a similar colonial experience. Hence, the incipient state of affairs is comparable. Yet, 
the different territories display significant differences in the demographic make-up. Zambia is 
the least densely populated, Zimbabwe a little denser, and Nyasaland is known for a relatively 
dense population. By 1950, roughly a decade before independence for these nations the 
number of people per square mile was 3,15, 7,06 and 29,8 respectively.24 Has this variation 
affected the development of property rights and land ownership? If so, that would correspond 
with the theories that were previously elucidated to illustrate the European example. 
Comparing these three colonies, and their experiences before, during and after colonialism 
could outline which factors account for divergent development of land rights up to the present 
situation. The research question of this thesis therefore is:  
How has population density influenced the development of property rights to land in Zambia, Zimbabwe and 
Malawi, 1923-2013? 
This question will not only test the assertion that dense population leads to the 
institutionalisation of stronger, individual property rights to land (as seen in the European 
                                                   
22 J.S. Galbraith, Crown and Charter. The early years of the British South Africa Company (London 1974) 
312.  
23 R. Hyam, ‘The geopolitical origins of the Central African Federation: Britain, Rhodesia and South 
Africa, 1948-1953’, The Historical Journal 30 (1987) 142-72, 168 and L.J. Butler, ‘Britain, the United States, 
and the demise of the Central African Federation, 1959-63’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth 
History 28 (2000) 131-51, 146.  
24 Compared to 286,27 for the Netherlands and 206,91 for the UK (1950). Data from 
https://www.gapminder.org/data/ accessed on 25-2-2016.  
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example), but will also elucidate the development of a contested land market. Also, taking into 
account population growth, it should mean the denser the population gets, the stronger 
property rights to land are defined. In order to illustrate the divergences in total population 
numbers and, most importantly, the stark differences in population density between the three 
territories from 1923 until 2013, see graph 1 and 2. Adhering to the theoretical considerations 
earlier proposed, one should expect the strongest rights to land to have developed in Malawi, 
and the weakest in Zambia. This thesis will evaluate that hypothesis.  
Graph 1. Total population in Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi 1923-201325 
 
                                                   
25 http://www.maseda.mw/censusinfomw/; https://ourworldindata.org/world-population-growth/;  
https://www.gapminder.org/data/ (all accessed on 30-1-2016) and J.W. Gregory and E. Mandala, 
‘Dimensions of conflict: emigrant labor from colonial Malawi and Zambia, 1900-1945’, in: D.D. Cordell 
and J.W. Gregory, African population and capitalism: historical perspectives (Boulder 1987) 221-40; 221, 
232; The National Archives (TNA), Public Records Office (PRO) Kew, London, United Kingdom, 
Dominions Office (DO) 35/1169, Report of the commission to enquire into the conditions prevailing, etc., 
in the pasturage of the colony (1943).  For some years, most notably pre-1923 Zimbabwe, no reliable 
data could be found. For the pre-war period, there is a notable discrepancy between colonial sources 
and contemporary databases, with colonial sources structurally reporting a lower population – a 
strategy serving political purposes (see chapter 5). Hence, for the early years colonial sources are 
mostly adjusted with a regression taken from more reliable sources, combining data from the World 
Bank, CIA and the United Nations.  
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Graph 2. Population density in Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi 1923-201326 
 
	   	  
                                                   
26 For country sizes in square kilometers (used to calculate population density):  
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_sovereign_states_and_dependencies_by_area accessed 30-1-
2016.  
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1.3. Thesis structure    
This research departs from the moment the BSAC retreated and the three territories became 
subjects to the British Crown: 1923. In order to understand the situation of land distribution 
and ownership before this date, the incipient state of affairs, the first chapter will provide an 
overview of the developments that led up to the colonisation of Zambia, Malawi and 
Zimbabwe and describe the terms and conditions on which land was held in pre-colonial times. 
Subsequently, the three countries will be considered separately. How did land rights evolve in 
Zambia, Malawi and Zimbabwe? Zambia and Malawi will be analysed first, after which 
Zimbabwe is a case that neither poses an extremely low or high population density, like 
Zambia and Malawi (respectively) do. It functions, thus, as a case wherein the effects of 
population density are mitigated: a 'test' case that can either prove or disprove the influence 
of population concentration on the establishment of land rights. Change and continuity will be 
tracked using archival sources and data obtained from The National Archives (TNA) in Kew, 
London, giving insight into the representation of the physical situation (such as population 
numbers and distribution and land allocation) and legal decision-making processes which 
impacted the division and appropriation of land and distribution of population. The latter will 
be tracked through legal documentation, including amendments to laws, and the 
correspondence concerning land policy between the authorities in the colonial and the 
Dominions Office (DO) and/or Colonial Office (CO). Furthermore, this research will be framed 
by academic literature and research on the historical development land rights, ultimately 
leading to a thorough overview of rights to land, and how they came into being.     
1.4 A right to land? 
In order to understand the development of land rights in African during the colonial era and 
beyond, it is imminent to have an understanding of what it means to hold a ‘right’ to land. In 
this section, the meaning of having ‘right to land’ (as referred to in this research) will be 
defined, as well as the different interpretations of the tenure27 systems dealt with in this thesis 
(European and African).  In a study on land tenure reform and rural livelihoods in Southern 
Africa, Adams et al. define land rights as follows:  
 ● rights to occupy a homestead, to use land for annual and perennial crops, to make permanent 
improvements, to bury the dead, and to have access for gathering fuel, poles, wild fruit, 
thatching grass, minerals, etc.;   
● rights to transact, give, mortgage, lease, rent and bequeath areas of exclusive use;  
● rights to exclude others from the above-listed rights, at community and/or individual 
levels; and   
● linked to the above, rights to enforcement of legal and administrative provisions in order 
to protect the rights holder.28   
The system of land tenure is usually analysed in terms of the distribution of rights in land. The 
idea of property is compared to a “bundle of sticks”: not one unitary asset, but an assemblage 
                                                   
27 Tenure is defined as “the terms and conditions on which land is held, used and transacted”. It thus 
relates to the adjustment of the terms of contracts between land owners and tenants, as well as the 
conversion of informal tenancy to formal property rights. M. Adams, S. Sibanda and S. Turner, ‘Land 
tenure reform and rural livelihoods in Southern Africa’, Natural resource perspectives 39 (1999) 1-15, 2.  
28 Ibid., 3.  
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of different, interrelated rights that can be accessed and applied on different occasions.29 
  
  Studying the process of how such property rights develop, it is asserted that dense 
population and scarcity of arable land has led to exclusive, transferrable, alienable, and 
enforceable private property rights to land: a factor endowment which becomes scarcer as 
population grows. 30  Theorists of the so-called property rights school developed an 
‘evolutionary theory of land rights’ (ETLR), asserting that with population pressure and 
commercialisation, individualisation occurs autonomously.31  Platteau elaborates:  
As long a land is abundant, the absence of property rights with their standards attribute of 
exclusivity and free transferability does not have damaging consequences (...) However, 
when there is growing competition for the use of land as a result of population growth 
and/or growth in product demand, communal ownership becomes unstable and produces 
harmful effects in the form of mismanagement and/or overexploitation of the now valuable 
resource (...) Therefore, when the gains of internalization become larger than the cost – 
due to an increase in the value of land and/or a reduction in measurement or enforcement 
costs – economic efficiency justifies the replacement of communal by private ownership 
rights.32  
Hence, this school of thought alleges there is a linear, teleological development of rights: 
when population pressure rises, land becomes valuable and private proprietary rights emerge. 
In the absence of population pressure, the colonialists encountered a land tenure system in 
Africa that was alien to them:  
Where there is no pressure on the land, i.e. when it is as free as air and water, there is 
obviously no more market for it then there is for air and water. It is, therefore, true as a fact 
to say that “there is not sale of land”, just as there was no sale of land among the early 
Britons, but it is obviously questionable to say that “the sale of land is forbidden” for this 
would presume a custom for the expression of formulation of which no opportunity has yet 
arisen.33 
Early British encounters with African systems of land rights gave rise to the notion that 
Africans guarded their land communally; hence the term ‘communal’ land ownership. The 
abundance of land had created no incentives for private property rights to emerge. A report 
written to “save time and avoid misunderstandings” by the CO’s land tenure specialist S. 
Brown Simpsons in 1954 illustrates how the colonial government viewed land rights  in Africa:  
                                                   
29 TNA, Colonial Office (CO) 955/50. European land tenure in Africa.  
30 G. Feder and D. Feeny, ‘Land tenure and property rights: Theory and implications for development 
theory’, The World Bank Economic Review 5 (1991) 135-53, 135. The development of private property 
rights in land product of centuries of economic, social, political and legal change which cannot be 
entirely or adequately reproduced here. See e.g. North, Structure and change in economic history.  
31 S.E. Migot-Adholla, F. Place and W. Olusch-Kosura, ‘Security of tenure and land productivity in Kenya’, 
in: J. Bruce and S.E. Migot-Adholla (eds.) Searching for land tenure security in Africa (Dubuque 1994) 119-
40.   
32 J.P. Platteau, ‘The evolutionary theory of land rights as applied to sub-Saharan Africa: A critical 
assessment’, Development and Change 27 (1996) 29-86, 31.  
33 CO 955/50, 4.  
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In the earliest stage the land and its produce is shared by the community as a whole; later 
the produce is the property of the family or individuals by whose toil it is won, and the 
control of the land become vested in the head of the family. When the tribal stage is 
reached, the control passes to the chief, who allots unoccupied lands at will, but is not 
justified in dispossessing any person or family who is using the land. Later still when the 
pressure of population has given to the land an exchange value, the conception of 
proprietary rights emerges, and sale, mortgage, and lease of the land, apart from its user, is 
recognized. These processes of natural evolution, leading up to individual ownership, may, 
I believe, be traced in every civilization known to history.34 
Kandaŵire observes that in much of ‘traditional’ Africa35 land rights are not normally vested in 
individual persons but in the group to which these individuals belong. Apart from this, there is 
the right to use land in perpetuity, yet this right is vested in individual persons within the group. 
It is relevant to note the “unifying contradiction” in the distribution of land rights in much of 
Africa: “The contradiction lies in the fact that the ideology of Africans generally stresses the 
supremacy of the group over its individual members, and yet these individuals possess pieces 
of land for as long as they identify themselves with the group”36. Hence, at the level of facts it 
seems as if individuals own land, while at the “level of ideas” it is the group that owns land.  
  
  In this way, the bundle of rights is shared yet held by all the people, with community 
leaders as co-owners, “who have the additional status of trustees over land whose disposal 
they control for the benefit of all members”37. This puts African leaders in a distinctly different 
economic position from an individual European owning land in a colony.38 Gordon, studying 
Zambia, confirms access and ownership of land to be rooted in networks of hierarchy and/or 
economic obligation.  He states that "… African lineage societies, which invested in social 
relationships and had complex transactions dealing with rights-in-people, negotiated rights to 
the land and other resources through earth priests, often the heads of clans, who were 
actually known as 'guardians' or 'owners of the land'"39.  
  As opposed to the European concept of individual ownership of a plot of land, with all 
the rights that come with it, African systems embedded land rights into networks of hierarchy, 
where economic, cultural and religious aspects interlocked. A last observation, for Zimbabwe, 
from Holleman substantiates the concept of communal land ownership:  
The village as a collective unit has a right to the collectivity of fields under actual cultivation. 
This right is controlled by the headman and his capacity as representative of the village 
community. But the individual members and sub-units of this community are entitled to the 
undisturbed use of their individual shares in the collective property, as long as they retain their 
                                                   
34 Ibid., 2.  
35 The author here refers to traditional tenure systems found in Malawi.  
36 J.A.K. Kandaŵire, ‘Thangata in pre-colonial and colonial systems of land tenure in Southern Malawi 
with special reference to Chingale’, Journal of the International African Institute 47 (1977) 185-91, 186.  
37 Ibid., 186.  
38 J.E. Casely Hayford, The truth about the West African land question (New York 1971) 39.  
39 In Bemba: umwine wa mpanga. D.M. Gordon, Nachituti's Gift. Economy, society, and environment in 
Central Africa (London 2006) 10.  
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membership of the village and the village itself remains in a position to exercise its right to its 
cultivation area.40  
This research is ultimately a reproduction of how the European system of individual land 
ownership and the elaborate African structures of tenure, where access and use of land were 
dependent upon group membership, interacted and transformed under demographic change.  
1.5 Relevance  
The relevance of this thesis question cannot be emphasised enough. The grand question in 
economic history, namely why some countries are rich whilst others are not, has made 
academics ardent about finding elements that fuel long-term economic growth. The quest to 
understand global variances, a pursuit that ultimately culminates in the Great Divergence- 
debate41, has largely omitted Africa from its orbit. A lack of reliable data providing insight into 
population and economic proxies such as GDP per capita over the long run are absent, or at 
most ‘guesstimates’, for pre-modern and modern times. Any attempt to contribute any 
information on the development of explanatory factors for growth, such as demography and 
population, can therefore contribute to filling the hiatus of Africa in the debate on the Great 
Divergence.   
  Moreover, a large and very quick shift from low population density to high population 
growth over the past century and a half have exacerbated the strain on land in Africa42, 
making land ownership and distribution an increasingly political issue in contemporary African 
affairs. Tenure reform is an on-going and contested debate, and social scientists recognise it  
to be of key concern to the world’s poorest peoples.43 Rapid population growth, whereby by 
the end of this century 40 per cent of all humans will be African44, further exacerbates the 
strain on land in sub-Saharan Africa. The ‘land question’ will therefore remain urgent in the 
foreseeable future, and insight into the historical development of current structures valuable 
to academic and policy debates on land reform in an era of increased pressure on land must 
be sought, analysed and be made available.   
  Furthermore, there seems to be no translation between a rise in GDP and a decrease 
in Gini-coefficient. This discrepancy is one of the biggest questions economists today face 
when studying economic development in Africa. 45  Africa namely herewith contests the 
virtuous connection between demographics and social uplift, challenging the notion that 
economic progress is not a universal process that will happen in similar ways across space 
and time.  Systems of ownership no doubt contribute to the division of wealth in nations that 
display an increase in inequality and lack of consistent economic progress, and an 
understanding of historical development of structures of ownership therefore contributes to 
                                                   
40 J.F. Holleman, Shona customary law. With reference to kinship, marriage, the family and the estates 
(London 1952) 7. 
41 Term first introduced by Samuel Huntington to describe the divergence between industrialised and 
non-industrialised nations in the nineteenth century, further explored by Kenneth  Pomeranz in K. 
Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Europe and the making of the modern world economy 
(Princeton 2000).  
42 E. Green, ‘The political demography of conflict in modern Africa’, Civil Wars 14 (2012) 477-498, 477.  
43 Gordon, Nachituti's Gift, 4.  
44 UNICEF Generation 2030 Africa: http://data.unicef.org/gen2030/ accessed 25-2-2016.  
45 M.O. Odedokun and J.I. Round, ‘Determinants of income inequality and its effects on economic 
growth. Evidence from African countries’, Discussion paper no. 2001/13 for UNU/WIDER.  
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pressing issues such as a stagnant or even rising inequality in societies that experience 
population growth. The right to land is all the more fundamental in societies where a large 
proportion of the population depends on agriculture. The different European and African 
circumstances which gave rise to such systems were legally diametrically opposed, and their 
mutual exclusivities, through colonialism, contributed to a clash in economic and social values. 
The uncomfortable status quo that ensued from negotiating these differences reverberates to 
this day.  Indeed, the ownership of land is an important, if not the most important, issue in the 
strained balancing of powers in Zimbabwe right now.   
  
Even though it remains unclear what one can expect from the effect of population growth in 
Africa, it is apparent that these developments have and will continue to have a profound 
impact on the relationship between people and the land they inhabit. In order to understand 
the particularities that influence such a historical process, it is fundamental to understand the 
factors that shape the social and economic dynamics that uniquely characterise time and 
place. This thesis aims to contribute to that understanding.  
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1.  THE INCIPIENT STATES 
 
“Buy land? You cannot buy land.  You cannot buy the rain, the wind, the sunshine.   
These things are for everyone.” 
Ndebele King Lobengula's response to Cecil Rhodes' request (via John Moffat) 
In order to understand the development of land rights after 1923, it is crucial to understand the 
incipient state of affairs. What systems of property rights were already in place? How did 
people relate to the land they inhabited, mined, farmed, or explored? What belonged to whom, 
and how were these patterns of ownership constructed? This chapter gives insight into the 
dynamics of the land market before the Europeans came and the changes after the first 
encounters between Europeans and Africans. 
Land was a prime factor in the definition of relations between African and settler46 populations. 
They held clashing views about ownership and land rights, which gave rise to a shattered 
landscape of interests and, in turn, strongly contributed to the socio-economic developments 
in the area that would become Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi. The case of Southern 
Rhodesia predominantly features in this chapter because there the process of land alienation 
(the appropriation by colonial powers of land owned by indigenous communities and 
administered according to their customs) was most active and remarkable. The general 
dynamics of the development of property rights to land will be described in this context - with 
attention to the particularities in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. 
 The early history of Rhodesia and Nyasaland is essentially the story of the British South Africa 
Company (hereafter BSAC). This private company, brought into Rhodesia by empire-
entrepreneur Cecil Rhodes, actively initiated a land hunt to acquire mineral rights. Adventures 
(and later settlers) were drawn to the promising yet empty lands north of the Limpopo River 
with grand promises of mineral wealth, and soon after the first explorations, European 
settlements arose.47  But life was hard, and gold hard to find. A protracted struggle for the 
ownership of mineral and land rights ensued between the BSAC, settlers pursuing other ways 
than mining to subsist, and the African population. Just before the turn of the twentieth 
century, a contested history of land began.48  
2.1 Ecology 
A study of tenure in a rural economy cannot be separated from its environmental context. 
Generally speaking, economic studies tend to neglect the relationship between economy and 
ecology; either downplaying or ignoring how humans participate in their natural environment, 
or failing to illustrate how the environmental context shapes human economies.49 Availability 
                                                   
46 Here I refer to settlers as Europeans that came to the regions discussed in this thesis with the 
purpose to stay. For more on the political meaning of the term ‘settler’, see M. Mamdani, ‘Beyond settler 
and native as political identities: Overcoming the political legacy of colonialism’, Comparative Studies in 
Society and History 43 (2001) 651-64.  
47 C. Black, The lands and peoples of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (London 1961) 11.  
48 L.H. Gann, The birth of a plural society: The development of Northern Rhodesia under the British 
South Africa Company, 1894-1914 (Manchester 1958) 115-50.  
49 D. Gordon, Nachichuti’s gift. Economy, society, and environment in Central Africa (London 2006) 5. 
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and fertility of soils, rainfall, erosion and mineral wealth are just a few (literal) 'ground' factors 
that contribute to the outcome of agricultural production, development of technologies, nature 
of settlement and systems of tenure.50  
  The entire area of the three nations with which this study is concerned lies within the 
tropics, extending about 1600 kilometres from north to south. Most of it is at an altitude of 
more than 1000 metres above sea level.51 Consequently, the climate is mild for many months 
in the year. Summer includes the wet months: November to April. During this period, rain 
averages between 0,5 and 1,5 metres a year, depending on the nature of the country. In the 
lower lying areas of Zimbabwe rainfall may be as slight as 40 centimetres a year, but on and 
around the Mlanje mountains in Nyasaland – the highest mountains in the territory – the 
annual total goes up to 2,5 metres. Covering more than 780.000 square kilometres52, the total 
territory of Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi is larger than the whole of the British Isles, France, 
Germany and Holland combined. An illustration of how ecological, environmental 
circumstances gave rise a specifically adapted rural economy is the citemene system in 
Northern Zambia. This agricultural system, comparable to slash-and-burn techniques, was an 
answer to soil poverty in the area. Citemene consisted of lopping trees, piling and burning the 
loppings, and sowing the main grain crop in the ashes. This system allowed the cultivation of 
soils that are otherwise unfit for use, and enabled the population to profit from reasonable 
certainty of good yields.53   
2.2 Venturing north: pre-colonial Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi  
Prior to the arrival of the Europeans the geographic area in question fell under the aegis of 
pre-colonial kingdoms: the Maravi to the north of the Lower Zambezi and today’s southern 
Malawi,54 the Monomatapa in eastern and southern Zimbabwe55, the Lozi in Barotseland, 
western Zambia56 and the Mashona and later Ndebele57 in western Zimbabwe.58  The people 
who occupied the land had mostly been, up until the relatively recent arrival of the European, 
nomadic groups who occupied land until they recognised it was time – mostly due to the 
slash-and-burn techniques they used for agriculture  – to move on. The population in this area 
had been severely depleted by the slave trading, which was still prevalent in the area around 
1800.59 Therefore, in this section, a concise history of the pre-colonial situation and the first 
                                                   
50 Much has been written about the relationship between economy and ecology. See e.g. S.L. 
Engerman and K.L. Sokoloff, ‘Factor endowments, institutions and different paths of growth among New 
World economies’, in S. Haber (ed.), How Latin America fell behind (Stanford 1997) 260-304 and G. 
Austin, ‘Resources, techniques, and strategies south of the Sahara: Revising the factor endowments 
perspective on African economic development, 1500-2000’, The Economic History Review 61 (2008) 
587-624.   
51 Barclays Bank D.C.O. Zambia. An economic survey (Lusaka 1968) 3.  
52 Black, The lands and peoples of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 21.  
53 S. M. Makings, Agricultural Chang ein Northern Rhodesia/Zambia. 1945-1965 (Stanford 1966) 201-2.  
54 M.D.D. Newitt, ‘The early history of the Maravi’, The Journal of African History 23 (1982) 145-62,  
145-51.  
55 A. S. Chigwedere, From Mutapa to Rhodes: 1000 to 1890 A.D. (London 1980) 45.  
56 J. Indakwa, Expansion of British rule in the interior of Central Africa: 1890-1924. A study of British 
Imperial expansion into Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi (Washington 1977) 5-24.  
57 Also referred to as Matabele. 
58 H.W.J. Sonius, Rhodesia. Een dilemma van ras en grond (Leiden 1966) 32.  
59 Gann, The birth of a plural society, 66-72; N.H. Pollock, Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia – corridor 
to the North (Pittsburgh 1971).  
14 
 
decades of European  activity and its impact on land rights in Malawi, Zimbabwe and Zambia 
is described below in order to set the point of departure for this thesis.    
2.2.1 The Portuguese, Livingstone and Rhodes  
The Portuguese arrived in Mozambique in the late 15th century and although they had a sense 
of land ownership themselves, they did not expand and settle much into the areas this thesis 
is concerned with. The occasional trader, prospector, explorer or missionary may have passed 
through, but left the people virtually free of any attempt at colonisation. In the early 1800s, the 
successors of the Monomatapa Empire, the Rozwi, drove a few encroaching Portuguese 
settlers out of the area of today’s north-eastern Zimbabwe.60  
  Travelling up from the south and into this same area came David Livingstone (1813-
1873) who, horrified by the conditions he found there (mostly connected with slavery), felt that 
the people who inhabited the territories through which he was passing would benefit from his 
‘three Cs’: Civilisation, Commerce and Christianity – an all-encompassing social, cultural and 
economic endeavour which included the termination of the slave trade.61 He felt that, with all 
the empty space he saw, colonisation by a few groups of hard working Europeans (Scots in his 
view) would soon get the place up on its feet and functioning properly. Several missionary 
stations were instituted in the fertile area that is now Malawi.62    
  However, in the south of the continent, the expansion of European (or white) farmers 
into the land perceived to be relatively free of occupation (such as the Orange Free State and 
the Transvaal) drew people northwards into the area beyond the Cape (which was South 
Africa for all intents and purposes.) A lot of these early trekkers had been farmers in this area. 
At the same time (around 1885), Britain was trying to bring some political stability to the area 
and was negotiating with various chiefs who, with their people, were settled throughout the 
area. Cecil Rhodes, using his wealth and position, began to encourage British-oriented groups 
northwards and in doing so cut off the initial, farming-oriented voyagers from their expansions. 
His vision was to bring much of South, Central, East and North Africa under British control or 
influence. And with this in mind, he pushed through Botswana (then known as Bechuanaland), 
and into the land north of the Limpopo – a territory he named Rhodesia.   
  It is estimated that the indigenous population of Rhodesia at that time was in the 
region less than 300.00063 - not a lot for a country of almost 400.000 square kilometres 
(almost ten times the size of The Netherlands)64. With a population density of 0,75, one can 
understand why the early settlers spoke of the land as being empty.  
2.2.2 Concessions and a Charter  
By negotiation and treaties the BSAC acquired mineral and other rights from African chiefs, 
the most important being those secured from Lobengula, the King of the Ndebele, in 1888, 
and Lewanika, Chief of the Barotse, in 1890. In that same year Cecil Rhodes built up and 
equipped his Pioneer Column in South Africa, picking men from all kinds of professions and 
trades who could, on disbandment, form the nucleus of a new community. 180 men of the 
Pioneer Column and 300 of the 500 members of the BSAC police crossed the Macloutsie 
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river in Botswana on June 27th. Each participant in the expedition was promised the right to 
claim 15 sites where gold could be delved and 3000 morgen65 of farmland66: an attractive 
offer for many. On September 12thof the same year, the column reached its destination and 
named the spot Salisbury (today Harare), and the soldiers became miners.   
  The land Rhodes and his men encountered was divided into Mashonaland (west) and 
Matabeleland (southeast), named after the dominant groups residing in these areas. 
Matabeleland was ruled by the notorious King Lobengula, from whom Rhodes’ agents 
acquired two determining concessions (the Rudd and the Lippert concession), thereby 
trumping all other concession-hunters and establishing a firm grip on the land.67 Rhodes’ 
request for a Royal Charter to give his privately owned company the authority to make treaties 
with African rulers and acquire territory on behalf of the British Empire was granted by Queen 
Victoria on October 29, 1889.68 The British government (erroneously, it would later appear) 
believed a chartered company would be more receptive to imperial control than a body of 
private capitalists, who might bring about diplomatic complications for the government. The 
definition of the charter’s field of operation was left deliberately vague, and comprised “the 
regions of South Africa lying immediately north of British Bechuanaland, and to the north and 
west of the South African Republic and west of the Portuguese dominions.”69 It would ensure 
British control of an area that was still relatively unexplored but nonetheless desired by other 
European powers and reduced the costs of control for the government to next to none.   
  The many privately held concessions were combined, and the British government 
granted the BSAC the right “to acquire by any concession, agreement, grant or treaty, all or 
any rights, interests, authorities, jurisdiction and powers of any kind or nature whatever, 
including powers necessary for the purpose of government and the preservation of public 
order.”70 Moreover, the Chartered Company was given the right “to acquire, cultivate, develop 
and improve any lands within the territories of the Company, and to make grants of land for 
specific periods or in perpetuity, either outright or otherwise.”71 This last clause was based on 
the Rudd concession (1888), assuring “all mineral rights” to the BSAC. The Lippert concession 
(1891) moreover granted the holder the power “to grant, lease or rent land in his [Lobengula’s] 
name”, which meant the company did not only give away mineral rights, but was also able to 
grant remarkable-sized plots of land to colonists and companies. Because there was no limit 
to the amount of acres that could be expropriated, by 1984 large plots of land were held by 
Europeans. The European settlers had little regard for the other clauses in the Company’s 
charter, namely to have “careful regard” for the “ customs and laws” of the “native population”, 
especially concerning the “holding, possession, transfer and disposition of lands and testate 
or intestate succession”72. This meant that the encroachment of European settlers onto African 
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lands continued without much consideration for anyone living on it, leading to a build-up of 
grievances and eventually several rebellions by the black African population.  
The promise of 1.214 hectares (3.000 acres) of land even before setting foot in Rhodesia was a 
threat to African land and the backbone of the Africans’ economic activity. The African method 
of agriculture was based on shifting cultivation, whereby a piece of land would be worked for 
three or four years and then moving to a new plot. The initial land was then left to revert to 
bush while fertility restored. Given the abundance of land and the lack of capital, this method 
is economically sound.73 The individual acquisition of land by the Europeans was foreign to 
customary African law, yet the sequestration became a key element in limiting African 
economic activity while serving the economic and labour interests of the Europeans.74 
2.2.3 Conflicts over land  
For Africans, it was impossible to individually own land and thus their rulers cannot concede 
ownership of land. Rights of ownership resided with the social group at large, and its leader 
was to protect those rights. 75  In negotiations, according to Rhodes’ biographer Gross, 
Lobengula would repeatedly pose the question: “You are sure you are not coming after grass 
and land?”, which would be soothed by Rhodes, who emphasised it was minerals he sought; 
not grass to feed cattle.76 Lobengula only later realised that the Europeans did in fact equate 
rights of exploitation with intricate rights to the ownership of land. The Lippert-concession, 
which gave the BSAC the security to “grant, lease or rent land”, for a period of 100 years, in an 
area later defined as the entire territory of Rhodesia in Lobengula’s name, is a prime example 
of how Rhodes and his allies acquired title by taking advantage of an inherent 
miscommunication between European and African relations to land.77 To the Africans, land 
was land and it did not belong to anyone other than their tribe or family group.78 This gave rise 
to a question that was imminent in many colonial territories: to what extent could the 
colonisers exercise right to the land, occupied or not?  
  The European appropriation of land in Rhodesia and Nyasaland was motivated by an 
economic use of the soil: a driver that directly clashed with the social, cultural, religious 
significance land had to the African population. Their connection to the land was derived from 
magic-religious bonds, going back for generations, and indissolubly connecting communities 
to the land through ancestral kinships. Where land was ample, African cultures had developed 
to appreciate what was valuable to them: the community.79 This clash between the colonisers 
and the African population regarding the economic and legal relationship the two groups had 
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with the land is at the heart of the problem of the apportionment of land. The Europeans 
viewed the communal nature of land use as primitive and traditional, and did not see the need 
to secure rights that were not legally embedded and known through (oral) tradition. The 
primitive and ‘tribal’ African, economically, only needed little land to subsist and, according to 
the second report of the Select Committee on Resettlement of Natives: “[T]he question of 
ownership of land never arose in his [the African] mind; it had never occurred to him that land 
could be owned as a spear was owned. It was something that a man might use if the chief 
agreed, but the right to the use of it could be revoked at any time.”80  
  Nonetheless, there were clear motivations for African chiefs to exchange land for 
protection. Plagued by warfare and traumatised by slave raids, various local chiefs were 
willing to transfer their main asset, land, in exchange for military protection.81In negotiations for 
mineral rights with Lobengula (and other chiefs), Rhodes purposely did not include the right to 
land as one of his demands. Gibbs observes:  
Rhodes and the Company knew well enough that the Rudd Concession gave them no 
power in the land other than to enter it and dig for gold. Lobengula was unlikely to be so 
foolish [as] to give more. Nor had Rhodes been so foolish as to ask for it. Getting what 
Lobengula was prepared to give, he could take the rest without asking.82  
But Lobengula was also playing a dangerous political game, trying to pit the Europeans who 
came hunting for concessions against each other. Rhodes and the German Lippert, for 
example. Lobengula reasoned that if Rhodes had the right to dig for gold, and Lippert the right 
to the land, they would fight and destroy each other, leaving the land for the Ndebele 
people.83 But Rhodes’ BSAC bought the concession for 30.000 pounds and some shares from 
Lippert: as of now, the Company saw itself legally empowered to grant land rights and went 
ahead to do so.84 
2.2.4 The First Chimurenga 
Lobengula’s Ndebele formed a powerful kingdom.85 Their military organisation was a threat to 
the expansionist ambitions of the BSAC, and breaking that military strength was key to its 
(economic) success. A conflict was therefore not shunned; rather, when the British Crown tried 
to mediate between the BSAC and Lobengula, Rhodes explicitly resisted any efforts that 
would harbour peace. Between 1893 and 1894, the first violent clash (First Matabele War) was 
fought, when Lobengula’s forces raided a Mashona village in the district of Fort Victoria – an 
area increasingly under control of the BSAC. Lobengula died shortly after the first war. The 
second Matabele War, or First Chimurenga (uprising), raged from 1896-7, and was a rebellion 
wherein Shona and Ndebele were united in their grievances about the encroachment of 
Europeans on their native land. 86 A British victory however led to the unification of both 
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territories, and in 1898 Mashona- and Matabeleland were united to form Rhodesia. 87  
  In 1893, the European population in Zimbabwe and Zambia combined was 1.226. This 
number increased to 4.863 by 1895. During the Chimurenga many left to go South, and by the 
end of 1896 their numbers had again dropped to 2.737. After 1897 the European population 
steadily increased, and by 1901 it was up to 11.032, to reach 15.000 by 1903. In that same year, 
the African population was estimated at 513.81388: already, a very significant population 
unbalance had established, which started to be reflected not only in the access to resources, 
but also in the division and ownership of land. As the number of settlers increased, their 
dream of an El Dorado evaporated. The promises of gold and mineral wealth proved too 
optimistic and the mining industry suffered from an endemic shortage of labour. The 
disappointing returns of the gold exploration forced the Company to look for other means to 
enhance its meagre returns and cover the costs of administration. The land market and 
agriculture offered an interesting alternative, and developing a profitable agricultural sector 
became a necessity in order to cover the losses suffered by the BSAC.89 The shift to 
agriculture meant that the BSAC’s hunger for land only grew. Land prices were forced up 
through investments in infrastructure (roads, railways, telegraph, energy-supply).90   
For the settler population, the first fifteen years were insecure and tough. Many whites died of 
malaria or hunger; one tenth of the white population was killed during the 1896-7 Chimurenga, 
and the Boer War (1889-1902) crushed any outlook of economic improvement. The small and 
increasingly threatened white community sought security in policies that kept the African 
population at a distance politically, economically and socially: sharing whatever little privilege 
they had acquired was deemed detrimental to the fragile group of settlers.91 This separation 
along lines of race became pivotal in the preservation of the settlers high(er) living standards, 
and was institutionalised through the creation of reserves where the local population, 
alienated from their native land, was to reside.   
2.2.5 Creating Native Reserves 
The instalment of ‘Native Reserves’ seemed to present a ready answer to the European 
problem of economic (in)viability in Rhodesia. In 1900, when taking into consideration their 
relations to land, four classes can be distinguished within the African population. The first lived 
on expropriated land by the settlers: so-called “native locations”, in built-up areas. They lived 
as tenants, and answered to agreements with landlords. The second group lived on 
unalienated land that belonged to the Company. The third were squatters, residing on private 
farms without an agreement. Fourth were those were relocated and lived in the newly created 
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Native Reserves. This last group were the only ones to enjoy any kind of legal tenure 
security.92 Those who lived in agreement with a landlord or on locations signed two-year 
contracts, with the risk of their contract not being renewed. Africans living on Company-land 
were at the mercy of any European with the intention to buy the land they lived on; and 
squatters could be evicted at any time.93 By 1905, 151.503 Africans were living in locations on 
private lands in Zimbabwe, under circumstances of insecure tenure. Labour was reinforced 
through the implementation of hut taxes: a fiscal leverage the population could not pay in any 
other way but through the performance of (wage) labour.94 The restraints of this tax is 
understood when one realises that it took an African about three months to make one pound, 
which was the hut tax levy in 1904.95 In order to guide the labour force to where they were 
most needed, pass regulations were introduced in 1902.96  
  The reserves served two purposes. First, to halt the encroachment of African farmers 
on the (volatile) produce market and second, to set aside the more desirable land for 
Europeans. As late as 1910, when the European agricultural sector was reasonably well 
established, the director of (European) agriculture wrote: “The difficulty of the farmers is not in 
the production but in the assurance of a market at reasonable prices, the demand by mines 
and prospectors for food, meat, potatoes, pumpkins, being of an erratic and unreliable 
character.97”Any measures to secure the position of European farmers in this unstable market, 
hampered by a lack of demand, was therefore more than welcome. The second purpose was 
to ensure a steady supply of labour for industrial and agricultural endeavours. As early as 1900 
J.F. Jones, secretary of the BSAC, reported “a serious situation has lately arisen in Rhodesia 
through the scarcity of native labour which has caused the shutting down of several of the 
most important mines.”98 Restricting the African population to native reserves, and even 
decreasing the size of these reserves over time, would ultimately add to a European 
stronghold of the economy. 99 It all comes down to one rule of thumb: the more land Africans 
had, the more they produced, and therefore the more they could sell. In turn, the more cash 
they would have to pay taxes and hence they would no longer be dependent on wage labour. 
Gann writes:  
The employers’ position worsened when some African villagers started to sell part of their 
crops. The growth of new townships and compounds are the unintended effect of creating 
a small market for African produce; mine-owners, prospectors and even white farmers all 
bought native grain and meat, thereby helping to spoil their own local labour supplies (…) 
Acreage under cultivation increased (…) Employers soon took note: southern Rhodesian 
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natives did not make good workmen, for the high price of grain was spoiling the labour 
market. 100  
The limited supply of labour had its effect on land ownership. Alienating the local population 
from their land, the source of their wealth, made wage labour the only choice for the African 
population to subsist.   
  It must be noted that the reserves were intended to provide secure tenure for the 
African population who, because of European intervention, became alienated from their native 
land. It was argued that Africans were not able to afford to buy land as the Europeans did, the 
reserves were a protective measure to ensure enough land was available for their needs.101 
Yet the ownership of land by Africans was structurally made impossible – regardless of 
whether they did have enough capital to legally buy land. Even the “Cape boys”, Africans and 
Coloureds (those of mixed race) who had helped Europeans suppress the Chimurenga, were 
forced to sell the 3.160 hectares of land they had legally bought.102 In 1904, the BSAC had 
claimed ownership of all the land that was not yet alienated.103 Land ownership became an 
instrument for segregation and preservation of European domination and an integral part of 
the Rhodesian economy.  
2.2.6 A growing population, a growing problem?  
The political and economic importance of the native reserves was growing as quickly as their 
number and size increased. The BSAC instituted a commission to oversee this development, 
and they foresaw that if the African population continued to grow at this rate it would 
eventually “deny the Europeans the right to land.”104 This pitted three parties against one 
another: 1) the settlers, who wanted to reduce the size of the reserves making more land 
available for agricultural purposes and invest the capital raised into the development of 
Rhodesia, 2) the Company, that wanted to raise capital for the shareholders in London rather 
than reinvest it in the mineral-poor Rhodesian soil but was influenced by the British 
Government who wanted to maintain the status quo out of fear for rebellion, and 3) the 
Africans, who through taxation and tenure security were being pushed into the Reserves and 
the least fertile areas of land. In 1913 there were about 60 reserves covering 22 per cent of the 
territory and housing 45 per cent of Africans.105 The 1914 Reserves Commission estimated 
Native Reserves to be 8.794.718 hectares while the Company and settlers controlled over 
28.327.995 hectares.106   
  Over the years, the squatting status of the African population on European 
landholdings proved untenable. In Matabeleland, where the process of land alienation was by 
far the most extensive, there were in 1898 35.000 people living on locations and 27.000 on 
private farms. By 1909, 78.000 were living in the Reserves, 60.000 on the unalienated land of 
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the company and 84.000 in the locations. The African population (and their cattle) was 
growing and their demand for agricultural and pastoral land began to pressure the European 
landholdings. The settlers, the Company and the British government were vigorously looking 
for ways to accommodate the growing population. At the same time, in 1907, the BSAC came 
to terms with the fact that the Rhodesian gold rush was more of an illusion than a reality. As a 
reaction, the company started to sell land, enabling the settlers to gain more political and 
economic leverage. So, while the white community’s political organisation and cohesion grew, 
the African system was disintegrating.  Because of the growing number of tenants in the 
locations the pressure on the farmlands grew. This went hand in hand with a period (1913 
onwards) of intensification of production and an increase of stock, making the Africans (and 
their cattle) who lived on the farmlands as tenants an increasing and major problem for the 
white farmers. One way to deal with this was imposing a grazing fee.107 Measures like these 
forced more and more Africans into the reserves, which grew to hold about 400.000 of the 
total 712.783 African population in southern Rhodesia in 1913.108  
2.2.7 From London to Rhodesia  
The issue of the Reserves was a tense one between London and Rhodesia. In 1918 the judicial 
committee decided that all property rights to the land were no longer the BSAC’s, but “by 
virtue of conquest” belonged to the Crown. The BSACs Charter no longer held right to the 
unalienated land. In order to obtain land ownership, the Lippert Concession was worthless as 
a title deed, and though the document might help to explain how and why the Company 
obtained governmental powers in Zimbabwe, it could not confer land ownership. The 
Company had conquered the country on the Crown's behalf: the Crown sanctioned the 
system of white settlement and native reserves and assumed the right to dispose of all land 
not in private ownership109.In 1920 the BSAC’s decision to decrease the size of the reserves 
with 404.685 hectares (1 million acres) gave rise to protests in the colonial territory, but none 
were to influence the BSAC’s Land Settlement Board to revise their policy.110   
  At the same time, the council had to consider the African case, put forward by the 
Aborigines Protection Society and backed by many missionaries and Ndebele tribesmen. 
Earlier on, before the Great War, the Administration had made sure that Lobengula's legitimate 
heirs could exert no further political influence. The Protection society's plead had little avail in 
British courts, who deemed native ownership of unalienated land was "inherently difficult". The 
Council argued that "some tribes were so low in the social organisation that their usages could 
not be reconciled with the legal institutions of a civilised society"111 - the fact that there were 
indigenous rights in place whose legal concepts approximated those valued by British lawyers 
was ignored, without any consequence. What is sure, is that the system of rights that was 
present before 1893 were diametrically inconsistent with white settlement. Colonisation, 
especially in Rhodesia, had the whole purpose of the forward movement pioneered by the 
Company and controlled by the Crown, with the result that the aboriginal system gave way to 
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another, prescribed by Order in Council. With conquest, sovereignty passed to the Crown, and 
the Crown thereby took over the land rights.112    
  The discrepancy with land ownership was a strong sign of the demise of the BSAC, 
and other (political) options to govern the land formerly administered by Rhodes’ company 
were explored. One was a union with South Africa, but a fear for the fast-growing nationalist 
Afrikaner movement put an end to that. Another was a political union of South and North 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland, as these three territories displayed Europeans and Africans of 
“similar stock” that could effectively complement each other with economic resources. The 
scarcely populated Rhodesia’s depended heavily on the labour supplied by the more densely 
populated Nyasaland. But an amalgamation of this kind was met with resistance from Northern 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland. In their eyes Southern Rhodesia merely wanted to escape the 
belittling supervision from London, and hence a so-called ‘responsible government’ between 
Britain and the settlers was installed on the first of October 1923.113   
  The rule of the BSAC was formally over. The three now separately governed territories 
would however soon realise their intricate (economic) interdependency.    
Map 5: An overview of the political administration of the territories  	  
source:	  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nyasaland#/media/File:Rhodesia_and_Nyasaland.png	  
 2.3 Zambia   
Zambia, historically constructed out of Barotseland (north-west Zambia) and the vast swathe of 
territory between Barotseland and Malawi, also fell under the control of the mineral-hungry 
BSAC. Heavy investment in Matabeleland and Mashonaland (see previous sections) 
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discourages the Company to venture into other areas, leaving the North of the Zambezi 
relatively unexplored. 114  Nonetheless, Company-control over the territory was deemed 
important due to its wealth in copper and as a strategic counterpoise against the territorial 
expansion of other European powers.115 Population densities were low and pressure on the 
land was insignificant. Most white farmers kept to land along the access route in and out of the 
country. Land did not become as huge an issue as in Southern Rhodesia. Settling in Northern 
Rhodesia possessed little advantages over Southern Rhodesia. The land was scarcely 
populated, so the problem of finding labour for any kind of industrial or agricultural investment 
was even more stringent.  Because of sparse settlement there were virtually no markets, bad 
communication, and high railway rates. Yet, the BSAC had a policy of selling land very cheaply. 
Those with little cash thus found their way north. They had no economic means, or knowledge 
(many settlers were inexperienced farmers 116 ) to pursue intensive agriculture, and the 
scattered nature of the settlement made the pooling of resources impossible. The 
inaccessibility had hitherto made it an unattractive place for development,117 but the discovery 
of minerals (copper, ore) more or less revolutionised white settlement. The prospects of 
“enormous development” ensured a growth of white population from a mere 3.634 in 1921 to 
15.000 in 1930, with numbers doubling in the three subsequent years.118 Especially after the 
Anglo-Boer War Zambia attracted an increasing number of white settlers. White settlement 
was concentrated along the railway line, and in the Abercorn and Fort Jameson areas.119   
   For the BSAC, Zambia was mostly valuable as a labour reserve for mining activities in 
Katanga and Zimbabwe. Since it was situated exactly in between both areas, stakes were high, 
but dependent on markets outside the territory. In a similar fashion as in Zimbabwe, the local 
African population was subjected to taxes to be paid in cash, which forced them into wage 
labour. 120 Migration patterns emerged from the Zambian countryside to the mining towns to 
the north and centre of the country. Roberts observes the extent to which the arrival of the 
Europeans and their economic stringencies changed everyday African life: “These migrants [to 
the urban areas] needed cash, and not only to pay tax, but to buy from European store the 
imported household goods which were replacing the cloths and pots and hoes once made 
and bartered in the village”121.   
  There were three areas where extensive farming was undertaken: along the railway 
line in order to serve the mining towns in Congo, in the Abercorn district (now Mbala) in the 
North, and Fort Jameson (now Chipata) in the east. Farmers in Fort Jameson took up tobacco 
farming for export, and the town started to grow into a small society of planters and officials.122 
In 1911, there were 159 holdings in Northern Rhodesia, occupying 3.940 out of 288.809 
hectares of land.123 This number constitutes a mere 1,4 per cent of the available, alienated land. 
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Nonetheless, because of the extensive nature of farming in Northern Rhodesia and the 
relative success some crops had in export, the number of farming immigrants steadily began 
to grow and the European farmers entered into a competition over land with the African 
population. Along the railway especially, many Africans were evicted - either with or without 
compensation.   
  Because land was so plentiful very few stayed to make tenancy agreements with the 
Europeans. Except in the Fort Jameson area: this ground is far more fertile and was already 
densely populated before the Europeans started to farm tobacco and cotton. Here, numbers 
ranging up to 55 people per square kilometre were not uncommon.124  When European 
agriculture started to take off and the stock of cattle grew, white farmers found the native 
slash-and-burn agriculture interfered with their cultivation.125 This, in combination with the 
problem of labour scarcity, led to the creation of reserves in a similar way as described for 
Zimbabwe, from 1913 onwards. Aside from Barotseland, a territory consistently protected from 
European encroachment due to the alleged strength of the Lozi people126, an area of 91.216 
hectares near Chipata was set aside for African settlement.127  
 2.4 Malawi 
The narrow strip of land between Mozambique on the east and south, Tanzania to the north 
and Northern Rhodesia to the west was once the corridor for central African slave trade.128 
Today, it is Malawi: the land of lakes. In Malawi, the population density patterns have been 
different from the two Rhodesia’s described above. Livingstone described the well-populated 
territory, which was previously peaceful but, primarily during the period 1859-63 haunted by 
the slave trade, as “ripe for commercialisation and Christianity”129. Around 1800, the main 
groups, based on matrilineal succession, in southern and central Malawi were the Mang’anja, 
Nyanja and Chewa. Between 1790 and 1860 the Ngoni and Yao (patrilineal societies), moved 
into the northern territory.130 Initially, Britain had little interest in colonising the area, which 
apparently lacked notable mineral wealth – and the other territories were first to pay off 
before new capital injections were to be made. 131 From 1876 onwards, a variety of European 
groups settled in the region; and a number of “European individuals, companies, missionaries, 
traders, hunters and planters acquired land from African chiefs”132. The British declared the 
region its Protectorate in 1891, “its reluctance finally overcome by growing anxiety over 
Portuguese intentions to take over the Highlands, lobbying by the Europeans settled in the 
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territory, and, significantly, Cecil Rhodes’ agreement to contribute money to the cost of 
administration”133. Large areas of land (well over 1 million hectares, totalling some 15 per cent) 
were set aside for European use and turned into plantations. The BSAC acquired around half a 
million hectares of land, generally in the north. Mainly interested in the potential for mineral 
exploitation, most of this land was never developed for agricultural use until eventually being 
leased or sold off by the Crown.    
  Similar to the modus operandi in Zimbabwe and Zambia, ‘land rights’ in Malawi were 
acquired through treaties and agreements with local chiefs. The deals also gave rise to similar 
grievances and misunderstandings: “the Europeans thinking chiefs had absolute rights of land 
ownership, the chiefs thinking Europeans would act like Africans in their land dealings”134. A 
later generation of chiefs explained how their ancestors had negotiated:  
Chief Kadewere of Chiradzulu told a commission of enquiry in 1915 that planters of an 
earlier generation had cultivated the friendship of the chiefs by making presents of cloth 
and other items; then enquiries followed about the chiefs' boundaries. This information was 
later incorporated into the alleged deed of sale which in fact was for no more than a small 
plot of ground for a house or a store. 'When a planter came to the village', said Chief 
Kadewere, 'he asked the chief to sell him a place where he could build his house and that 
is the only plot the chief signed for. The old chiefs say this is what happened'. The 
information was exploited and used for the purposes of laying claim to larger areas than 
those actually demarcated.135 
Nonetheless, in 1902 European settlers’ rights to the land acquired from the indigenous 
communities prior to 1894 were formalised through so-called Certificates of Claim, covering a 
total area of 1,5 million hectares.136 Regardless of the interpretations of those who signed the 
agreements, in practice this meant that the African communities resident in the areas subject 
to the Certificates lost ownership and control of the land.137 It also meant the population could 
be compelled to work on European estates – again enforced through the imposition of hut 
taxes. Since it were the Shire Highlands that had attracted most setters 138 , large-scale 
migrations by people trying to flee the repressive labour regimes began into the southern 
parts of the country.139 Competition over land increased as population rose starkly after 1900; 
between 1902 and 1909 alone, the number of Africans living in the Shire Highlands more than 
doubled from 95.000 to 210.000,140 mostly a result of immigration from Portuguese-ruled 
Mozambique by people fleeing even more repressive regimes.141 Tensions of labour and land 
would continue to rise throughout the decades and culminated in the 1915 Chilembwe uprising, 
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when several white estate-managers were killed.142  
  Similar to the situation in Zimbabwe and Zambia, control over land and labour were 
dominant issues during the early years of colonial history in Malawi. The African population 
was incorporated into the colonial economy as tenants, seasonal wage labourers, food 
producers, or as migrant labourers for plantations and mines in South Africa and Zimbabwe.143 
It was, however, a more diversified economy than in either Rhodesia at this time. Also, 
resistance against oppression was a persistent aspect in Malawi, from an early date onwards. 
The density of the population made land all the more valuable, and people were willing to 
fight for it.   
 2.5 Subconclusion  
This excerpt of history illustrates the most stringent issue in Rhodesia and Nyasaland since 
European settlement: the structural deficiency of labour to fuel the European industrial 
activities. By 1923, different groups with different interests had established themselves: the 
BSAC, British government, the settlers and the African population.  
 The relationship to land during the rule of the BSAC over Rhodesia is characterised by the 
decline in expectations for a grand future in gold-winning activities, forcing a shift to 
agriculture. Consequentially, settlers became more interested in land ownership and 
administration and increased their grip on the land, most and foremost through the creation 
and expansion of ‘reserves’. These reserves not only functioned as a demarcation of land but 
also ensured (and enhanced) the provision of African labour to European agricultural and 
mining enterprises. 144  From 1907 onwards, the immigration of European farmers was 
increasingly promoted.   
  The 1889 Charter had instructed the Company to recognise African customary law, 
under which all land was held in trust by the chief for the entire community. The Company was 
to make sure to “from time to time (...) assign to the natives land sufficient for their occupation 
whether as tribe or portions of tribes, and suitable for the agricultural and pastoral 
requirements including in all cases a fair and equitable proportion of springs or permanent 
water”145, a clause that can be (and was) casually interpreted. “From time to time” turned out to 
be rather often, as Europeans felt increasingly threatened on their newly acquainted land, 
fearful of losing any grip on whatever economic success they had established. The final blow 
came with Milner’s proclamation, which completely disposed Africans of land. “Reserve”, he 
declared, “means land and property of the British South Africa Company set apart for the 
purposes of native settlements exclusively.”146 Alienation of African land, because the land 
was the source of all African economic activity, has been the root cause of the economic, 
political and social problems that have plagued Rhodesia ever since the days of the early 
settlers.147 
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3. ZAMBIA 
 
The first chapter of this thesis closely examines the development of land rights in Zambia. It is 
a case study of the interaction between people and land in a country with a very sparse 
population. Historically, there were little incentives to implement structures of private property 
to land, yet colonial interaction severely changed the way people came to relate to the soil 
they lived on and farmed of. First of all, the factors that set Zambia apart from the other cases 
studied in this thesis will be elucidated: the ecological circumstances, historic systems of 
ownership and colonial destination as agricultural (and later mining) enclave.  The introduction 
of Native Reserves and Native Trust Land will be discussed, along with the development of a 
dual agrarian system, which was designed to maximise European possibilities for production 
and marginalised the black Zambian population, ensuring their dependence on wage labour. 
The first distinctly private property rights to land develop: yet they are attainable for a small 
group within the economy. A case-study (Petauke) is examined to test for divergent 
development in an area that is more densely populated compared to the rest of the Zambian 
territory. It does not render a remarkably different pattern of ownership: one where  small part 
of the population holds firm, private rights to land, while others are denied perpetual security 
of tenure. Post-independence saw settlement schemes, socialism and several Land Acts 
redressing past inequities. This process, combined with population growth, ensures a 
continued battle for rights to land in current Zambia.  
3.1 Creating a nation for cultivation: 1924-1964	  
The density and distribution of population has been, historically, determined by man’s capacity 
to make a living off the land. Hence, rural population patterns reflect a country’s natural 
resources. Zambia is characterised by ecologically different regions: from fertile to arid, and 
different regions, soil types and ecological circumstances create different opportunities for a 
population to sustain themselves.  In Zambia, citemene was practiced in regions of soil 
poverty: a slash-and-burn technique whereby trees were lopped, piled and burned, and the 
main grain sowed in the ashes. In the areas under citemene, which make up about one-fifth of 
Zambia’s total land-surface, population density was only about 4 people per square kilometre 
in 1943148, and has not changed much since (see). Large regions are uninhabited, due to 
infestation of tsetse flies found in the game reserves of Luangwa and western Zambia, or due 
to barren soil, for example found in much of the sand belt west of the upper Zambezi. Rather 
high population densities can be found in fertile parts of the southern and eastern provinces; 
on the upper Zambezi flood plain, on the lower Luapula and around Lake Bangweulu. Here, 
population density can rise to more than 40 people per square kilometre – a tenfold 
compared to the regions first mentioned. In the vast woodlands of the northeast and 
northwest, dominated by miombo woodland149, density ranges between 2 and 10 per square 
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kilometre.150	  Generally,	  the	  distribution	  of	  population	  in	  Zambia	  is	  low,	  and	  dense	  concentrations	  are	  
to	  be	  found	  a	  few	  clusters	  remote	  from	  one	  another,	  such	  as	  Lusaka	  and	  the	  Copperbelt.	  See	  Table	  1:	  	  
Table 1. Population density in Zambian 
Provinces151	  	  
	   Province	   Density	  
(people/km²)	  
1	   Central152	   13.4	  
2	   Copperbelt153	   62.5	  
3	   Eastern	   24.7	  
4	   Luapula	   19	  
5	   Lusaka	   100.4	  
6	   Muchinga	   8.1	  
7	   Northern	   14.2	  
8	   North-­‐Western	   5.6	  
9	   Southern	   18.8	  
10	   Western	   7	  
-­‐	   Δ	   17.3	  
	  
The numbers noted make Zambia the most sparsely populated of the three territories studied 
in this thesis.  Its area is almost double that of Zimbabwe and almost six times that of Malawi, 
but it still has the smallest total population (16,2 million, 2015 estimate154). 65 per cent of this 
population live in rural areas under precarious circumstances. Households typically cultivate 
small plots of land: 82 per cent are small-scale farmers cultivating 5 hectares or less. In 2008, 
1,1 million small-scale farmers held about 1 hectare of land: a small and vulnerable resource of 
wealth when one adds that the majority of livelihoods are based on subsistence farming.155 In 
an agricultural economy like this where the population is extremely vulnerable to food 
insecurity, policy interventions concerning and tenure directly impact the livelihoods of many 
Zambians. This, combined with its remarkably low population densities, makes it an interesting 
case study for this thesis. How did population numbers influence Zambia’s system of laws 
guiding property to land? Historically land has been kept in the lineage or clan and has 
been passed on through inheritance via the male line. This means a man will typically receive 
a portion of land through membership to a clan or lineage – an entity that is (much) bigger 
than the nuclear family.156 When young men would come of age they could request land from 
the traditional leader or chief. In areas where land was scarce the leadership would divide the 
available land himself. Newcomers to an area appeal to the local leader for access, and 
interestingly for Zambia, migrants are welcomed because “adding to the population increases 
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the leadership’s political base”157. This confirms the relative value of labour over land in 
Zambia: a ratio that has played a role throughout colonial and postcolonial history of land in 
Zambia.   	  
  In 1924 the BSAC’s Charter lapsed and the British Government assumed control.158 The 
agreement assigned from the Company upon the Crown “all such rights and interests in land 
as it [the Company] claims to have acquired by virtue of the Concessions granted by 
Lewanika”159. This meant the claims the Company had previously laid on land in the North 
were now extrapolated throughout the entirety of the territory, and “the transfer of Northern 
Rhodesia to the Colonial Office did not in itself cause any sudden change in the direction of 
the country’s affairs”160. It continued to be ruled by a small white elite - now as civil servants.
 The state of Northern Rhodesia the Colonial Office inherited from the BSAC in 1924 
was still in budgetary deficit.161 Because of this reason, Britain’s main concern was to see that 
the territory was made to pay its own way. A strategy to achieve this goal was to increase 
export, and ultimately balance revenue against expenditure. This strategy was deployed by 
colonial Zambia’s first Governor: Sir Herbert Stanley. He believed that Zambia should be 
developed as a ‘white man’s country’, and strong links with white settlers in southern Africa 
were to be promoted. Hence, further European immigration was encouraged, and large blocks 
of the most fertile and accessible land (mostly situated along the line of rail between 
Livingstone and Katanga) were set aside for exclusive European use. This would also benefit 
the young state’s cash flow because it lowered the price of African labour, since Africans were 
severely handicapped in producing cash crops (through limited access to fertile land), and 
thus forced to seek cash through wage-labour.162 A cash economy that facilitated extraction of 
capital was further institutionalised through the introduction of income and hut taxes.163 
Following the example set in South Africa and colonial Zimbabwe, in the 1928 Northern 
Rhodesia Order in Council a distinction was made between Crown Land and African reserves: 
the first of which could be bought and sold according to English Land Law and the second 
were for African occupation under customary tenure arrangements.164 The most promising and 
fertile plots of land were accommodated to the Crown and the remainder was to be customary 
land, or divided into reserves, establishing a relatively rich “line of rail” which contrasted with a 
vast poor hinterland.165 
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Map 6: State and customary 
land in Zambia.166  
The black parts show Crown 
Land: a narrow strip of land up to 
50 kilometres on either side of 
the railway line from Livingstone 
to the Copperbelt, including thin 
pockets of land near Chipata, 
Mbala, Mukushi, Mumbwa, and 
Mwinilunga. The demarcated 
part on the left marks 
Barotseland.   
 
 
Between 1924 and 1927 Zambian land was surveyed and the areas around Chipata (Fort 
Jameson) in the east, Mbala (Abercorn) in the far north and along the railways line were 
deemed Crown territories. In between, reserves were marked out, and Africans living near the 
frontiers were forcefully moved into them.167 The reserves hemmed white farming areas to 
ensure labour was proximate and provided a home for the 60.000 people who were 
displaced by the demarcation of Crown Land. Reserve land could not be bought and sold, in 
contrast to Crown land – where legal title of ownership could only be acquired by whites. This 
restricted access to about two-thirds of the country to the African population: they could only 
inhabit and cultivate land in the Reserves168, whereas the rest of the land was either subject to 
the Crown or left unassigned169. The enactment of Crown Land was continued, and by 1938 
there were 38 reserves outside Barotseland, covering almost 14 million hectares.170   
  The invasive socio-economic strategy the colonial administration employed meant 
people were forced to leave land they had inhabited for centuries and, hence, duly impacted 
peoples’ livelihoods. Between 1942 and 1946 318 villages in the Eastern Province and 120 
villages in the Western province were relocated.171 Yet the duality in the land system also 
significantly increased Zambia’s agricultural output; the colonial land system was designed to 
maximise its use of land and labour. The average areas under maize172 grew to 13.500 
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hectares between 1925-1930. Within five years it expanded to 17.000 hectares, reaching a 
high	  point of 19.000 in 1930.173 Land under agriculture was continuously expanded; to boost 
production, an extra 1.537.805 hectares of customary land was acquired by the government in 
1941.   
 Hence, the foundation of land administration in Zambia can be traced back to the 
Northern Rhodesia Order in Council of 1928, which established Crown land to be administered 
through freehold tenure for European settlers and Native Reserves under usufruct rights for 
African occupation.174 These ‘customary’ rights were guarded by newly empowered traditional 
authorities.175 Swathes of undesignated land, known as ‘silent lands’, were left in anticipation 
of an influx of more European settlers.176  
3.1.1. Native Trust Lands  
The coercive displacement of the African population from both state and ‘silent’ lands into the 
Native Reserves led to massive population pressures in the Reserves, creating negative social 
outcomes and environmental degradation. By 1938, the Pimm Commission was formally 
installed and acknowledged the disastrous effects of overcrowding in the Reserves and the 
futility of having left the silent lands uninhabited, since the coveted arrival of new Europeans 
farmers never materialised.177 By now, there were severe land problems in Chipata, Katete and 
Mazabuka. It took almost another decade to enact the Northern Rhodesia Native Trust Lands 
Order in Council to address the issue of artificial land scarcity. The 1947 Land Order added a 
category: Trust Land. Unalienated areas that were allegedly “unsuitable for African cultivation” 
and/or areas known to contain mineral deposits were retained as Crown Land, while formerly 
undesignated ‘silent’ land (44.211.906 hectares) was designated as Native Trust Land. Here, 
customary authorities were the ones in charge of land rights, and could grant usufruct rights to 
land.    
  Yet, all rights that were to be enacted on Trust Land were subject to the Governor: his 
authority (or represented authority) was required to grant any freehold or leasehold title. The 
Colonial Office notes that “rights of occupancy in native trust land may be granted to non-
Africans for periods not exceeding 99 years, provided the Governor deems that such a grant 
is for the benefit direct or indirect of the inhabitants of the Territory as a whole.”178 Hence 
Native Trust Land came to depend on a malleable set of rights, and other than what its 
intentions might exude, was not solely set aside for the occupancy of “tribes or groups of 
tribes”.179 There was one very important difference between Native Trust Land and Native 
Reserve Land; on Trust Land, the colonial administration continued to hold the right to 
appropriate land and grant leasehold or freehold title to individuals. Native Trust land would 
remain under customary law and could not be converted into Crown land. Alienation to African 
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people was restricted: but “non-natives” could be granted rights of occupancy for a period of 
99 years. The Native Reserves were held solely for the use and occupation of Africans, while 
trust land was for this same purpose, but enabled leases to be issued to non-Africans.180 This 
meant that essentially customary authorities held in the land in trust for the potential future 
use by the colonial state.181  
  De jure, the term and the definition of trust land is rather ambiguous. On the one hand 
it was meant to be held in ‘trust’ and ensure sufficient land for habitation and agriculture for 
the African population, but on the other hand it did little to protect these rights. De facto, it 
meant land that was previously subject to customary tenure now became available for 
expansion by white settlers. It remains unclear what circumstances exactly are taken into 
consideration, or rather, what reasons there would be not to grant white settlement in a 
certain area. The only criteria was whether settlement was to “the use or common benefit 
direct or indirect of the ‘natives’”182, but under a paternalistic regime, this meant what was 
viewed as beneficial to the native population – including reallocation of villages and forced 
removal from native grounds.  This new category of land with its opaque set of rights came to 
encompass 75 per cent of the colony. 183  Its expansion from 1937 to 1952 and 1957 is 
represented in charts 1, 2 and 3 below.  
Graphs 3, 4 and 5. Land distribution in Zambia184  
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Even though there was an increase of Native Trust Land between 1952 and 1957, this did not 
mean there was more land available for Africans. Because of the fluid rights guarding Native 
Trust Land, leaving legal leverage for European settlers to gain legal title to it, Trust Land 
became a euphemism for land to be acquired by white settlers with the means to do so. The 
paternalism of this policy becomes even more evident as, in 1955, a Commission specialising 
in tenure arrangements recommended that title should remain a special privilege, only to be 
granted to “good farmers” and holdings that were “large enough to constitute an economic 
unit”.185 Yet: “[there is] no doubt whatsoever that it would be for the direct or indirect benefit of 
the inhabitants of this territory if, in given areas in Native Trust Land, a European farmer were 
permitted to hold a 99 year right of occupancy over an area of, say, 2000 acres. ”186 Title 
became a special privilege, a privilege confirming the stronghold of European settlers on 
Zambian land by making legal title exclusively attainable for those with access to capital, 
labour, and leverage in the administration.   
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3.1.2 Subconclusion  
The desire to attract more European farmers was an on-going theme in the economic and 
agricultural development of Zambia. From 1951 onwards plans were devised to ensure an easy 
transition from leasehold to freehold tenure for Europeans. “Freehold” , according to a 
transcript of a meeting held in the colonial office in 1950, held a “magical attraction” for 
farmers.187  Although leasehold granted the administration greater control over the allocation 
of land188, the possibilities to borrow from banks were greater under freehold and enforcing a 
system solely of leaseholds was impossible without a significant increase of staff, which 
“cannot be contemplated.”189 The colonial administration faced with a dilemma - how to a) 
attract more European farmers to boost market growth and b) retain control over land 
allocation and, ultimately, political power? Inter-governmental communication notes: “It may 
be true that freehold tenure would be popular among farmers, but this is only natural because, 
from the point of view of Government, they would be getting something for nothing”.190 The 
Northern Rhodesian Agricultural Lands Bill 1956 attempted to answer this question. It held 
control, but also enabled a transition to freehold title. Freehold on Crown land could be 
granted after a probationary period of leasehold: a leaseholder may, after a minimum period 
of 7 years, apply for an option to purchase his holding provided that he has given evidence of 
good husbandry and installed permanent improvements of not less than 10,000 pounds in 
value (5,000 if the holding was less than 1,000 acres). 191   “The general policy of the 
department [of agriculture] is to develop and to stabilise European and African agriculture in 
order to ensure as great a measure of self-sufficiency in territorial food supplies a possible, 
combined with a high level of farming prosperity.”192  
  There was a stringent need to diversify the country’s economy, which was heavily 
dependent on the export of copper. Especially during the first half of the 1950’s, there was a 
spectacular rise in copper prices, for one due to the Korean War. There were more jobs for 
Europeans on the copper mines than ever before, and the number of whites in colonial 
Zambia rose from 22,000 to 37,000 between 1946 and 1951, reached 49,000 in 1953 and 
72,000 in 1958.193 Yet copper alone could not carry the country’s prosperity: the economic 
advance was unbalanced. The European community was wealthy, but on itself too small of a 
market to sustain expansion of trade and industry. Roberts explains: “If Europeans were to 
continue to enter the country as managers, supervisors and businessmen, they would have to 
depend on African as well as European buying power”194. This is why the growth of the 
agricultural sector was key to the development of the country. Increasing African production of 
food and cash crops would mean more jobs and new industries. But “… the scarcity of land for 
high-yield production” and the “sparseness of the African population” were severe obstacles 
for the emergence of a diversified economy. The sudden decline in copper prices from 1956 
onwards attested to that weakness. While the attraction for further European emigration 
eroded, African resistance movements grew in number and size, rising against colour bars in	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employment, exclusion from education and overall colonial exploitation. 1964 saw an 
independent Zambia, with Kenneth Kaunda as its first president.195   
3.2 Independence and beyond: 1964-2013 
Independence brought sweeping changes to many aspects of Zambian politics, but 
administration of land remained markedly unchanged for more than a decade. Both Native 
Reserves and Native Trust Lands continued to exist, as did the governments’ right to allocate 
Trust Land without consent from TA’s. Crown Land only merely changed its name and became 
known as State Land – no administrative change occurred.196 However, there was a significant 
shift in commercial farming. Where the country had always relied heavily on the commercial 
farm sector and its food surplus to feed its urban population, many Europeans settlers 
abandoned their commercial farms after independence: of the 1,185 European farms that were 
occupied in 1961, approximately 460 were vacated within two years of independence. By 
1970-71, the commercial farming sector had declined to 1,076 farming units, of which 643 were 
classified as "African" and 433 as "non-African": the departure of European farmers from the 
Central, Lusaka and Southern province (areas near the urban markets and main transport 
network) from 1964 onwards permitted the Zambian elite to move onto the vacated farms and 
initiated the establishment of an indigenous landed class.197 Jumping ahead another decade 
to 1981, the number of commercial farming units owned by whites by most counts had fallen 
even further to around 300.198 European farmers were pushed away by (a lack of faith in) 
Zambian independence and with this a fear of exclusion from (political) power, regulations 
hindering expatriation of profits and “marketing policies that seriously eroded profits” and 
pulled by major land incentives in Zimbabwe and South Africa.199 The postcolonial government 
appropriated most of this land and redistributed it to Zambians through so-called “settlement 
schemes”200.  
3.2.1. Settlement schemes   
Settlement schemes were aimed to allocate land to individuals in order to stimulate 
agricultural commercialisation and ensure domestic food-sufficiency.201 Villages were moved 
to more accessible locations where land was more suited to agriculture or where there was 
more developed infrastructure to facilitate market access.202 Individuals who had successfully 
applied or had been identified by the state to participate in a settlement scheme were 
allocated a plot of land that ranged from 10 to 250 hectares, either free of charge or for a 
small fee.  Tenure was leasehold: first on a short-term basis, and if obligations of production 
were met, for extended periods of time. The scale of land available for these schemes was 
substantial: by 1987, 550.000 hectares had been used to instigate this programme of large-
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scale investment in agriculture.203  The government’s prerogative to assign title makes for a 
system vulnerable to bureaucracy, favouritism and corruption. Sitko et al. researched the 
source of land titles in Zambia and found that wage-earners from the public sector were the 
most likely to hold title to land, and smallholder farmers were the least likely to have access to 
land through formal title. Vacated plots and land reserved for settlement schemes and thus 
ultimately to develop indigenous agriculture were used as state patronage systems for 
“retrenched or retired civil servants”204. Sitko et al. conclude, after a econometric regression 
analysis of employment and land title, that “’… Zambia’s system of allocating land title to 
smallholders is configured in such a way as to disproportionately favour individuals with the 
economic and social advantages conferred through wage labour, particularly in the public 
sector”205. Such practices severely hampered the success of these schemes to bring about 
more productivity in the agricultural sector since land was often not transferred to those with 
the most potential to utilise it optimally, but to beneficiaries designated by the state.206 Also, 
the multitude of state bureaucracies that became involved with distributing land to associates 
“made it impossible for the state to effectively track and register the distribution of titled land 
necessary for triggering the development of land markets and associated credit markets”207, 
leading to an unregulated land market that did not contribute to opening up Zambia’s land for 
sustainable farming practices.    
  Bureaucracy also made acquiring title on Native Trust Land an arduous task. Roth et al. 
illustrate:  
   
 …these procedures, involving six different sections in three different ministries (the 
 Agricultural Lands Board, the Commissioner of Lands, the Land Registry Section and the 
 Land Survey Section, all in the MOL, the Land Use Planning Branch in the Ministry of 
 Agriculture, and the Valuation  Branch in the Ministry of Local Government and Housing) 
 are far more complex than can be justified.208  
This complexity was coupled with severe understaffing and resulted in extended delays of 
land transactions. In order to negotiate resettlement between headmen, parry cadres and 
local officials and effectively reach the rural population, Village Productivity Committees 
(VPC’s) were installed. Yet this form of “rural institution building” was another example of the 
failure by the postcolonial government to draw villages and villagers into its orbit. VPC’s had 
“not transformed villages into effective production units”209 and never evolved into legally 
binding organisations. Rather, interpretations of custom remained influential in land allocation 
for the rural population.210  
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 When the world copper price collapsed in 1974 and Zambia’s economy was plunged into a 
prolonged recession. This downturn was exacerbated by heavy investment in the 
development of transportation routes to the sea and the Rhodesian Bush War in Zimbabwe. 
Agricultural market infrastructure and input supply services deteriorated and real crop prices 
stagnated.211 By 1980, Zambia, once a net exporter of maize, was forced to import half of its 
domestic consumption needs.212  
3.2.2 Petauke: access to land in a rural area 
The installation of the settlement schemes and the economic recession brought about 
considerable change in the way the rural population related to the land. Kanduza assessed 
the impact of postcolonial policy on the traditional system of land allocation and its alleged 
insecurity of ownership in a rural area in the Eastern Province: Petauke.213 The District had a 
population density of 28,2 in 2000, and poses an exceptional case in Zambia.214 As a locus 
with relative dense population, it serves as an interesting case study in a country, which is 
otherwise remarkably scarcely populated. Nonetheless, there is no indication that property 
rights to land developed in a different way in this area compared to the rest of the country: the 
sense of ownership and land security was inherently connected to being a part of the 
community.  
Map 7. Petauke Disctrict, Zambia215 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
During the 1970’s, in Petauke District, the majority of people gained access to land by opening 
up unused land. Between 1966 and 1972 Kanduza notes a large increase in people who 
gained land by opening plots that were previously unused, which most likely results from the 
implementation of the settlement schemes. This process of village regrouping forced 
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communities (villages) to seek land elsewhere and farm land that was previously empty.216 
Even though most people during this period accessed new, previously uninhabited land, it 
was a social endeavour that concerned the entire community – even though the end result 
may be individual title to leasehold land. 96,2 per cent of the respondents interviewed in 
Kanduza’s study indicated all forms of land acquisition were always mediated by the village 
head. The chief was the ene chalo, or “the owner of the earth”.217 Ultimately title to land does 
not lie with the whole family, but is in the hands of the head of the household. Yet when 
gaining access to new land, he/she is subject to the authorities in the village. Junior members 
of the family may have access to parcels of land, but they did not hold the power to subdivide, 
sell, lease or give away the land. The boundaries of the village, farms and plots (also under 
regrouping) were determined through negotiations between the village head, councillors and 
household heads, who would consult with neighbours and local authorities and decide where 
and to whom to (al)locate parcels.218 The allocation of farmland, hence, was a joint, community 
decision.   
  Regardless of the communality of the process of allocating land, people did feel secure 
of tenure. Traditional structures did not allow land to be given (or sold/leased) away to non-
relatives: land would be passed on to kin. The study shows that 73,5 per cent of the villagers 
holding land in Petauke said they felt secure to pass land to their sons, 62,4 per cent to 
daughters 29,9 per cent to spouses, 14,5 per cent to son-in-laws, and 28,1 per cent to 
nephews and nieces.219 Hence, those who held land felt confident about their rights to and 
ownership of the land. Bequest (whether partible or not) was in accordance with individual 
preferences and established practices alike. Kanduza’s study shows confidence with regard to 
the rights enjoyed under existing tenancy. The majority expected this same security would be 
passed on to their children: 53,6 per cent were convinced that the existing tenancy granted 
them definite ownership, 42,8 per cent was not so sure (“did not express strong confidence”) 
and the remaining 3,6 per cent were uncertain. The land described here is State Land, is 
guarded by customary tenure and subject to leaseholds. However, de facto, tenure is 
perceived as if there are indeed individual rights to land: there is room for individual rights to 
exist within a system of communal tenure.  
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Table 2: Land distribution in Petauke District by manner of acquisition220 
Method	  of	  acquisition	  	   Percentage	  (%)	  
Chief	  or	  village	  head	   4,1	  
Parents	   20,6	  
Inherited	   13,8	  
Spouse	   1,4	  
Maternal	  relatives	   1,1	  
Parents-­‐in-­‐law	   6,8	  
Self-­‐acquired	  (new	  land)	   50,9	  
Other	  	   1,3	  
3.2.3 African socialism and the Land Act  
The onset of an economic recession and the failure of the settlement schemes to boost 
agriculture production and relieve Zambia’s dependence on the volatility of global copper 
prices called for a radical change in land policy. Little had changed since 1965, when 91 per 
cent of exports consisted of copper alone while tobacco (the main export crop) constituted 
only 1,3 per cent of total exports.221 By 1973, the majority of land in Zambia was still under 
customary tenure in the form of Reserves or Trust Land (see graph 4). But Zambia’s post-
independence government was influenced by the socialist regimes of other African 
postcolonial governments; most notably Tanzania. The idea was that land belonged to the 
people, and the individual’s right to land was simply to use it.222 The government’s political 
objective was “to mould Zambia into a classless society in which the exploitation of one man 
by another was to be eliminated”223.    
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Graph 6. Land distribution in Zambia224 
 
Two Acts aimed to challenge this situation and regain control of land markets and agricultural 
production. The first was the Lands Acquisition Act (1970), which grants the President the 
power to acquire property when “he is of the opinion that it is desirable or expedient in the 
interest of the Republic to do so”.225 If and when land would be acquired, compensation or a 
grant of other land may be offered to the landholder, depending on the presence of owners 
and whether the land was developed or not.226 And the second, five years later, the Land 
(Conversion of Titles) Act vested all land in Zambia absolutely in the President227 and replaced 
freehold title by leasehold.228 It also nationalised vacant and underdeveloped plots of land 
and forbade subdivision and sublease without the President’s consent. 229  Free titles or 
leaseholds that were already in effect at the time were converted to leaseholds not exceeding 
100 years.230 The first clause in the act states that the right of possession of all minerals oils 
and precious stones remains the lessor’s – which was now the state. Aiming, once again, to 
boost production for commercial farmers and smallholders alike, the lessee was not allowed 
to let the land remain idle for more than three years without the lessor’s consent.231 In addition 
to an impetus to production, the 1975 Land Act was an attempt to put an end to land 
speculation. The scarceness of land under freehold (see the graph above) that was created 
during colonialism and perpetuated after independence had led to an overheated land market, 
whereby prices spiralled to unknown heights and had made freehold tenure unattainable for 
ordinary citizens.232 After 1975, prices became subject to valuations by qualified “valuers”233.	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Land did no longer hold any intrinsic value, and only improvements to the land (like buildings 
or agricultural infrastructure) could be bought or sold.234 This subdued the land market as such 
and made private ownership of land impossible: land was no longer a saleable or 
mortgageable commodity.235  
  Yet a highly unequal agricultural sector remained in place. Momba notes the limited 
opportunities to access credit for smallholders; a disadvantage that was not mitigated by 
making land an untradeable and non-mortgageable commodity. In 1978-9 most of the 
agricultural credit went to large-scale farmers236, while small-scale farmers237 received only 
8.66 (K 1.353.317,28) per cent of the total amount.238 It is exemplary of the skewed land market 
that remained in place after 1964. The government attempted to fill the production gap that 
was left after Europeans had emigrated through settlement schemes and the abolishment of 
freehold title239, but an economic miracle failed to occur.   
  It must be noted that the vast majority of land in Zambia was still administered as 
Reserve Land. This land was very sparsely populated and dominated by subsistence and 
smallholder farming. As of 1976 Zambia’s population totalled just over four million, with more 
than a million people living in or around towns. Outside the towns, population density merely 
reached 4 people per square kilometre.240 Land in these areas, which was often difficult to 
farm due to ecological conditions, was set apart for the exclusive use of the “indigenous 
peoples of Zambia”. Yet the President could issue grants of land to Zambians for periods up to 
99 years, and rights of occupancy of up to 99 years to non-Zambians whilst also demanding 
rent for the use of land. This last measure was a result of the 1985 Land Amendment Act: a 
piece of legislation that restricted the alienation of land to non-Zambians without the written 
consent of the President.241  
3.2.4 The effects of the 1995 Land Act  
The 1995 Land Act brought back privatised land rights and was supposed to reinvigorate a 
land market, but recent studies find it disadvantages the rural population who live under 
customary tenure arrangements. The efforts made by the Kaunda government to spark 
Zambia’s agricultural sector had not been adequately successful to create sustainable 
economic growth, and land became a central issue in resolving this problem. Zambia’s 
economy remained dependent on mining and increasingly upon international donors. This 
combined with the spirit of the post-Cold War, which was very different from Kaunda’s policies 
of nationalisation: liberalisation and privatisation were promoted worldwide, and Zambia was 
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no exception.242 Land reform became an electoral pledge, but also a key conditionality the 
country was to meet in order for it to be able to restructure its international debt. This resulted 
in the election of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) in 1991: a government that 
sought to break with socialist land policies and implement extensive market reforms. 243 The 
MMD’s election manifesto highlights:  
 The MMD shall institutionalise a modern, coherent, simplified and relevant land law code 
 intended to ensure the fundamental right to private ownership of land (…). To this end, the 
 MMD government will (…) bring a more efficient and equitable system of tenure conversion 
 and land allocation in customary lands; land adjudication legislation will be enacted and 
 coordinated in such a way that confidence shall be restored in land investors (…) the MMD 
 shall attach economic value to undeveloped land [and] promote regular issuance of title 
 deeds to productive land owners in both rural and urban areas.244  
As donors, the World Bank and IMF played a significant role in ensuring Zambian land policy 
was liberalised. By repealing the 1975 Act and reinstituting a land market, the 1995 Land Act 
solidified private property rights to land.245 Trust and reserve lands were amalgamated into a 
new category: customary land.246 The existing rights in these areas were protected, it was 
possible to acquire tracts of land under freehold or leasehold tenure; hence, individual 
property rights to land were reinstated.  The government argued that this policy change made 
“villagers (...) able to use their land as collateral to secure credit to invest in farms and 
businesses,”247 a line of thought fully in agreement with the ideology of the Bretton Woods 
institutions and De Soto’s hypothesis of private property as a means to aggregate capital and 
enable growth.   
  Still, for the customary tenure that governed 93 per cent of land in Zambia, the 1995 
law changed little. Administratively, Trust Land and Reserves were still guided by customary 
tenure: rights of occupancy and use were protected, but there was no registration of 
ownership. Rather, intricate rights of (private) ownership were already at play, wherein some 
tracts of land were cultivated and ‘belonged’ to individuals, whereas others would be used 
communally.248 Land was obtained by clearing undeveloped land, through gifts, sales or 
transfer in exchange for goods, services or marriage.249 Every land settlement or clearing in 
customary areas was considered by the chief and possible headman, who guarded the 
communal interest.  Strangers or newcomers in an area required permission from such a local 
authority to acquire land and settle. The United Nations Economic Survey observed:   
 
  The security of tenure tribal customary laws provided is almost equivalent to the security 
 provided under freehold. Any individual who established residence in a village can acquire 
                                                   
242 M. Hansungule, P. Feeney and R. Palmer, ‘Report on land tenure insecurity on the Zambian 
Copperbelt’, Report for Oxfam GB (2004) 11.  
243 Brown, ‘Contestation, confusion and corruption’,  84. 
244 Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) Manifesto 1991, 7 cited in Brown, ‘Contestation, 
confusion and corruption’,  84. 
245 Sitko et al., ‘Does smallholder land titling facilitate agricultural growth?’, 793. 
246 Roth et al., ‘Legal framework and administration of land policy in Zambia’, 19.  
247 Brown, ‘Contestation, confusion and corruption’,  86. 
248 Adams, ‘Land tenure policy and practice in Zambia’, 7.  
249 USAID, Land tenure profile Zambia, 8.  
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 customary rights over the land, although nobody can lay a claim to land over which another	  
	   individual has established rights. The rights are permanent unless they are extinguished by 
 abandonment or death.250  
These property rights are deemed secure enough to allow access to formal credit facilitated 
by the state.251  
 Table 2 shows the highly privatised nature of rights in the Southern and Eastern 
provinces; the data come from a survey held in 1992-93 of nearly 200 households.252 The 
study focused on the link between tenure and on-farm tree planting activities, yet gives an 
interesting insight into the workings of land rights in customary areas in the years just before 
the Land Act was enacted. The data show that the overwhelming majority of households in 
these provinces felt they held strong rights of use to the land: almost 100% felt they had the 
right to cultivate, use inputs, plant trees and harvest agricultural produce. Respondents were 
less secure about their right to retain the land after long periods of fallow: only 53 per cent felt 
certain in the Southern province.  
Table 3: Prevalence of household rights over farmland in the Southern and Eastern provinces 
in Zambia (in %)253 
Rights	   Southern	  province	   Eastern	  province	  
Use	  rights:	  	  	  
	  	  Cultivate	  annual	  crops	  
	  	  Cultivate	  perennial	  crops	  
	  	  Use	  inputs	  
	  	  Erect	  a	  fence	  
	  	  Plant	  trees	  
	  	  Cut	  trees	  
	  	  Harvest	  produce	  from	  trees	  
	  	  Retain	  land	  after	  long	  fallow	  
%	  
98,9	  
98,9	  
98,9	  
98,9	  
98,9	  
79,6	  
93,5	  
52,7	  
%	  
98,9	  
96,3	  
98,9	  
82,9	  
96,3	  
94,9	  
98,7	  
81,7	  
Transfer	  Rights:	  	  
	  	  Give	  trees	  to	  other	  family	  members	  
	  	  Give	  land	  to	  other	  family	  members	  
	  	  Give	  or	  sell	  land	  outside	  of	  the	  family	  
	  
64,5	  
53,8	  
40,9	  
	  
	  60,8	  
76,8	  
37,8	  
Exclusion	  Rights:	  
	  	  Prevent	  others	  from	  growing	  crops	  
	  	  Prevent	  other	  from	  harvesting	  crops	  
	  	  Prevent	  others	  from	  grazing	  animals	  
	  	  Prevent	  others	  from	  growing	  trees	  
	  	  Prevent	  others	  from	  harvesting	  trees	  	  
	  
86,0	  
83,9	  
76,3	  
84,9	  
86,0	  
	  
96,3	  
97,6	  
28,0	  
96,3	  
91,5	  
                                                   
250 United Nations Economic Survey, cited in Van Loenen, Land tenure in Zambia, np.  
251 Van Loenen, ‘Land tenure in Zambia’, 5.  
252 Place et al., ‘Land tenure and agricultural development in customary areas’, 156-7.  
253 Ibid., 157. In the Southern province the total number of households interviewed was 93, in the 
Eastern province 82. Numbers are the percentages of households that expressed they felt they had 
these rights.   
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These numbers show that the rights in customary areas were already highly privatised before 
1995. It is therefore not very surprising that the liberalisation of the land market and 
reinstitution of private rights did in fact not change much for the 93 per cent of land in Zambia 
that fell under customary law. After 1995, numbers point to an increase in leasehold title, but 
the growth is not staggering: the 6 per cent of land that was held in state leasehold in 1970 
rose to 10 per cent in 2002.254 Most conversions of customary land into leasehold took place 
in rural districts surrounding Lusaka, the Copperbelt and in the vicinity of tourist destinations 
(Livingstone, South Luangwa National Park and Lower Zambezi National Park). Other research 
shows the reinstalling of titling has no benevolent effect on smallholders and rural population, 
but benefits foreign investors and the national elite.255 The 1995 Land Act also made it easier 
for foreigners to acquire land. Together with the Zambian elite, foreign buyers have been 
buying large-scale commercial farms. Sipangule et al. found: “Land that is targeted by 
investors is close to infrastructure and markets and suitable for agricultural production. These 
areas are also marked by higher population densities”256. Apart from the skewed patterns of 
settlement that is solidified by the act, whereby the most promising parts of land are alienated, 
another study points out the increasing inequality and the onset of a class system.257 For 
example, in 1996, only 3 investors held title in the Chiawa chieftaincy on the outskirt of the 
Lower Zambezi National Park. Three years later, nineteen others (all tourist operators) held 
land in this area. Brown points out the problematic nature of this development, since small-
scale and subsistence farmers were not in the same position to defend the customary rights 
they held to the land and convert these rights into recognised leasehold title.258 The costs of 
converting customary to leasehold title proved too high for this group. Costs of converting 
customary land to a 14-year lease requires 
  ...a sketch, the consent of the chief, payment of a lease charge, and multiple trips to district 
 headquarters and the Ministry of Lands office in Lusaka or Ndola.259 The cost to obtain a 
 14-year  lease is at least $100 (and often much more) and a 99-year lease requires a 
 rigorous and expensive boundary survey prepared by a licensed surveyor; in 2005, 
 average charges for survey and registration and travel costs were at least $500 
 (US$ equivalent) and often multiples of that amount, and typically required between 2 and 
 3 years to complete. The lessee must also pay an annual ground rent to the District 
 Revenue Collector.260 
                                                   
254 Brown, ‘Contestation, confusion and corruption’, 86.  
255 Ibid., 87-8; N. Sitko and T.S. Jayne, ‘Structural dynamism or elite land capture?  A case study of 
emergent farm growth in Zambia’, Food Policy 48 (2014) 194-202, 200; Sitko et al., ‘Does smallholder 
land titling facilitate agricultural growth?’, 794.  
256 K. Sipangule, K. Nolte and J. Lay, ‘Commercial farms in Zambian and the relationship with 
smallholders farms’, Paper for the 2016 World Bank conference on land and poverty, March 14-18 2016 
Washington DC, np.   
257 J.C. Momba, ‘The state, rural class formation and peasant political participation in Zambia’, 331-57.  
258 Brown, ‘Contestation, confusion and corruption’, 88.  
259 Roth et al. ‘Legal framework and administration of land policy in Zambia’, 19-21.  
260 USAID, Land tenure profile Zambia, 7.  
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Since smallholders and subsistence farmers on average earn $219 per year261 and feel relative 
security over their customary rights, there is little incentive to spend limited income and time 
on land-conversion.262  Lastly, Sitko and Jayne found that the customary land that is being 
captured by elites has increased the land converted to leasehold by urban wage earners. 
There are little alternatives that allow them to invest the (surplus) capital generated through 
wage labour in urban areas; hence land has become an interesting investment opportunity. 
The study points to the inefficient and unproductive use of leasehold land held by wage 
earners: on average, 28 per cent of the land was used for the production of crop, fallow or 
livestock, while the remainder of their land lays idle.263 In other words, titles are mostly 
acquired by those not primarily engaged in agriculture. This “sub-optimal” use of land is, for 
obvious reasons, detrimental to the development of a productive agricultural system that 
Zambia so desperately needs to diversify its economy and uplift the standards of living of its 
rural population.264	    	  
  In all, the 1995 Land Act has led to an increase in absentee land-ownership in Zambia, 
opened up the Zambian land market to foreign buyers, solidified class differences and 
increased inequality. These effects are the result of a land policy that was imposed on Zambia 
by international conditions, and has structurally underestimated the security of privately land 
rights in customary areas.265 Even though rights were not documented in law, in the rural 
areas, where population has always been sparse and land abundant, people were free to 
choose how to access and use the land. There was no incentive to record the customary 
rights, since there was no stringent land scarcity. Hence, in Zambia, it was simple for the 
government (both colonial and postcolonial) to dictate land rights as they were met with little 
resistance. This, in turn, allowed national and international elites to alienate land.  Both of 
these aspects, easy access but loosely defined rights and inefficient use of land are a direct 
result of relative land abundance and little population pressure.  
3.2.5. Protecting a fragile system   
Private property rights to land, as implemented by the 1995 Land Act, did not emancipate the 
rural population. In harsh ecological circumstances a system of customary rights had 
developed that not merely met subsistence needs, but survival – especially in times of 
drought or crop failure. A respondent, described as an “elderly woman” in a study by 
Muyakawa (2003), explains: 
                                                   
261 Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), ‘Zambia: country action plan’, Initiative on Soaring Food 
Prices (ISFP) 2009 via http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ISFP/Zambia_Final_Draft.pdf accessed 
on 9-5-2016.  
262 USAID, Land tenure profile Zambia, 7.  
263 Sitko and Jayne, ‘Structural dynamism or elite land capture?’, 201; Sitko et al., ‘Does smallholder land 
titling facilitate agricultural growth?’,  794.  
264 Brown describes an example that is awfully familiar when one knows how the BSAC acquired land 
grants before 1900. A South African investor was able to acquire land from Chief Nkanya along the 
Luangwa River. Brown continues: “Once he had the title, the investor returned to Johannesburg where 
he sold the title for $200,000. (...) The chief was led to believe that these particular individuals were 
investing for the long term and that he was granting them the use, but not the ownership, of these 
lands.” Cited in: Brown, ‘Contestation, confusion and corruption’, 90.  
265 Other studies find that the conversion to leasehold title benefits men much more than women, 
contributing to gender inequality. See e.g. A.H. Malambo, ‘Land administration in Zambia since 1991: 
History, opportunity and challenges’, Global advanced research journal of history, political science and 
international relations 2 (2013) 53-66.   
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When a place is for grazing cattle and used by all villagers, how then can one person came 
and get title for it? Where will the other people take their animals to graze especially if rich 
green grass is available on only one location in the village? Maybe for people in the town it 
is OK to have title to their land but in villages, because of communal ownership of some 
scarce  resources it will be very difficult.266 
Although some instances of encroachment and strife over boundaries have arisen, because of the 
relatively low population density land disputes are generally not as severe as those found in other 
parts of sub-Saharan Africa267; including Malawi. Commonly disputes are resolved by village 
headmen, yet when these local leaders fail to address the issue at hand satisfactorily, Land 
Tribunals can be approached.268  There is little awareness however of the existence of the 
Tribunals; they are often underfunded, inaccessible to those who do not speak English, and 
operating with a towering backlog of cases.269 
  This means the system of customary rights, however privatised they are, are weakly 
protected, and fragile. As a chief from the North-western Province eloquently voiced the matter 
at hand to the Minister of Land in 2002:  
We appreciate your effort to make land available to investors, which is important for 
 development and food security. But we have serious concerns. Chiefs are not chiefs 
 without land. When we look at the Land Act we feel that chiefs don’t own the land 
 anymore because all land is vested in the President and the chiefs have become only the 
 agents who help to process the land for investors.270 
The government, or civil society, has not been able to formulate an appropriate answer to this 
dichotomy. How can Zambia on the one hand stimulate its agricultural sector and adhere to 
global standards for market integration, whilst protecting a system of customary property 
rights to land? As of now, the government is encouraging an "open-door" policy to incite 
capital creation and encourage foreign investors to develop agricultural businesses in Zambia. 
Those who are willing to invest mostly leave disgruntled, as the ministry of lands “is unable to 
designate clearly defined, demarcated, and registered areas of land for settlement, or when 
negotiations are held with the chiefs which must subsequently be turned down”271.  Pestered 
by high debt loads, declining donor aid, and slow economic growth,272 land policy and reform 
remain on the agenda of the Zambian government, but it remains a constant balancing act 
between the needs of an international community for more clearly demarcated land and 
protecting the intricate relationship the population in Zambia has with the land they inhabit.  
3.3 Subconclusion  
In Zambia, the fluid relationship between individual and communal land ownership was never 
really understood, or purposely disregarded, by the colonial government. During colonialism 
                                                   
266 Elderly woman, Hamapande village, Monze Districht, Zambia in Muyakawa et al. 2003 cited in Brown, 
‘Contestation, confusion and corruption’, 91.  
267 Place et al., ‘Land tenure and agricultural development in customary areas’, 161.  
268 USAID, Land tenure profile Zambia, 9-10.  
269 Place et al, ‘Land tenure and agricultural development in customary areas’, 161; en USAID, Land 
tenure profile Zambia.  
270 Brown, ‘Contestation, confusion and corruption’, 96.  
271 Roth et al., ‘Legal framework and administration of land policy in Zambia’, 20.  
272 Place et al., ‘Land tenure and agricultural development in customary areas’, 20.  
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the pressing demand for labour induced repressive measures to manipulate the labour market 
through interventions on the land market. 273 Labour constraints were a constant problem for 
the expansion of the agricultural sector. Although forms of individual tenure did exist in African 
property structures (as the Petauke- example illustrates, including its continuation after 
colonial rule), an idea of communal tenure as an inhibition to optimal production was formed 
and implemented on the land market. The concept of Trust Land furthermore embodies the 
ambiguity between communal and. Ultimately, before the end of colonialism, the dual agrarian 
system with its double-standards for guarding land rights was firmly institutionalised in the 
agricultural economy of Zambia. The sparse population of Zambia made enabled the 
government to relocate people with relative ease; illustrated by the policy aims from 1955 
onwards, which strived to stabilise population numbers in the areas with better soils and 
attract European farmers. Post-independent measures, such as settlement schemes, did not 
do enough to redress the unbalanced land market, favouring those close to the government, 
and not reaching villages and villagers who needed land reform the most. Nationalism and 
economic socialism dictated land tenure policy, and during the early years of the Kaunda 
regime, all crown lands were renamed state lands.274 Freehold became leasehold and “land” 
lost its intrinsic value. Market-based land redistribution became the dominant approach to land 
reform after the recession in the 1970s.275 Land control was centralised in 1975 yet the 
allocation of land rights continued to be predominantly communal, carried out by chiefs and 
headmen. Access to rural land continued to be linked to the negotiation of settlement rights 
and village allegiances.276 In all, although Zambia’s land reform policies during colonialism 
have created a severely hampered land market, there were little land disputes, and the rural 
population (93 per cent of the population, comprising of 1,1 million small-scale households 
cultivating on average one hectare each277) regulate their land through communal systems of 
land rights.  
 	  	  	  	  	   	  
                                                   
273 Frankema, ‘The colonial roots of land inequality’, 445.  
274 Brown, ‘Contestation, confusion and corruption’, 83.  
275 Ibid., 79.  
276 Berry, No condition is permanent, 129.  
277 USAID, Land tenure profile Zambia, 1.  
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4. MALAWI 
 
In the old days [thangata] was a good thing. The chief would kill fowls and goats, and make a lot of 
food, and prepare everything ready. And then he would take a small boy and tell him to say that the 
chief wants tangata tomorrow. And everyone would turn out to tangata. And when they came the 
chief would offer them beer and say "Now come to the garden and so give me your labour." And then 
they went to the garden and started hoeing. I cannot say what time. They had no way of keeping 
time, but I should say it would be about 6:30 to 7:00 a.m. Then they started working away until 
midday. And then food and beer came. And after that they marched to the chief's village in peace and 
with no signs of grief. And they all sat around the chief's courtyard. And all the food was brought. 
And after feasting away, they began to dance. And the chief said "Now you have done very well and 
helped me. Go in peace" and that is what is known by the natives as tangata.  
Joseph Bismarck, testifying in 1915 before the Commission of Inquiry into the Chilembwe Rising. Cited in B. 
Pachai, ‘Labour Tenancy and Agrarian Discontent: A Case Study of Nyasaland (Malawi)’, Paper delivered to the 
Centre for African Studies, Dalhousie University (1975) 7.  
Malawi poses an interesting case study for the effects of population density. With a total 
population of more than 17 million and a population density of nearly 140 people per square 
kilometre, Malawi is one of the most densely populated countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.278 A 
shortage of agricultural land is therefore not only a current problem, but has been recurrent 
throughout its history279; setting Malawi apart from the other countries studied in this thesis. 
The on-going struggle for land and land policy reform is a product of a historical process, 
wherein the availability, access and ownership of land were all contested and claimed by a 
variety of parties. The set of customs and laws that came to guide tenure in Malawi draw on a 
combination of modified colonial land legislation and a complex set of customary rules and 
norms, which have been interpreted and adapted to increasing pressure on land in different 
parts of the country.280 This chapter shows the colonial government faced remarkably more 
resistance compared to Zambia, most notable from civil society organisations. It also shows 
the Malawian people were, despite the extensive distorting effects on land markets and 
settlement imposed by the colonial government, able to retain a certain agency over their land. 
This chapter will argue population density is of explanatory value in understanding the 
development of land rights comparing a densely settled territory versus Zambia, with its 
sparse population. It starts with the recognition of defining social factors in the determination 
of land in Malawian society, such as matrilineal organisation, follows the transformation of the 
indigenous labour system thangata under colonialism, the installation of a dual agrarian 
system, the postcolonial attempts to install private land ownership and the on-going 
marginalisation of smallholder farmers.   
 
                                                   
278 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.POP.DNST accessed on 16-4-2016 
279 P.E. Peters, ‘”Our daughters inherit our land, but our sons use their wives’ fields”: matrilineal-
matrilocal land tenure and the New Land Policy in Malawi’, Journal of Eastern African Studies 4 (2010) 
179-199, 179.  
280 S. Holden, R. Kaarhus and R. Lunduka, ‘Land policy reform: The role of land markets and women’s 
land rights in Malawi’, Noragric Report No. 36 (2006)  1.  
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4.1. Special circumstances 
Within Malawi’s national boundaries there is a considerable regional variation with regards to 
population density. A study by Holden, Kaarhus and Lunduka (2006) on the progress of land 
policy reform found an average population density of around 53 per square kilometre in the 
north, whereas the central region (which includes the capital of Lilongwe) population density 
reached 140. The highest ratios of people versus land were found in the south, where 
population numbers were close to 174 per km².281 A representation of regional variation in 
population density and the fluctuations therein can be found in Table 1.   
  With some of the finest arable land in former British Central Africa282, land and the 
relevance of access to land cannot be stressed enough.  To this day the agricultural sector 
employs 85 per cent of the workforce and generates 90 per cent of foreign exchange 
earnings.283 Control over land and labour were key aspects of the colonial history of Malawi. 
 There are several factors shaping the development of land rights, land occupation and 
land access in the Malawian context. The first has to do with migratory patterns that influence 
the population density in several regions. The second involves cultural customs that 
determine access to and inheritance of land.  
4.1.2 Migration  
Malawi’s territory has always known notable number of emigrants and immigrants. From 1899 
onwards, the brutal enforcement of a new labour code in present day Mozambique led to 
large-scale migration of the Lomwe ethno-linguistic group into the southern parts of Malawi. 284  
Kuczynski indicates a net immigration of several hundred thousand from Mozambique during 
the first fifty years of British administration, yet “in the first three decades births probably did 
not exceed deaths. In the last two decades there may have been a natural increase but it 
certainly was not large”285. Colonial Officials note at least half of the increase in population 
between 1921 and 1931 was due to Lomwe and Sena immigration286 which might also explain 
some of the stark variations in table 4.    
  On the other hand, densely populated Malawi also functioned as a labour pool for the 
mines in Rhodesia and South Africa. Gregory and Mandala hypothesise an emigration of at 
least 15 per cent of the adult male population in 1921, 1926, and 1931; and of 25 per cent in 
1945.287 Others estimate the annual impact of the outflow of emigrants ranges from 5 males 
per 1000 in 1920 to nearly 30 per 1000 in 1940.  
 	  
                                                   
281 Ibid., 4. Data from 2005.  
282 B. Pachai, ‘Land policies in Malawi: An examination of the colonial legacy’, The Journal of African 
History 14 (1973) 681-698, 681.  
283 D. Chinigò, ‘Re-peasantization and land reclamation movements in Malawi’, African Affairs 115, 97-118, 
99.  
284 R.B. Boeder, Silent majority: a history of the Lomwe in Malawi (Pretoria 1984).  
285 R.R. Kuczynski, Demographic survey of the British Colonial Empire: Vol II (London 1948) 638.  
286 CO 323/854/41. Nyasaland Protectorate Blue Book report: Original Correspondence from Governor 
Smith Despatch no. 164. 25 April 1921.  
287 J.W. Gregory and E. Mandala, ‘Dimensions of conflict: emigrant labor from colonial Malawi and 
Zambia, 1900-1945’, in: D.D. Cordell and J.W. Gregory, African population and capitalism: historical 
perspectives (Boulder 1987) 221-40, 228.  
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TABLE	  4	  
Regional	  population	  density	  in	  Malawi*	  
(in	  people	  per	  square	  kilometre**)	  
	   Lower-­‐	   Blantyre	   Mlanje	   Zomba	   Upper-­‐	   South-­‐	   Lilongwe	   Dedza	   Dowa	   West-­‐	   Mombera	   North-­‐
	   Shire	   	   	   	   Shire	   Nyasa	   	   	   	   Nyasa	   	   	   Nyasa	  
1920	   35,5	   36,9	   14,4	   20,1	   12,9	   11,9	   15,6	   28,2	   22,6	   7,4	   10,1	   4	  
1921	   32,9	   35,6	   15,7	   25,8	   9	   12,1	   17,5	   24	   21,5	   7,9	   10,3	   3,9	  
1922	   27	   59,3	   16,3	   32,2	   6,4	   12,8	   19,1	   21,5	   16,6	   7,9	   10,5	   3,8	  
1923	   33	   29,8	   16,7	   32,6	   4,7	   12,9	   19,2	   21,3	   17	   7,8	   10,5	   3,8	  
1924	   32,7	   29,2	   17,7	   32,8	   6,2	   13,1	   19,4	   21,2	   17,3	   8,3	   10,8	   3,8	  
1925	   33,7	  	   29,2	   18,9	   33	   6,4	   13,1	   20	   21,5	   17,3	   8,6	   10,	  8	   3,8	  
1926	   33,4	   29,4	   21,6	   33,4	   8,1	   14,2	   21,3	   21,9	   17,8	   8,5	   10,4	   4	  
1927	  	   32,9	   26,9	   23,4	   33,7	   10,4	   15,7	   17,3	   22,1	   18,3	   8,4	   9,8	   4,1	  
1928	   32,6	   29,8	   23,4	   38,1	   10,4	   15,7	   17,3	   23,4	   18,6	   8,3	   9,4	   4,1	  
1929	   32,8	   29,8	   23,8	   39	   10,4	   16,1	   21,2	   23,4	   19,1	   7,2	   9,8	   4,1	  
1930	   36,3	   29,3	   25,8	   39,2	   10,4	   16,2	   22,4	   23,5	   19,5	   7,2	   9,8	   4,1	  
1931	   36,8	   29	   30	   45	   11,5	   17,5	   22,3	   23,1	   19,6	   8,9	   11,9	   4,9	  
1932	   43	   33,7	   34	   46,2	   11,5	   17,6	   20	   29,4	   24,9	   8,9	   11,9	   4,9	  
1933	   44	   43,6	   34	   47,1	   11,6	   17,8	   20,5	   29	   25,1	   7,3	   12	   3,9	  
1934	   44,7	   33,7	   34,3	   46,4	   11,5	   17,2	   19,9	   25,9	   26,8	   9,1	   12,1	   5,8	  
1935	   44,3	   33,7	   34,2	   47,3	   11,5	   17,2	   19,9	   25,7	   26,8	   9,8	   11,8	   5,9	  
1936	   44,4	   33,7	   36,8	   47,1	   12,8	   17,1	   20,1	   23,4	   26,9	   9,8	   10,6	   5,9	  
1937	   44,6	   33,7	   40,1	   46,1	   13,1	   17	   20,1	   20	   27,1	   9,8	   9,4	   5,9	  
1938	   43,3	   33,7	   41,1	   46,1	   13,1	   17	   21,2	   25,8	   26,6	   10,6	   10,1	   5,9	  
1939	   42,7	   33,6	   41,1	   47,6	   13,3	   17,1	   20,3	   25,8	   28,2	   10,6	   10,1	   5,9	  
Source: The National Archives (TNA), Colonial Office (CO) 452/23-42, Nyasaland Blue books of Statistics 1920-1939.  
* Regions were selected based on a continuous collection of data from 1920 onwards 
** Population density in square kilometres calculated from square mileage 
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4.1.3 Matrilineality and matrilocality  
In a large part of Malawian society access to land follow matrilineal and matrilocal principle. 
This means that “inheritance  and succession run through the female line so that children are 
members of their mother’s lineage,  the  heir  to  a  male  authority  holder  is  his  sister’s  son,  
and,  on  marriage, husbands  move  to  their  wives’ village”288. This system had historically 
granted access to land and forged strong family ties, especially between brother and sister. 
Land was only accessible through membership to a community, a (extended) family (mbumba).  
Yet many western observers argued it inhibits agricultural development, mainly by subdividing 
plots to heirs and alienating males from land transactions:  
Males have been discouraged from looking at the farm as a source of income because, for 
the most part, they have had little or no control over the land. To obtain the use of land a 
man must not only marry since it is the women who have rights to the land, but the most 
also move to his wife’s village to obtain the land. If a man divorces his wife, as frequently 
happens, then he must relinquish that piece of land and will not get another until he 
marries again. On the death of the farmer the rights to cultivate pass through the female 
line and a piece of land is often fragmented among several women, usually sisters. A man 
has little influence over his successor to the land and the land usually has no market value 
(though this is changing), so that investment of time and money in it is not attractive. Such 
interplot mobility and the insecurity of the whole system meant that the typical male has 
had little interest in developing the land he was using.289 
It must be noted that not all social units or groups in Malawi used this system. The Angoni of 
northern Malawi, for example, are a patrilineal group and hence exempt from the 
abovementioned customs.290  
4.2 Land rights in colonial Malawi, 1923-1964 
At the starting point of this analysis, land in colonial Malawi was either in the hands of private 
owners under freehold tenure or deemed Crown land. The first group held strong, individual 
rights to the land, of which the legal titles were recorded when the British Central Africa 
Protectorate was proclaimed in 1891. The second was in the hands of the British 
Commissioner himself, who was responsible for the administration of the Protectorate, and 
whose goal was to develop agriculture through the agency of the European farmers.291 Crown 
land consisted of all the unoccupied lands, and British policy assumed ownership of this land 
to the Crown. The Crown could give land in the form of land concessions to new settlers 
under terms of freehold or leasehold.292    
  In pre-colonial Malawian society, customary systems determined land rights. Scholars 
agree on the multifaceted nature of customary law, and the many factors that define it prevent 
the presentation of a complete overview.  Nonetheless, an overview of the different forms of 
rights can be found in the first chapter of this thesis. Note that in Malawi, usually fields are 
passed on through matrilineal inheritance, and the chief’s role is as judge or arbiter in dispute	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cases.293   
  After the pioneer foreigners, traders and missionaries had laid claims on vast extents 
of land (for a more detailed history of this process, see chapter 2), both chiefs and colonial 
administrators started to raise the issues of ownership and occupation of land. These 
concepts became increasingly protracted and contested as population numbers (both settler 
and African) grew and the increased pressure on the land magnified the differences294 
between the occidental and African systems.  
4.2.1 Thangata  
The Europeans needed workers to develop the land and produce crops for export (mainly 
cotton and tobacco) on the newly established plantations. A system of labour tenancy was 
invoked, based on a traditional system of labour exchange that was in place before European 
presence.  Yet, Kandaŵire notes: “there is a whole world of difference between traditional 
thangata and colonial thangata. The former is nothing other than a social institution, which 
embodies a pre-colonial notion of reciprocal labour. In the colonial situation the term came to 
mean forced labour”295. Colonial thangata became equivalent to forced labour, since those 
who were living inside the boundaries of land acquired by a European settler were declared 
tenants. Rather than paying rent, it was possible for tenants to perform labour without pay for 
the estate owner for a certain period each year. An increased pressure on land through earlier 
influx of immigrants made security of tenure increasingly pivotal for the indigenous population, 
while the Europeans were able to profit from the expansion of the labour reserve. New 
tenants were all the more dependent on estate owners for their land. But the black population 
were successful farmers: within a time span of 10 years, production of cotton by African 
smallholders increased from 26 to 1200 tons.296 This economic success provided alternatives 
for subsistence, and hence, a form of autonomy for the farmers.  This, in combination with 
heavy recruitment of labourers for the South African mines, further hampered the quest for 
labour by the European estate owners. A hut tax (1912) whereby one-half of this tax could be 
paid off through work for a European settler was imposed in order to settle this issue.297  
 By all means, colonial thangata was an exploitative system. Historians note physical 
mistreatment, ill payment298 and destruction of cash crops or payment in crops (such as 
tobacco) instead of money in order to compel labour.299 In a severely unbalanced trade-off, 
Europeans exchanged the right to occupy alienated land for readily available labour – a 
situation that brings to mind the situations on trust land in Zambia. But here, especially in the 
densely populated Shire Highlands in Malawi, disputes between settlers and the local people 
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began to increase, and conflict over land was more common, more explicit and more violent 
than in sparsely populated colonial Zambia.  
4.2.2 Grievances and the non-disturbance clause  
More and more chiefs, who conventionally had the strongest grip on the land, sensed that 
they and/or their fathers had been swindled of their land. But Harry Johnston,  first head of the 
Nyasaland colonial administration, inverted any possible form of guilt for the division of and 
the conditions on Malawian land into a paternalistic form of credit for protecting the chiefs and 
their subjects:  
The fact is, that at the time the chiefs sold land to the Europeans they were very heedless 
of the results. All they desired was the immediate possession of the trade goods or money 
given in payment.... It was, however, highly necessary to secure these people from the 
results of their chief's heedlessness, in many cases, as they were apt to become the serfs 
of the white man when he began to appear as their over-lord. One of the results of the land 
settlement, therefore, was to completely free the natives from any dependency on the 
white settler, by restoring to them the inalienable occupancy of their villages and 
plantations.300 
What Johnston did to restore the “inalienable occupancy of their villages and plantations”, was 
to insert a clause into title deeds or certificates of claim that came to be known as the non-
disturbance clause. Herein European landowners were reprimanded not to disturb existing 
villages and plantations without the consent in writing of the head of the administration. Its 
objective was to protect people through entitling them to live free of rent or labour 
obligations301, and was a reaction to widespread dissatisfaction among Malawians who had 
become landless or forced into thangata through European land alienation. In 1915, grievances 
led to the 1915 Chilembwe uprising, where a European estate in the south was attacked and 
six people, whereof three Europeans, were murdered. Yet, apart from the fact that Johnston 
himself would be the judge to what extent entire communities were disturbed, documentation 
from the Colonial Office reveals that “It looks as if Sir Harry Johnston and his assistants were 
not as thorough as they made out in inspecting all the lands concerned before issuing 
Certificates of Claim”302. This discovery, however, did not seem to ameliorate the colonial 
administrations’ restoration-policy to secure the population. Pachai (1973) has noted the vast 
amount of land that was alienated during Johnston’s administration: by 1936, 66 certificates of 
claim were registered, 59 with land rights and 11 with mineral rights, covering an area of 
1.499.464 hectares of a total landholding potential of 10.182.669 hectares – meaning roughly 
15 per cent of the total land area was privately held under freehold tenure by European 
owners. This includes the finest arable lands and the most densely populated part of the 
country, in the Shire Highlands.303  At the end of the First World War, the colonial government 
was faced with at least two problems. On the one hand, there was the aggrieved African 
population, fuelled by increasing dissatisfaction with their socio-economic position, while on 
the other hand, European estate holders were laying off farm workers due to a decline in 
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demand for labour – a result of the economic slowdown of the first World War. The second 
problem enforced the first, as the estates sought ways (and often just acted upon their 
economic inclinations) to evict their tenants who, without sufficient thangata-obligations, had 
become rent-free squatters.304 Their response was the appointment of a Land Commission to 
address the legal aspects of the colonial regime’s land holding policies, which now resulted in 
a growing class of landless peasants. The 1920 Commission recommended “the provision of 
land reserves for indigenous communities as long as it did not lead to loss of labour by the 
British settler community”305. Labour-as-payment schemes were deconstructed and replaced 
with schemes whereby tenants could sell their crops to the planters at low prices – practically 
making the estates middlemen, or hubs, where agricultural surplus was traded. The 
Commission also paved the way for the 1928 Natives on Private Estates Ordinance306: a law 
that further dismantled thangata. It stated that:   
…every resident African was entitled to a site, materials for a hut and a cultivable plot of 
ground. He had to enter into an agreement with the landowner either to work for wages for 
whole or part of his rent or to cultivate his plot, and sell part of his crops to the landowner 
in lieu of rent. In either case, it was the duty of the land-owner to provide the resident with 
work and a cultivable plot. Failure to provide either of these would negate his claim to rent. 
Rent was to be fixed by a District Board, and this included the fixing of the exchange rate 
for cash crops cultivated. Except for those residents who failed to meet their rent 
obligations within a month of the due date, no resident was to be evicted unless six 
months' notice to quit had been served at the end of each quinquennial period.307 
Furthermore, a clause in the act stated that the government could acquire land for those 
Africans who were made landless as a result of eviction. Owners of estates over 4046,856 
hectares (10,000 acres) were allowed to evict up to 10 per cent of tenants in 1933, and every 5 
years thereafter. These people were to be re-settled on Crown Lands.308 In exchange, the 
estate would be granted land ownership of Crown land of equivalent value elsewhere in the 
territory.309 But the 1928 Act was as ambivalent as the earlier statement by the Commission, 
because on the one hand it entitled every resident African to a site and a cultivable plot of 
ground310, but issues of original rights and security of tenure were disregarded. It protected 
tenants from the worst excesses of thangata, but rather solved the estate owners’ surplus of 
tenants and granted new traction in a stagnant market by allowing the diversification of rent. It 
stipulated three ways in which African could reside on private estates, all of which were 
ultimately controlled by the landowner: through the payment of rent; labour in lieu of the 
whole or part of the rent; or the sale of crops for the whole or part of the rent.311 These 
measures might have sufficiently satisfied parties at this point in time, but it failed to tackle the 
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structural issues stemming from dense population and a biased arrangement of land 
ownership.  
4.2.3 Dual system of ownership   
At the beginning of the 1930’s, the colonial administration and private estate holders were the 
two exclusive owners of the land in colonial Malawi. Yet, their hegemony was challenged by a 
peasantised population without rights of ownership, unsecure tenure, and restricted access to 
land. A socially unjust system that implicitly determined ownership along racial lines amplified 
the voice of the Native Associations: a movement initiated and pursued by missionaries, 
teachers, priests, civil servants, businessmen, farmers and chiefs. They called on the 
government about the loss of their rights, their need for more land and security of tenure.312 By 
now, there were three groups in society that quarrelled over land rights: the government, the 
estate-holders, and the African population. The first was concerned with raising as much taxes 
as possible without paralysing the economy, the second with the need for a reliable flow of 
cheap labour313, and the latter with justice for past actions and securing a livelihood for current 
and future generations.   As 1933 approached, the first year the plantations were legally 
allowed to evict tenants according to the 1928 Ordinance, tensions between the landholders 
and African communities rose. The government reacted by re-purchasing land from the 
estate-holders in order to accommodate evicted population. The Native Authority Bill of 1933 
organised rural communities into so-called Native Authorities. These were to represent the 
communities regarding land and agricultural issues, and were in fact an institutionalisation of a) 
indirect rule through local chiefs and b) the dual agrarian (freehold and communal) systems. 
Although the first may empower local communities and strengthen their hold on land, both 
measures (most certainly the second) enforced the dynamic of peasantisation. Chinigò 
illustrates its effects: “In Thyolo, as long as the supply of land was relatively large, the chiefs 
distributed land to the Lomwe in exchange for produce or labour services; after a few years 
this led to a provision of usufruct rights free of charge”314. From 1936 onwards, the government 
passed successive Native Trust Land Orders-in-Council, meaning the state could declare 
parcels of land ‘native trust land’ and hence reserve it for ‘native’ settlement. De jure this was 
a new means to allocate and control land ownership, but de facto little changed, as the state 
retained the interest in the land as well as the power to dispose of such lands by grant of 
lease to make it private or estate land.315   
  At this point, the African population was divided between those who lived on Crown (or, 
when enacted, trust) land and those who lived on freehold land. African chiefs on the Crown 
land were recognized as traditional authorities (TA’s), through which the government 
exercised administration of the population. In their turn, the TA’s communicated their 
grievances about the lack of cultivable land, whereupon the government receded to the 
strategy of granted verbal assurances to Africans that their rights to land were being 
safeguarded. But this angered the estate holders who relied entirely on the dispossessed 
class for the supply of labour.316 Hence even though the government aimed to protect the 
planters interests by looking for ways to avoid conflict, the persistence of thangata and the 
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continued alienation of land by European planters made sure that any legal attempt to 
reorganise the system of land rights were mere juridical concoctions, unable to soothe the 
perpetual conflict between Africans and Europeans. 
4.2.4 Reorganisation schemes  
Social	  unrest	  regarding	   land	   increased	  in	  the	  decades	  to	  follow	  and	  was	  amplified	  by	  the	  economic	  
stringencies	   of	   the	   1930s	   and	   the	   war	   years	   of	   the	   1940s.317	  1945 saw a victory of the British 
Labour party, and a full-fledged adoption of more progressive colonial land polices that were 
to strengthen peasant farming for food consumption and market production was adopted.318 
Another Land Commission was called into action (1946), concluding that “conflict between 
natives and settlers over land tenure” was a “major problem”319. This realisation inspired two 
government programmes to be initiated in the 1950s: the Master Farmers’ Scheme and the 
Village Improvement Schemes. The first aimed to establish progressive farming through a 
class of yeomen who adopted modern agricultural techniques. Synergies with estate 
agriculture were aspired to by assigning individual land titles. The Village Improvement 
Schemes were deemed a viable solution to resettle Africans and so reduce pressure on land 
in the densely populated areas in the south.320 Here, population density reached 173 per km2 
on Crown lands321; a result from an already historically dense occupation pattern, augmented 
by evictions from estate land and immigration. But rather than relieving pressure on land and 
increasing agricultural production, the schemes were ambiguously used to dislocate the most 
politically active individuals from their homes322; undermine existing matrilineal tenure systems 
by denying women autonomy in land-related decisions323, and insist on fixed patterns of 
rotation that resulted in a 20-30 per cent decrease of food production.324 The attempts to 
reorganise the tenurial system without revising the dual agrarian system as a whole failed. 
 The period of  ‘reorganisation’ just after the Second World War shows a complex field 
of different actors holding clashing interests and views regarding the question who owns, or 
should own, the land. Regardless of where people lived, the African population continued to 
be marginalised and forced into peasantry by the dual system of agriculture. The situation on 
the estates might have improved here and there; the so-called liberal rule that Africans could 
sell their crops to the planters at a low price was still a “subtle way to of getting the African to 
collaborate willingly in the exploitation of his own labour for the benefit of the landlord”325. 
Policy-revision regarding crown lands fall into this same paradox, whereby re-purchasing of 
land by the government to resettle evicted tenants and even give them the opportunity to 
hold individual title, turned out to be a way for the administration to exercise more control over 
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native, rural society.   
  A study by Kandaŵire of the Chingale district, where a resettlement scheme was 
implemented from 1948-1954, highlights the ambiguities. He found that traditional leaders, 
who had been denied authority over their native grounds under thangata, now regained a 
position wherein they could determine who had access to and ownership of land. But instead 
of this leading to satisfaction in an area where 34.000 people were living on two hundred 
square miles and land was highly contested, this led to the formation of contending groups “… 
claiming the right to dispose of land to others, while these latter reject his claim as an 
improper attempt to monopolise land rights”326. TA’s had been undermined throughout the 
period of colonisation, and reinstating means as powerful as determining land access were 
contested by the population. A ‘principle of primacy’, favouring those who were in the area the 
time when the government bought it from the private owners to decide on the allocation of 
land to newcomers, further complicated the issue in an area where migration and land 
alienation had always been present. In other words, the resettlement schemes pitted the 
population against one another in a struggle for land, instead of reaching its objectives of 
solving contestation concerning land rights and increase production. Kandaŵire signifies: “The 
colonial land policy had created the asymmetrical social structure which had been aimed at 
preserving those African institutions which could lead to a cheap exploitation of resources in 
the country for the benefit of the colonisers”327. 
4.2.5 Towards independence 
The year 1949-50 was a year of severe food shortage in colonial Malawi. Highly insecure land 
rights and continuous resettlement, whereby people were either disabled or discouraged to 
invest in plots of land, undoubtedly contributed to this famine. Social tensions were at an all-
time high, manifested by the 1953 Tennet uprising: an outbreak of violence whereby more 
than 10 people were killed on an estate in Thyolo after protests against malpractices and 
exploitation. Chinigò observes that this uprising “…exacerbated a deep sense of injustice, 
which ended up further legitimising the land encroachments initiated months before, on 
plantations belonging to the British Central Africa Company” 328 . The massacre is still 
remembered today as a fundamental moment in the anti-colonial struggle in southern Malawi. 
 Earlier attempts to regulate agricultural and land issues had failed – the time for a 
radical change in land policies seemed more pressing than ever before. The government 
resorted to its usual expedient and set up a Land Commission, which reported as follows: “… 
[we] have reached the conclusion that the only solution is the clear-cut one of getting rid of 
the status of resident native and leaving him free to quit the estate or to stay there on terms 
satisfactory both to himself and the landlord, substituting contractual for statutory rights”329. In 
order to act upon this conclusion, the government re-purchased large tracts of land held in 
freehold by the British Central Africa Company (BCAC), which held large holdings that 
remained undeveloped. When the General Manager took up the fight, an anonymous 
correspondent responded: “It is useless of Mr Nicol330 making himself ill by trying to save the 
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plums of his property, the trend of Nationalisation has come to Nyasaland and privately-owned 
land is doomed”331.   
  A period of transition seemed to have begun. A	  Land	  Ordinance	  Regime	  was	  passed	   in	  
1951,	  which	  deﬁned	  land	  as	  public,	  private	  or	  customary,	  though	  the	  latter	  was	  a	  type	  of	  public	  land,	  
which	  remained	  under	  the	  ultimate	  control	  of	  the	  Protectorate’s	  governor.	  Land	  tenure	  regimes	  that	  
were	   previously	   “created	   by	   treaty,	   convention,	   agreement	   or	   conquest”	   were	   formalised	   and	  
defined	   land	   as	   either	   public,	   private	   or	   customary.	  332	  	   By June 1954, 141.640 hectares were 
reacquired by the government to increase the share of public/customary land, meant to 
resettle African population. This left a mere 3,7 per cent of land (352.886 hectares) in private 
hands in the form of freehold estates. Apart from reacquisition and resettlement, a trend of 
securing African tenure was enforced by the 1952 Private Estates Ordinance. The bill legalised 
the presence of all resident Africans on estates and made registration obligatory; entitled 
every resident to the land they already under crops at the time of implementation (with the 
right to withdraw the land if it was not put to ‘good use’); abolished the five-year period of 
eviction.333 Under the motto of economic partnership, economic production became a direct 
factor influencing the occupation and cultivation of land. Security of tenure remained the 
prime issue in this respect. In 1952 the European representative for Blantyre underlined: 
“…security of tenure was what the peasant cultivator as well as the big landowner wanted”334. 
In spite of the introduction of customary land, where security of tenure was supposed to be 
guarded by traditional law, the 1952 Ordinance once again failed to tackle the dual agrarian 
system. The special status customary law gained in fact meant a further marginalisation of 
Africans, who were now not only became spatially and economically separated, but legally 
and culturally as well. 335   
  The struggle for comprehensive redistribution of land became a strong pillar of the 
independence-movement. In order to prevent further escalation and conflict, until 
independence in 1964 the government saw no other option than to further try to 
accommodate land rights to the needs of the African population. The first measure was to 
fortify customary law, in 1960 with the introduction of a legal provision for property and land to 
be inherited according to customary rules, and in 1962 the right to reside on privates estates 
as a resident was extended to children and dependants of those residents through the Private 
Estates Bill. This latter piece of legislation was the work of dr. Banda, who in a few years would 
become the first prime minister of an independent Malawi. The tone for the intentions of his 
postcolonial policy regarding land was set: neither the exploitation of labour tenants under the 
guise of rent, nor large tracts of undeveloped private land would be tolerated. Furthermore, 
security of tenure should be offered at fair rental prices and without the threat of resettlement 
or eviction to African residents and their descendants and dependants.336	  
4.2.6 Subconclusion 
The road to independence was paved with attempts to align African land interests with those 
of the Europeans. But those interests were split into two main groups who desired stronger 
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grip on the land; African peasants who became residents versus private estate holders. The 
colonial government aimed to balance them out, but was heavily influenced by British political-
economic stakes. From the very beginning of Malawi’s Protectorate-state onwards, land 
ownership was determined by race and British law. Agricultural production was geared 
towards export and depended heavily on the employment of African labour. Since Africans 
were not willing to work for the planter, thangata was enforced and the latter was obliged to 
work for the former.337 Thangata, and the liberalised version in the form of sharecropping, 
were means of the coloniser to exclude the colonised from full participation in the economy.338 
This system facilitated a shift from reciprocal labour (pre-colonial) to marketable labour 
(colonial). Thangata and the ensuing dual agrarian system also firmly established the right to 
dispose and allocate land into the hands of colonial administrators and plantation holders, 
leaving traditional leaders and smallholders empty-handed. On both Crown (to partially 
become customary) and freehold land, Africans lacked security of tenure and were stripped of 
the land they had occupied and used in supposed perpetuity.   
4.3 Land rights in postcolonial Malawi, 1964-2013 
When Malawi gained independence from the British in 1964, it inherited a grid of contested 
land rights. During the colonial era, population continued to grow with more than one per cent 
per annum339, now averaging at 33 people per square kilometre, compared to 5 and 11 in 
Zambia and Zimbabwe respectively.340 The fact that the colonial economy had almost fully 
relied on plantations made the dispersion of land a powerful topic, especially in a society that 
was trying to remake and rekindle its socio-economic structure in order to face the future. 
Radical changes were to take place.  The first postcolonial government was led by dr. Banda. 
During the proceedings that followed independence, he emphasised that the existing customs 
for holding and tilling land were out-dated and unsuitable for developing a country with an 
economy based on agriculture. Banda argued that the colonial; dual system of customary/trust 
land and plantation land discouraged individuals and institutions from providing loans for 
investment in and development of land. In a statement that seems neoliberal avant la lettre, a 
flourishing agricultural economy based on individual title was envisioned:   
 
  First by accepting and recognising the principle or idea of individual ownership of land and
 secondly by insisting that anyone who owns land, whether as an individual or a as the head 
 of his or her family, is strictly responsible for the economic and productive use of his or her 
 land; otherwise it must be taken away.341 
To revive the economy, tenure reforms were deemed absolutely necessary. Previously 
unfixed and uncertain land boundaries had led to contention and even conflict, and 
succession rules led to excessive fragmentation and subdivision of holdings. Dense 
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population and the shortage of land also caused uncontrollable dealings in land. 342  A 
scattered and contested economic fabric was the result, discouraging long-term investment in 
any given plot of land. Dr. Banda eloquently illustrated his vision to solve this problem:  
No one is responsible… for the uneconomic and wasted use of land because no one holds 
land as an individual. Land is held in common… and everybody’s baby is nobody’s baby at 
all.343 
In other words, a move towards individual land rights was initiated. Within three years of 
independence, three new statutes were enacted. The first was the Customary Land 
Development Act, which provided for the "ascertainment of rights and interest in customary 
land" and for its "conversion" for "better agricultural development", processes termed 
"allocation of customary land". The second was the Registered Land Act, which provided the 
machinery for registering titles to land, including allocated land, and the new substantive land 
law applicable thereto. The third was the Local Land Boards Act; providing the machinery for 
controlling dealings in allocated land after registration.344 
4.3.1 New laws, new economy?    
The Land Bill introduced in 1965 recognised that land was the country’s greatest economic 
asset and that its potential could only be maximally used when subjected to proper rules and 
regulations. The colonial categories of Crown, freehold and trust land were moulded into 
public, private and customary land. All three categories were placed under full governmental 
supervision and control. The goal of all these new regulations was planned and orderly 
development of the agricultural sector. 345 The first attempt to fully implement this goal was 
through the Lilongwe Land Development Programme (LLDP)346. Covering 202.343 hectares in 
the densely populated Lilongwe District, the programme was supposed to advance a 
transition from a subsistence to a cash economy. Its success was to be extended into other 
districts, in anticipation of national coverage.347 Its aim was to increase agricultural productivity, 
but land rights were the key of its strategy. It aimed to “re-organize land tenure systems from 
usufruct to consolidated holdings under a registered deed of freehold title, thus making land 
preservation and improvement worthwhile to the individual”348 . Hence, land held under 
customary tenure was now to accommodate individual ownership.     
  Yet the process of titling land in Lilongwe led to more disruption than productivity. The 
titling programme ran aground on the time it took to identify, demarcate and title land, and 
only a small area was finally covered.349 The core problems was identifying the unit of land to 
be granted individual title and the propensity of chiefs and elders to control the allocation 
process, leading to younger men and especially women, who traditionally hold strong ties to 
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the land through matrilineality, to be worse off. Emphasis on individual title can easily take 
away or dilute women’s rights to land, as men could easily take advantage of the opportunity 
to possess more land and rights. Due to a lack of resources and poor economic positions, 
women may be inclined to sell their titles to wealthy groups in order to survive. Matchaya 
concludes: “This phenomenon may be much more under the titling regimes than it is under 
the traditional land ownership because the latter has inbuilt checks against destitute land 
alienation”350.   
  The transition to a system of individual land rights was fraught with problems. The 
registration of an individual as a proprietor “confers on him the rights of ownership of that land 
as private land”351, but the Act was quickly adapted to also accommodate the registration of 
“family land” rights. Eventually, family land became the norm under LLDP352, although one 
representative per family was registered as the proprietor.353  The designation of new land 
rights in a densely populated area, where land was scarce and desired, proved to be a hotbed 
for strife over proprietorship and demarcation. The introduction of this system was a means to 
exercise new relations of power, based on land, between and within families, chiefs, headmen 
and governmental “demarcation teams”. The LLDP set out to institutionalise a system, with all 
its distinct characteristics, that had never been present on customary territory; one with clear-
cut boundaries and unequivocal owners. Whereas access and ownership to land had always 
been dependent upon belonging to a community, or mbumba (family):  
While the boundary of the village is fixed, the family united boundary is more flexible, 
depending upon relative land pressure between families, enthusiasm during the hoeing 
season, and new marriages in the families. The leader of the family holds the rights of the 
land in trust for the absent members, and it is he [the trustee] who allocates lands to an 
outsider354 
A move to private rights was initiated, but resisted by rural population and TA’s. Policy was 
adapted and the family remained the nexus on the customary land. As Kishindo has noted for 
the Yao people in Balaka (to the north of Zomba): “Families that have enjoyed uninterrupted 
use of specific pieces of land for generations do not perceive themselves as mere right 
holders but owners of the land they use”355.   
The futility to define and demarcate family units and record the persons with interests therein 
was the most notable shortcoming of the postcolonial effort to reform the land system.  Also, 
policy-makers saw that individual title would not overcome rampant fragmentation and 
subdivision of	   holdings,	   and	   that	   larger	   family	   holdings	   would	   be	   better	   equipped	   to	   optimally	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exploit	   the	   land	   on	   a	   cooperative	   basis	   than	   a	  multitude	   of	   individuals	   holdings	   that	  would	   rarely	  
exceed	  2	  hectares.356	  	  	  
4.3.2 The revival of a dual system  
The first attempts by the Banda-led government to spark agricultural growth through 
implementing individual title did not work. But while government officials tried to demarcate 
land and assign title in Lilongwe, another remarkable process was taking place. A 1967 
amendment to the Land Act allowed customary land to be converted and leased to individuals 
and corporations for up to 99 years. This arrangement was well put to use and a Malawian 
landed class began to emerge. Holden et al. note some 1.200.000 hectares of land were 
converted from customary to leasehold between 1977 and 1997, mostly for the production of 
high-value tobacco. A 1972 amendment to the 1963 Special Crops Act introduced a licensing 
system for burley and flue cured tobacco production. The licensing system ensured that these 
varieties of tobacco could only be grown on freehold and leasehold land, which prevented 
smallholder farmers from producing and commercialising them357, and prevented them from 
participating in the most rewarding area of the economy. This situation is similar the dual 
colonial system, where the most fertile parts of the country were in the hands of planters, and 
the remaining part was held in trust for the African population.   
  There is another aspect in Banda’s policy that hints of a continuation of the colonial 
system. In 1965 the Chiefs Act was enacted, formalising the role of Native Authorities in 
customary areas. Chiefs were legitimised as the intermediaries between the people and the 
state. This marked the consolidation of a dual administrative system, and a revival, or 
continuation, of the system that did not differ much from the colonial one which was in 
place.358 Agricultural products were obtained from the smallholder producers on customary 
land through regulation, while the newly established political elite was provided with “the 
carrot” of leased estates. These underwent a remarkable expansion during the 1970s and 
1980s by annexing some 700.000 hectares of customary land.359 A combination of reasons 
such as mismanagement, overcapitalisation and the economic slump following on the oil crisis 
meant many of these estates were failing by the early 1980s. Structural adjustment 
programmes offered by the Bretton Woods institutions were introduced including its 
accompanying liberalisation policies. On the one hand this meant that the most successful and 
entrepreneurial smallholders were able to integrate into global market networks, while it also 
intensified the process of land alienation and displacement without offering alternative 
sources of income for the majority of the middle-income and poorer population. The latter 
became dependent on wage labour and subsistence agriculture, and inequality grew. From 
1990 to 2006 the average income of the bottom quartile was a tenth of the top quartile, with 
an increase from 1:4 to 1:11 between 1986 and 1990. 360  This economic malaise incited 
reclamation movements, which revolved around “the symbolic as well as the material meaning 
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of land”361. The politicisation of the rural population led to public protests challenging the 
Banda regime and eventually a national referendum, which heralded the entry of multiparty 
democracy in 1994.362  In the run up to the elections the land question was at the centre of 
political contention, which eventually gave Bakili Muluzi the power of the Presidency.363   
4.3.3 Post-British, post-Banda: a new era?   
In 1996, a Presidential Commission of Inquiry on Land Policy Reform (PCILPR) was established 
to “recommend the main principles of a new land policy which will foster a more economically 
eﬃcient, environmentally sustainable and social equitable land tenure system.”364 It concluded 
that the granting of private titles through the LLDP had not achieved greater security of 
ownership, negotiability of title nor a robust land market.365 Lastly, it expressed a concern 
regarding the historical wrong done to those who saw their land alienated to Europeans and 
for which “it is not unreasonable that demands for some form of land readjustment are being 
asserted”366. The report also recognised the variety in customary tenure rules (including the 
different matrilineal and patrilineal forms) as “a complex mixture of rules of conduct, leadership 
codes and management principles relating to access to and control of land in a given social 
context”367. Thus even though customary rules may vary between communities, it will usually 
mean that “every individual has, by virtue of membership in a given community, access to the 
land resources of that community in space and time”368. Such rights are transmissible to 
designate heirs. But the increase of pressure on land under such customary tenure led the 
Commission to point out changes in the traditional lineage organisation of descent, 
inheritance and succession, whereby potential heirs “most distant from core lineage members 
are increasingly becoming targets for eviction”369.   
  This occurred most frequently in those areas that suffered most from land pressure, 
especially in the Southern Region. In order to reduce population pressure over land, the 
Community-Based Rural Land Development Project was called into life by government and 
donor organisations. It was based on the ‘willing seller, willing buyer’ model, and provided 
resettlement for the landless or near-landless farmers out of Tyholo and Mulanje.370 Even 
though it sounds as a reasonable solution to a structural problem, several studies question its 
effectiveness. It became clear that a large number of beneficiaries actually returned after 
resettlement – a dynamic that created even more problems. A farmer from the area 
commented:  
                                                   
361 Chinigò, ‘Re-peasantization and land reclamation movements in Malawi’, 102. 
362 Peters and Kambewa, ‘Whose security?, 451. 
363 Silungwe, Customary land tenure reform and development, 30.  
364 Holden et al., ‘Land policy reform’, 13. The PCILPR was set up and executed by the Ministry of Land 
with the  assistance of the World Bank.  
365 Holden et al., ‘Land policy reform’, 14.  
366 PCILPR 1998, cited in Holden et al., ‘Land policy reform’, 13-14. 
367 Ibid., 13.  
368 Ibid., 13.  
369 Ibid., 14.   
370 Chinigò, ‘Re-peasantization and land reclamation movements in Malawi’, 111.  
64 
 
 [T]he project was a failure. People are coming back from Mangochi, they claim back the 
 land they left to others, and this creates endless disputes. Resettlement meant conflict, and 
 this is disrupting our communities. And we continue to be short of land.371 
The serious disputes over land, especially in the South, and the abovementioned findings of 
the Commission inspired the creation of the Malawi National Land Policy, which was discussed 
in Cabinet in 2002. All land-related laws set forth in this Policy were to be reviewed by a 
Special Law Commission (2003).372 It recommended a) new restrictions on freehold tenure, for 
example by reserving it for Malawian citizens, b) the conversion of parts of freehold land into 
leasehold, and c) supervision of the status of companies and corporates with shares in land in 
Malawi.373 With regards to customary land, the New Land Policy states customary landholdings 
shall be registered as private customary estates. To circumvent the problem of subdivision 
and interchangeable rights between the individual and the family, which were noted earlier on, 
these customary estates were to be registered for entire communities, families or individuals. 
These customary estates will have “private usufructuary rights in perpetuity, and once 
registered, the title of the owner will have full legal status and can be leased or used as 
security for a mortgage loan.” Hence, tenure on customary land (now covering almost 70 per 
cent of national land) moved towards stronger individualised rights, but units for titling 
remained unspecified.374   
4.3.4 A struggle for ownership   
The 2002 Land Policy has been subject to heavy debate until the early 2010s and has still not 
been passed as law.375  So far, adoption of the principles proposed in the Land Policy has 
been limited to a handful of donor-sponsored projects.376 At its core, the Land Policy aims to 
address the historical problem whereby land in Malawi was expropriated from communities 
without compensation. The distinction between government and public land, made by the 
Muluzi government was supposed to make land acquisition more transparent. Acquisition for 
national development purposes (infrastructure, environmental protection) should be 
government land, and land acquired for the benefit of the general public should be 
compensated based on the “open market value and paid to the owner both for the land and 
improvements”. The 2006 Commission suggested the establishment of a titled “Land 
Acquisition and Compensation Act”, to ensure that any acquisition under the Act shall be 
accompanied by appropriate compensation.377 Two structural problems inhibit broad 
public support of and therefore the adoption of the New Land Policy. The first is determining 
the extent of compensation. The Commission also recommended an independent evaluator, 
appointed by the Minister or local government authority, shall be called upon to determine 
‘appropriate’ compensation. The compensation was to be calculated based on losses of 
“occupational rights, loss of land, loss of structure (investments), loss of business, relocation 
costs, loss of goodwill, costs of professional advice, injurious affection, nuisance or loss or 
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reduction of tenure as long as they are not too remote and are a natural and reasonable 
consequence of the disposition of the land”378. But how are former, present and future rights 
to land quantified in a scattered, unregulated land market as Malawi? The policy assumes  “all 
existing rights and encumbrances” can be incorporated, but these rights are more often 
incompatible between existing uses and rights that are derived from (past) allegiances – rights 
that need far more analysis and are not easily singled out.379 The second  important factor that 
impeded the adoption of the Bill is the struggle for power which a contested system of rights 
as described above has generated. Resistance to land reform came from the traditional 
authorities and/or their representatives. Their resistance, voiced during the Commissions’ 
consultative process, was based on the conception that the Bill would undermine their power 
over land. The 2002 Land Policy suggested that Customary Land Committees should be 
implemented to control the TA’s. The Committees were to oversee formalisation of customary 
land and allocation of village lands380, which can be taken as a restriction to their authority, 
which had been (politically) enforced during the Banda regime.381 Peters describes the social 
struggle for power and ownership:  
 …some farmers (…) reject the stance of the chiefs who are trying to reassert their rights 
 over the scheme land. Some say that the chiefs do not own the land but are trustees, and 
 that the plots should belong to those who have cultivated them for years. Some say that 
 the government owns the land but is lending it to the farmers on the scheme, and chiefs 
 should not be involved at all. Yet others, echoing the oﬃcial government view, say that the 
 land should belong to the new (and to be formed) associations of users of the scheme 
 plots.382 
The role of TA’s is also disputed in the land rental and sales market. As population grows and 
land becomes increasingly scarce, leasing in or leasing out land has become a common 
means for people to improve their welfare or search for alternative livelihoods.383  The TAs are 
also very much involved in determining prices and periods of lease384, and a new Land Policy 
would undermine this economic position of power as well.  
Because of the central role land played in the local power structures, the conflict over land 
became entangled with competition and conflict over authority. Through the mobilisation of 
TA’s into civil society and their position of power in multiparty democracy, the struggle for land 
was one between “elders (or seniors) and juniors, between traditional authorities or chiefs of 
various stripes and younger educated groups, between men and women, between locals and 
migrants, between autochthones and strangers” and also one that found resonance in the 
highest political and economic circles.385  
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4.4 Subconclusion  
Independence did not lead to a radical break with colonial land policies. Instead, the first 
decades after independence were characterised by a clash in the government’s intentions to 
stimulate agricultural development and the policies it installed to that end.  During the Banda-
era, there was no focus on land redistribution and channelling resources to smallholder 
agriculture but a continued emphasis on estate agriculture.386 A political-economic elite was 
able to install itself, global market integration was enabled by liberalisation, and encroachment 
onto public land was unproblematic. Hence, postcolonial Malawi saw a continuation of colonial 
land policies. Yet colonial policies defined ownership and occupation on the basis of race, 
while postcolonial policies deracialised ownership in the freehold agricultural sector, giving 
way to an African elite.387  On-going economic malaise and rising inequality, both directly 
related to the question who owns the land in Malawi, forced Banda to resign. After Banda, 
another kick-start for land reform was initiated. It was, once again, based on the assumption 
that customary land was inherently insecure and traditional systems of land allocation and 
inheritance did not promote agricultural development. Traditional systems were further 
eroded, and a substantial resistance grew among traditional leaders and civil society 
representatives. To this day, the debate on who decides the owner and the value of land is 
on-going. With increasing land scarcity demand for land rises and may increasingly be 
satisfied through land markets.   
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5. ZIMBABWE 
Scarcity is constructed through the machinations of tenure and ownership 
J. Till, ‘Scare stories: scarce stories. The ideology of austerity’, SCIBE, scarcity + creativity in the built 
environment working paper nr. 10, (2012) 6.   
This final chapter serves as a case to test the outcomes of the previous chapters, which 
represent extremes with regard to population density.  Zimbabwe hovers in-between them 
(see graph 1 and 2), and should thus neither have developed especially clearly demarcated 
land rights, nor was land a negligible factor endowment, with open access as a result. Yet 
Zimbabwe has developed the most intense history of land rights of the territories studied and, 
perhaps, of the world in modern history.  A Rhodesian settler in 1949 summarised his point of 
view: “Don’t regard the country as a Black Man’s country, where the white man is the intruder, 
an exploiter of Black labour, a superior; look at it as an empty country (which it practically is for 
what are 1.750.000 millions [sic.] in a country three times the size of England?) to be settled 
with (a) white population ....”388. The ratio between people and land was relevant from the first 
colonial encounters onwards, and this chapter traces the dynamics between population and 
land. Land was not as easily alienated as in sparsely populated Zambia, and creating Reserves 
was a tactic employed by the BSAC from its inception onwards. Premier Coghlan, for example, 
told the all-settler legislative assembly in 1927, “This is essentially a country where the white 
man has come and desires to stay, and he can only be certain of doing so if he has certain 
portions of the colony made his exclusively”389. This chapter traces the development of that 
intention via the controversial Native Land Husbandry Act, a Second Chimurenga, Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence, land policy implications installed by the British and Bretton 
Woods, to the Third Chimurenga, and the ensuing struggle for land between race and class 
extending into the present.  
5.1 Land rights in colonial Zimbabwe: 1923-1980 
The ownership of land is an integral part of the colonial and postcolonial history of Zimbabwe. 
Unlike any other country in sub Saharan Africa, the struggle for land in Zimbabwe has spurred 
political upheaval and outright violence between those who held land, and those who did not. 
Yet the reason for researching the impact of population density on the bundle of rights that 
determine land ownership is not as evident as in the case of Zambia or Malawi. Both these 
countries pose an either extraordinarily low, or a remarkably high density, which leads one to 
assume its impact to be far greater than in a country where the concentration of population 
was never either notably high or low. Yet, this makes Zimbabwe an ideal test case wherein the 
alleged effects of population density can be mitigated.   
  In 1923, administrative authority of the territory of Southern Rhodesia was transferred 
from the BSAC to the Responsible Government, institutionalising a “settlers390’ state”.391 It had 
                                                   
388 A.S. Mlambo, ‘Building a white man’s country: Aspects of white immigration into Rhodesia up to 
World War II’, Zambezia 15 (1998) 123-46, 131.  
389 V.E. Machingaidze,  ‘Agrarian change from above: The Southern Rhodesia Native Land Husbandry 
Act and African response’, The international journal of African historical studies 24 (1991) 557-88, 559.  
390 The term ‘settler’ can change its connotation for different speakers in different periods during the 
history of Zimbabwe. It is a label that is inextricably linked to access to land in colonial and postcolonial 
eras. Here, it refers to white colonists who occupied vast swathes of agricultural land during the colonial 
68 
 
been the result of a build-up of pressure from the expanding settler population, for whom the 
scattered legal landscape of BSAC treaties and overlapping authority exercised by the British 
colonial commission designating Crown Lands, were an obstruction to further development.392 
Yet, settlers sought development mostly through expanding control over territory, which, ever 
since the arrival of the Pioneer Column in 1890, had become a predominant aspect of 
government in Southern Rhodesia. The fact that a relatively large number of white settlers 
established themselves in colonial Zimbabwe is mostly ascribed to the beneficial ecological 
circumstances: temperature, vegetation, quality of the soil, water supply, etc., made for a 
tropical climate that was nonetheless well-suited for whites to settle: most notably the “high 
field” crosscutting the middle of the country (see the yellow strip on map 1).393 The natural 
wealth of the land offered legion opportunity for the newly established Europeans to invest in 
agriculture and mining – both sectors that were in dire need of affordable labour. The 
population density at that time was not as low as in Zambia, yet numerous enough to form a 
potentially vigorous opposition394: a fear that, for example, was seen as confirmed by the ‘First 
Chimurenga’395.  Possession of land became a pivotal tool for the European powers to forge 
dominance over a population that was neither especially numerous nor sparse – a protracted, 
frenzied history of land rights is its result.  
Rhodesia was colonised with the belief it would flourish as a gold-mining economy and 
generate unprecedented revenues for its exploiters. Yet at the end of the 19th century, the 
projections made by the BSAC were persistently too high and matched neither the generated 
costs nor returns on the overhead capital.396 The persistent overestimations called for an 
“emergency economic response” and the government resorted to a “least-cost” means of 
forging economic development, namely the granting of large-scale land concession to white 
immigrants; mostly companies based in South Africa or Britain.397 The argument here was that 
if a white rural bourgeoisie would settle in Rhodesia, they would develop the country and 
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consequently “raise the value of its [the white rural bourgeoisie] assets in the area – viz. the 
railway system, the mine claims, and especially land”398. Land, therefore, has been pivotal in 
the social and economic development of Zimbabwe - European settlers were encouraged to 
set up farms, and the colony was readied to transform from a disappointing goldfield into an 
agricultural based settler colony.399 In 1905 the Department of Agriculture wrote: “…there 
appears to be a general awakening to the fact that the lasting prosperity of the country and its 
greatest and most permanent (sic.) source of wealth lie in its pastoral and agricultural 
industries”400. The focus on agriculture only increased the importance of land, and tensions 
arose between immigrants and indigenous people, leading to the instalment of Native 
Reserves in order to diminish future conflicts over land and create a supply of cheap labour.401  
Map 8: Relief map of Zimbabwe402 
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5.1.1 The rise of a settler economy  
The availability of labour and land were key issues for the creating of an agricultural settler 
economy. The early years of ‘responsible government’ were focused on enlarging and 
protecting the rights for Europeans to land: a process that went hand in hand with restricting 
access to and alienating land from the indigenous population. Land, Gann notes, “always 
formed the life-blood of Rhodesian politics”403, and with the institutionalisation of responsible 
government, pre-1923 settler conventions were turned into law.404 Previously, land policy had 
been somewhat improvisatory yet dominated by the European community’s interests. The 
1923 Constitution provided the maintenance of the exclusive use rights for Africans in Native 
Reserves, similar to those set aside in 1895. The rest of the land was available for purchase by 
both Europeans and Africans.405 The concern to strengthen the grip on land by the settler 
population was not yet reflected in land law. Concessions were granted ad hoc and the 
difference between ‘African’ and ‘European’ areas had a meaning in everyday parlance, but 
not in law.406 In 1923, still, the Constitution Letters Patent stated  “a native may acquire, hold, 
encumber, and dispose of land on the same conditions as person who is not a native”407. Yet 
not many Africans had been able to make use of this provision to purchase land for individual 
tenure: 18.210 hectares were sold to Africans compared to the 12.545.254 hectares purchased, 
during the same period, by Europeans.408 In reality, the barrier between white and non-white 
land markets was maintained by the prices to which land in European areas had risen and the 
inability of nearly all Africans and most Indians to afford the acquisition of land.409 There were 
clear signs of class formation, based on the access and right to own land in the colony410: a 
division that became entrenched law by the 1930 Land Apportionment Act.  
  The crisis years of the 1930’s solidified the class relations. Politically, the newly 
installed government was no longer uncontested. Chiefs complained to visiting dignitaries that 
the reserves were becoming too small, wages were too low, and taxes and prices too high. 
The land question, in particular, was a topic that united African grievances, and a 
consciousness that severe racial inequality was creeping into Rhodesian land policies grew.411 
Although their organisation, inspired by the South African National Congress and mostly 
propelled by missionaries, posed little threat to the establishment, in general there was a 
sense that Africans became less respectful of the settled authority. 412  The Rhodesian 
government saw a motive to strengthen their legal rights to land and, if possible, annihilate the 
defiance of the current ambiguous legislation concerning land. Longingly, they looked at the 
pattern of physical separation of races which had been installed in South Africa, and where 
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Africans came into “as little as possible conflict or competition with the white man socially, 
economically, and politically”413. The possibility to demarcate separate areas was looked into 
by the Morris Carter Land Commission, set up in 1925.414 The Commission set out to:  
Enquire into and report upon the expediency and practicability of setting apart defined 
 areas  outside the boundaries of Native Reserves a) within which Natives only shall be 
 permitted to  acquire ownership of or interest in land, and b) within which only Europeans 
shall be  permitted to acquire ownership of or interest in land.415 
The Commission concluded that a form of territorial apartheid was both preferred by Africans 
and Europeans 416 , yet that there was also a need to set aside land for purchase by 
‘detribalised’ and ‘progressive’ rural Africans who aspired to better themselves. The 
commission declared that African land ownership should only be permitted in areas especially 
designated for that purpose, and suggested some 3 million hectares of land located next to 
the reserves – in the hope communal farmers would be able to learn from their more 
‘advanced’ neighbours.417  Hence, the commission advised a policy of setting aside defined 
areas in which the acquisition of land should be confined to Africans and Europeans 
respectively, was both practicable and desirable, “until the native has advanced much further 
on the path to civilisation, it is better that points of contact between the two races should be 
reduced”418. The areas were deemed Native Purchase Land: land set aside for those Africans 
who were able and willing to acquire individual tenure. Africans thus lost the right to buy land 
anywhere in the territory, but benefited from a protected land market.419 This advice passed as 
legislation in the form of the 1930 Land Apportionment Act.420  The Act gave effect to the 
principal recommendations of the Carter Commission and introduced the major policy 
regarding the ownership of land, dividing the country’s territory on the basis of European and 
African Lands. This meant the creation of an exclusive European area, maintenance of Native 
Areas, a new category of Native Purchase area, and unassigned land, left “for future 
determination”421. This land was mostly rocky and waterless, unfit for agriculture.422 The Act 
also established a Native Land Board: a Board that advised Africans on acquiring land in 
Native Purchase Areas.   
   In a 1930 report the Dominions Office reflects: “… this Bill relates primarily only to the 
question of the purchase of land on individual tenure. The Native who is content to live under 
tribal conditions is provided for by ample reserves fixed some time ago by a Commission.” 
The reserves mentioned amounted to 2.5 million acres of land, on which 560.000 of the total 
880.000 of the African population resided. The Bill did not change the nature or size of the 
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reserves, which were determined pre-1923, but provided the setting apart of “Native purchase 
areas, in which only Natives may hold or occupy land”. The report concludes: “On the whole, 
the proposed legislation has been generally regarded as making generous provision for the 
Natives”423.   
  Yet the report fails to note that the 7 million acres that were set aside as purchase 
areas were of poor quality and “often in isolated areas of the country, far removed from 
transportation lines and markets.”424 The areas were set up to compensate for the loss of right 
to purchase land anywhere in the country, but by independence in 1980 less than 10.000 of 
the 50.000 people that were envisioned to have made us of the provision had actually settled 
in the purchase areas425.  
Graph 7. Land division in Zimbabwe after implementation of the Land Apportionment Act426 
 
5.1.2  Between the acts: pressure on the land increases 
The 1930 Land Apportionment Act caused for a seemingly clear-cut segmentation of land into 
a European area where land was allocated through market forces, and an African area where 
allocation was communal, and neither having the right to purchase in the reserve of the 
other.427 In reality, the situation on the land was more complex. The policy of segregation of 
land ownership involved the removal of many thousands of people from the European into the 
designated Native Areas. 428  This, combined with continued population growth, led to 
significant pressure on the land in the reserves. By the end of the Second World War, the 
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reserves were seriously overcrowded and overstocked429: both the result of and incentives for 
changes in land policies after 1930.   
  Apart from the Africans that inhabited European areas, the Act did not provide for the 
urban African population. Since the towns were all situated in the European Areas, it was 
impossible for Africans to live within its borders and carry on business – which, in turn, would 
be detrimental for e.g. mining towns. A 1941 amendment to the Land Act attempted to solve 
this problem, by creating Native Urban Areas in the vicinity of European towns.430 In reality, 
these were African locations under special provisions of the Act, but remained part of the 
European Area: Africans could only acquire leaseholds. These areas were usually far from the 
towns, so that Africans had long and difficult daily journeys to work. Because of the 
impracticality, people would often reside in European areas in order to be nearer to their 
employment: a habit a 1945 amendment to the Act ended. It forbade “disposing of or 
attempting to dispose of any such land [land within a European Area] to a Native; lease any 
such land to a Native; permit, suffer or allow any Native to occupy  such land”431.   
  Yet the 1945 amendment addressed another problem as well. As noted, when the 
European Area was created, many African families were living within its borders, as they had 
for generations. Government policy was to move these people gradually to African lands, but 
95.000 remained in the European Area in addition to those entitled to live on estates and for 
which the Act had made exemptions. There were also an estimated 175.000 Zimbabwean 
Africans living in Forest Area or, on the old communal basis, in the Native Purchase Area.432 
This was known as the “squatter problem”433. Very little fertile, attractive land remained 
unoccupied in the European areas, and space could only be made available by clearing land 
or compelling existing owners to sell. Land scarcity was enhanced by the influx of European 
settlers escaping the economic hardships of post-war Europe. White population grew from 
80.500 in 1945 to 219.000 by 1960. The majority of these immigrants turned to farming, and 
the amount of European-owned farms nearly doubled from 4.673 in 1945 to 8.632 in 1960.434 
From 1945 onwards land scarcity became an increasingly pressing problem in European and 
African areas.   
  Due to the arrival of more European settlers, post-war settlement policy was not only 
focused on controlling land prices, but also on removing squatters from alienated land. 435 
Since the government could not regulate the private market of agricultural land, it focused on 
the second aspect of the solution, and actively targeted the relocation of squatters. Between 
1945-51, more than 85.000 families were moved from European land into reserves436, some of 
which were located in inhospitable and tsetse-ridden areas. By now, the African population 
was forcefully stripped from secure tenure.  A 1943 survey by the Natural Resources Board on 
the Conservation of Natural Resources on the Land Occupied by Natives found the African 
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population of Zimbabwe was living on the following lands under the following tenurial 
conditions:  
1. Natives on occupied alienated farms in the European area. These may be a) ordinary 
agricultural labourers on monthly contract, possibly cultivating a small plot but not in 
accordance with any form of tenancy agreement b) labour agreement tenants and c) cash-
paying tenants who agreements must now be annually renewed by the Chief Native  
Commissioner, under the authority of a permit granted by the Minister of Native affairs 
2. Natives on un-occupied alienated farms in the European area - usually the property of land 
companies - paying from 1 to 2 pounds per head per annum rent (27.000) 
3. Natives on Crown Land in the European area (76.000)  
4. Natives in the native purchase area, subdivided into those who have acquired or are in the 
process of acquiring a plot in a survey locality, those cultivating land which has not yet 
been survey or dividend into plots and those on such portions of special occupational area 
land as have now been included in the native purchase area. Here the land tenure system 
for the present at any rate resembles that of a centralised reserve rather than that of an 
alienated portion of the Native (purchase) area. The grazing is communal; arable land is 
allocated between natives but on holds a lease or deed of grant. The remainder of the 
special occupation area, where as you will observe from what I have just said in the legal 
position of the natives is week, will eventually be incorporated in the native reserves 
5. Natives in Reserves both a) those that have been centralised and b) those that have not 
yet been centralised (885.000)437 
Table 5 illustrates the decrease in the share of population living on alienated lands, and, as a 
result of the amendments in the Land Apportionment Act, the relative increase of population in 
the reserves.  
Table 5. Distribution of African population in Zimbabwe by type of land tenure, 1922-51 (all 
figures in thousands)438 
 Total African 
population 
In Reserves In Native Purchase 
Areas 
On alienated lands 
1922 788 503 - 285 (36,2%) 
1926 848 553 - 295 (34,8%) 
1931 983 641 - 342 (34,8%) 
1936 1081 719 54 308 (28,5%) 
1941 1265 854 103 308 (24,3%) 
1946 1533 1084 135 314 (20,5%) 
1951 1840 1258 237 344 (18,7%) 
 
As can be deduced from table 5, population density in the areas designated to Africans 
increased significantly during 1922-1951. By 1955, population density in the reserves had risen 
to 28,6 compared to 11,2 in 1931439, when the Land Apportionment Act had just been passed. 
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This fuelled not only grievances by the African population, but also an interesting 
governmental response. The government was looking for ways to increase the carrying 
capacity of the Reserves, for one by preventing individual tenure. Precariously, a 
governmental report from 1945 for example notes:  “It is sometimes argued that with limited 
land available for Natives in general, the creation of individual plots over as great an area as 
7.900.000 acres [3.197.016 hectares ] is wasteful and that a wiser policy would be to develop 
the area on the lines of centralised [communal] reserve440”. The Natural Resources Board 
notes, in the same year: “and the opinion of the administrative officials of this department is 
dictated by necessity, because a given area of land cut up into holdings for individual tenure 
will obviously not accommodate the same number of people as could be accommodated 
under the communal system441”. The state of the soil was also a  source of problems, since the 
land in the Reserves was often uncultivable: “It should be pointed out that in many of the 
Native Reserves in south-eastern Mashonaland, where they cover  a very large acreage, the 
country is of a very broken and diversiform nature and includes mountain, hill, valley, plain and 
vlei land with its grazing.” It was advised to implement a “correct system of pasture 
management”, able to adapt to the specific ecological circumstances. “Only in this way can 
the carrying capacity of these reserves be maintained and increased”442, states a 1943 Report 
of Commission to enquire into the conditions prevailing in the pasturage of the colony. The 
same problems were found in the Native Purchase Areas:  
A considerable portion of the Native Purchase Area is uninhabitable; it will not be possible 
to subdivide all the area into plots for individual tenure. Certainly the land is now 
uninhabitable and probably about 4,5 million acres [1.8 million hectares] of further land 
within the existing Native Purchase Area might with advantage be settled after the manner 
of a centralised reserve.443 
In other words, the government was considering a re-evaluation of private land ownership in 
the Purchase Areas due to the increased pressure on the land, arguing that an intensive 
system of agricultural with communal fields has the ability to hold a larger amount of people. 
Yet another report:    
The bulk of the opinion of officials of the Native Department and others is entirely opposed 
to the policy of granting individual holdings to natives – a form of tenure contrary to their 
traditions. Looked at from the point of view of the conservation of the soil (…) much more 
effective supervision and control of the landholders is essential. It is contended that better 
use could be made of the land and that it could accommodate more natives if occupied on 
communal principles – points of importance where there appears to be a shortage of 
land.444  
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The Reserves were designed to hold more people, rather than to provide homes where 
people could exercise their choices in an economic way: that is, to farm in accordance with 
the ecological circumstances at hand. Individual tenure was possibly also seen as leverage 
against the colonial regime, and granting more grip on land, would grant the population more 
grip on political affairs. Therefore, the pressures of population density and the need to 
increase access to land to farm more sustainably and effectively were weaker than the direct 
political power of the colonial government. The economic grievances that this unsustainable 
system created continued to brood, with disastrous consequences for the history of 
Zimbabwe.  
5.1.3 The Native Land Husbandry Act  
Overpopulation on African Lands became a priority for land policy after the Second World War. 
Up to this point in time, the reserves were employed to hold as many people as possible, and 
communal tenure was hailed for its carrying capacity; it was even hoped to bring about 
agricultural improvement.445 Yet soon the severe overpopulation and degradation of land 
made any form of agricultural growth impossible, and a solution was proposed with the Native 
Husbandry Act (NLHA) in 1951.446 The objectives of the Act were to:  
(i)          to provide for a reasonable standard of good husbandry and for the protection of 
natural resources by all Africans using the land; 
(ii)          to limit the number of stock in any area to its carrying capacity, and, as far as 
practicable, to relate stock holding to arable land holding as a means of improving 
farming practice;  
(iii)  to allocate individual rights in arable areas and in communal grazing areas as far as was 
possible in terms of economic units, and, where this was not possible due to over-
population, to prevent further fragmentation and to provide for the aggregation of 
fragmentary holdings in economic units;   
(iv) to provide individual security of tenure of arable land and individual security of grazing 
rights in communal grazing areas; and   
(v)          to provide for the setting aside of land for towns and business centres in the 
African areas.447 
These goals directly changed the way the people in the overcrowded Reserves were to relate 
to the land. The Act was designed to ensure ‘sound’ farming practices, and such practices 
could, according to new governmental ideas, only be attained on the basis of individual land 
tenure. In practice, the Act meant inhabitants of the African reserves could gain farming and 
grazing rights of certain demarcated plots, which were not inheritable, were granted to 
individuals. The combination of arable land and grazing rights was supposed to be sufficient 
to provide an “economic basis” for a family. The arable acreage and number of cattle which 
may be held varied from 6 acres [2,4 hectares] and 6 cattle to 15 acres [6,7 hectares] and 20 
cattle according to the nature of the land. Yet a man may have up to three holdings.448 If the 
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holder of these rights would show proof of “inadequate husbandry”, the rights would lapse449 
and be auctioned off on the market.450 Underlying this Act was the belief that traditional 
farming practice based on shifting cultivation and communal occupation were wasteful and 
primitive, and a replacement by settled and more productive methods was the answer to both 
spur production and halt ecological degradation.451 In other words, the land degradation was 
blamed on African malpractices, rather than on the consequences of forced resettlement after 
the second world war to make way for new European immigrants. It was thought that 
communal agriculture led to ‘soil-mining’: the depletion of nutrients in the soils due to overuse 
and farming without fertilizer.452 Communal tenure supposedly encouraged this, since user-
rights would dissolve when land was not farmed – including periods of fallowing, while 
individual property was viewed as a remedy against soil degradation.453   
  The implementation of the Act was “expensive” and proceeded slowly and with 
friction.454 In 1955 the Native Agricultural Department established “steady” progress had been 
made, but “in the light of what can be and has to be done the rate of overall improvement is 
so slow as to frustrate any but the most enthusiastic”455. Explaining the slow course of 
executing the Act, a confidential report to government notes: “A main cause of friction has 
been the need to compel Africans to reduce their cattle, the possession of which is 
traditionally important to Africans”456. The report also found that many more families had been 
entitled to holdings than could actually be provided for with holdings of “economic size” within 
the available areas. This led to the conclusion that “many Africans will in the future be without 
land rights”457.   
  The government’s response to overpopulation and land degradation by granting 
individual rights to land might seem surprising since land had become a crucial asset in power 
relations between Africans and Europeans. Yet the idea that the colonial government granted 
the African population gained more leverage over land is deceiving. Apart from the slow and 
incomplete implementation of its statutes, there are several clues that suggest the Act was a 
political instrument to appeal to international partners and integrate the African lands into the 
land market, resulting in landlessness among its inhabitants. First of all, Pollak notes the Act 
was mostly a way to appear “conciliatory and ameliorative” towards the African majority in a 
white-dominated economy – a policy that was supposed to evoke support from London for 
the federation of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland – with Southern-
Rhodesia as the financial, commercial and administrative centre.458 Secondly, the introduction 
of “individual land tenure” as a civilising measure paid no attention to the type of agriculture 
and the system of ownership that was already in place. Individual user rights were often 
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already in place, although dependent upon membership of a community.459 The NLHA did not 
grant rights of individual ownership that could be passed on to an heir, or sold to the highest 
bidder: the individual tenure the Act granted was in reality void of ownership. Instead of 
placing the security of tenure into the hands of a headman or chief, as was previously the case, 
the Act placed the agency to determine tenure on African lands in the hands of a paternalistic 
European administration.460 Thirdly, for Africans living in urban areas, the NLHA offered no 
option to secure tenure whatsoever. In 1958 the Urban African Affairs Commission suggested 
that “at least some non-racial areas should be created within the towns, and that Africans 
should be given more security of tenure there”. The proposal was quickly refuted on the 
grounds that it involved an erosion of the Land Apportionment Act, which was held by 
Europeans “as a charter, almost a bill of rights in this country”461. All these points resulted in a 
land market within the reserves, and landlessness as a result. The NLHA made the African 
population, for the first time, volatile to losing their land entirely: either when they did not 
manage it according to European standards, or were not able to access an allocated plot 
because of slow and unclear allocation methods, or were unable to obtain money for 
surveying fees and the maintenance of the land. These people were forced onto the labour 
market.462   
It is not surprising that the period after the Second World War, when racial segregation was 
solidified through land allocation laws, which constantly favoured the European population, 
saw a growth of African resentment.463 A confidential report concluded the NLHA “…will mean 
the end of traditional African way of life, by which every African, even if settled in a town, had 
some communal rights in a reserve; and the recognition of what has long existed in practice, 
an African proletariat permanently settled in the towns, and without any tie to the land.464” 
Hence, despite the government’s interest in developing a rural economy and land reform, 
which would consequentially generate more rural income and taxes, the sluggish 
implementation of the Act, the commercialisation of land rights in the reserves, and growing 
landlessness made the NLHA more of a political façade than an actual reversal in land 
ownership policy.  
5.1.4 Political turmoil: unilateral independence and the Second Chimurenga  
African opposition against the NLHA grew. Ever since 1923 the colonial government had 
ensured a white monopoly on the most fertile lands, forcefully relocated entire African 
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communities, de-stocked valuable465 cattle, encouraged landlessness and hence forced the 
African population to turn to labour. The access to land was a key aspect of opposition to the 
act: with limited mobility and few other opportunities to make a livelihood, people were tied to 
their land. Threats to their position relating land are hence direct threats to their security.466 In 
1958, the African population of some 2.550.000 had less than 17.000.000 hectares available 
for settlement and agriculture, while the European population of 207.000 held 19.500.000 
hectares 467 : a population density of respectively 15 and 1. African grievances became 
increasingly politically organised, and were for example represented by the Southern 
Rhodesia African Farmers Union. 468  A significant number of wealthier peasants echoed 
nationalist cries. Together with rural businessmen (“reserve entrepreneurs”), schoolteachers, 
headmasters, as well as chiefs and headmen, they coordinated branches of the African 
National Congress and the National Democratic Party (NDP).469 Their voices were amplified by 
strikes and several alarming reports about the abject state of poverty among African 
communities.470   
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Map 9. Land apportionment in Zimbabwe 1955471  
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outline in the relief map, map 8.  
81 
 
Their opposition did not go unnoticed. In 1960, prime-minister Whitehead observed that a 
continuation of the ““one way traffic in the purchase of land would be politically unacceptable”.  
The administration worried about the backlash, from white farmers, land reform would evoke, 
but also about the “economic stagnation” in the reserves: “The European farmer could be 
persuaded to accept the idea of throwing open European land and the native purchase areas 
to purchase by any race and allowing the reserves and Special Native Areas to be brought 
into the common pool at a later date – in the case of some reserves, much later. He is usually 
well able to stand on his own feet.” 472 As a response to the increasing pressure on land and 
the on-going problems in the reserves, the Select Committee on the Resettlement of Natives 
had been installed.473 By 1960, they had produced two reports. The first (October 1959) 
recommended that: 
(i) Africans should be able to acquire freeholds as well as leaseholds in urban areas 
(ii) African townships should be sited and developed so as to facilitate industry and 
business, and as close as possible to areas where Africans work. Transport should 
be improved; 
(iii) Government should play more part in the development and administration of 
townships [but the principle of administration but the European municipalities 
should continue; thus there would be no African local government].474  
The second report (August 1960) concluded that: 
(i) All agricultural land should be open to purchase by anyone, regardless of race. 
This would involve the repeal of the a) Land Apportionment Act b) those sections of 
the constitution which set aside the Native Reserves;  
(ii) As an interim measure, the existing Native Reserves, Special Native Area and 
Native Purchase Area should be amalgamated in a new category called “African 
Land”, administered uniformly and all available for freehold purchase by 
Africans.475   
Implementation of the recommendations of these reports would involve abandoning the 
principles which had governed land use in the country for thirty years, namely the creation of a 
‘settlers state’, which developed itself through its control over territory. The report concludes: 
“Europeans would have to bring themselves to realise that they can no longer keep half of the 
land while the Africans, ten times as numerous, are faced with increasing difficulty in getting a 
living from the land476”.   
  The problem was exacerbated by the slow industrialisation of the colony. The NLHA 
caused an increasing number of Africans who became deprived of their land security and 
hence in need of income from labour. Yet the number of jobs rose by a mere 50.000 between 
1956-60: positions that were both taken up by indigenous and foreign Africans.477 In 1962, the 
Chief Native Commissioner wrote:  
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It was hoped that the increasing industrialisation and economic growth in the non-Tribal 
areas would provide this alternative [livelihood]… Up to the end of 1956, this is what in fact 
happened, the population increasing during the period 1951-56 by 16 percent, and overall 
employment by 15 percent. Since then there has been a slowing down in the rate of 
industrial expansion and economic growth. The population has increased by 18 percent in 
the succeeding five years [1956-61] but the increase in overall employment outlets have not 
kept pace with the increase in population, nor has any means of social security, other than 
land in the Tribal areas, been devised.478 
The realisation by the Chief Native Commissioner and the reports by the Select Committee 
showed clear signs that land reform was necessary in order to avoid further impoverishment 
of the African population. The warnings, however, were met with apathy. William Harper, the 
parliament’s Leader of Opposition, described the recommendation to repeal the Act and open 
up all land in the colony to be purchased by any race “a sledge-hammer blow at European 
settlement”. He continued: “If this report is acted upon, as it may well be, then with all humility 
I say: God help Southern Rhodesia.479”   
  The contradiction between white and black interests grew severely during the 1960s. 
This is illustrated by the Native Affairs Amendment Act: an amendment to the NLHA. This 
amendment made refusal to move an offense, as well as not answering questions concerning 
information required to grant farming rights to a new dwelling site. Consequently, it increased 
the power of the state and was aimed at anti NHLA-activists in the reserves. From then on, it 
was an offense for “any native (or headman) who makes any statement or does any act or 
thing… which is likely to undermine the authority of an officer of the Government”480. It also 
abolished meetings in the reserves without previous written permission by the Native 
Committee.481    
  These further constrictions the Amendment proposed were oil upon the fire of African 
nationalist movements. Nationalist riots broke out in townships in 1960482 and were vigorously 
suppressed, as were the rising number of strikes and boycotts in both rural and urban 
areas.483 The grievances held by the African population were eventually unified in the NDP in 
1960, established by Nkomo, Mugabe, Chitepo and Sithole. The NDP was banned 1961 and 
morphed into the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), led by Nkomo.484 The Zimbabwe 
African National Union (ZANU) was formed in August 1963 by Chitepo and Sithole as a 
breakaway from ZAPU. ZANU accused ZAPU of reluctance to engage in a physical 
confrontation with the government, and adopted a policy of militancy and “confrontation” with 
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the settler government.485 During this tumultuous period African nationalism became more 
and more institutionalised, and reactionary whites also came together in order to strengthen 
their position. In 1962 they had united in the Rhodesian Front, led by Ian Smith. This party won 
the Southern Rhodesian election of 1965, having been buoyed by a 1964 referendum, wherein 
whites had overwhelmingly voted for independence from Britain. Backed by the knowledge 
the UK would take action and send troops, Smith issued a Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence (UDI) on 11 November 1965.486 A settler economy had become a settler state.487
 This political chronicle of events might seem trivial in the analysis of population density 
and land rights, yet is crucial to its development in Zimbabwe.  The adversities between the 
settler regime and the increasingly militant opposition is all about land (dis)possession. Their 
histories are shaped by the access and rights to land, and their determination is derived from 
the motivation to increase or maintain those rights and privileges. In a 1973 speech ZANU’s 
chairman Chitepo said:  
  I could go into the whole theories of discrimination in legislation, in residency, in economic 
 opportunities, in education. I could go into that, but I will restrict myself to the question of 
 land because it is very basic. To us, the essence of exploitation, the essence of white 
 domination, is domination over land. That is the real issue.488  
For the African nationalists, from 1964 onwards the struggle for independence no longer took 
the non-confrontational, constitutional route. Their efforts and demands were not resonated 
by the settler regime, or by the British government. The latter feared black (mis)rule might lead 
to a large number of whites leaving Rhodesia for Britain – a prospect it could not economically 
accommodate.489  Hence, it became obvious they would have to liberate themselves from 
settler rule. This realisation coupled with the more militant routine and the adoption of armed 
confrontation, led to the notion that ‘we are our own liberators’: the slogan of the first ZANU 
congress in 1964.490  
  The nature of the confrontation was elaborated. During the conference, different 
tactics were spelled out that were supposed to create an explosive political climate and 
eventually frighten whites out of power. A ‘Five Point Plan’ specified the enemy and spelt out 
the confrontation. It described targeting infrastructure such as bridges and roads to cause 
delay and prevent movement by army and police; cutting of telephone wires and electricity 
pylon; boycotting dipping fees and poll taxes; destruction of European farms and livestock and 
targeting Native Commissioners’ Offices, police stations and white owned shops in African 
townships.491 Both the ZANU and ZAPU organised military wings who took up the armed 
struggle, and the ‘Second Chimurenga’ commenced when both armies launched a guerrilla 
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war against Smith’s regime492: a struggle for liberation and land redistribution that would last 
until 1979.493 “Mwana wevhu/umntwana womhlabati (child of the soil)” became the nationalists’ 
rallying call.494  
  After the outbreak of the Chimurenga, or ‘Rhodesian Bush War’, the UDI-government 
was faced with overcrowding and landlessness in the reserves, an increasing amount of land 
disputes and mounting guerrilla-activities throughout the country.495 The 1960’s were also 
characterised by a strong population increase in various areas. In 1962, the Gokwe district had 
a population of 60.320, but by 1969 this had risen to 130.400: an increase of about 55 per 
cent. This gives a population density of 4.19 in 1962, and 9.07 in 1969. This trend continued to 
increase, resulting in a population density of 16.59 persons per square kilometre in 1982.496 
This sharp population increase in the rural reserve areas shaped the politics in land: not only 
in Gokwe, but in the country as a whole.  
5.1.5 The colonial government’s last acts   
In 1967 the Tribal Trust Land Act (TTLA) was introduced. The act vested the occupation and 
use of land in the reserves (tribal areas) in ‘tribal’ land authorities. The chief and/or headman of 
the area were given more authority and were allowed to rule according to ‘tribal custom’. 
Chiefs’ authority was further increased with limited criminal jurisdiction and punitive powers. 
Most of all, the TTLA established the chief’s authority over land, for one through the 
installation of Tribal Land Authorities, which were entitled to determine the use of land in the 
African areas. 497  Although traditional leaders retrieved forms of jurisdiction from the 
government, Nyambara asserts the transference of jurisdiction to allocate land was mostly a 
mechanism to shift responsibility for land shortage in rural areas from the state to traditional 
authorities. The power of ‘communal’ land tenure was stressed in order to pass the blame and 
avert the African nationalists.498 This did work to a certain extent: chiefs were often viewed as 
“collaborators” by guerrilla fighters and their sympathisers. In all, the overhauling of judicial 
powers over land to the chiefs and headman eventually contributed to the general breakdown 
of traditional leadership structures.499  
  The ambiguous situation created room for different groups to assert their interests: the 
absence of formal law allowed people to enlarge their land allocations. Both legal and 
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customary paradigms were manipulated, and people manoeuvred them in order to acquire 
land.500 R.L.C. Cuncliffe explains the situation at hand in Mashonaland in a letter to the Deputy 
Secretary for Development:  
One of the concerns is that a tribesman should not be permitted to hold land under two 
different authorities, i.e., in terms of rights under the African Land Husbandry Act and also 
other land by authority of the Tribal Land Authority. This is likely to cause chaos but can be 
controlled by the Tribal Authorities themselves refusing to allow any African Land 
Husbandry holder to have more land than he is entitled to under his African Land 
Husbandry rights, unless the holder renounces his African Land Husbandry Act rights.501 
 What was most manipulated was the idea of ‘communal’ or ‘traditional’ land tenure system. 
Historians suggest the notion of ‘traditional’ land tenure was mostly a colonial construction 
aimed to reinforce the chiefs’ powers and lay a basis for indirect rule and control of land 
through the imagined jurisdiction of the chiefs.502 The construction and enforcement of the 
‘communal’ are said to have ‘frozen’ dynamic systems of fluid, contested and varying rights of 
land access and ownership.503 The interplay between the ‘invention of tradition’ and the legal 
realms gave rise to a very complex system to guard a highly contested right, namely that to 
land. It is not surprising therefore tensions between different groups exerting different rights 
within legal frameworks only increased in this period.   
From 1963 to 1969 ‘land-grabbing’504 became more widespread and uncontrolled.  Eventually, 
the government passed the Land Tenure Act in 1969, which attempted to end the ambiguity 
and reinstated the division between African and European land, as previously devised by the 
NLHA. Zvobgo summarises its implications:  
Section 11 for example stated that if an African was occupying land in the European Area, 
the owner or person occupying or in control of such land or his agent was deemed to have 
permitted it unless the contrary was proved. Section 16 of the Act permitted an African to 
occupy urban land or residential accommodation in the European Area only for 
employment purposes. Under Section 17 the owner or controller of urban land in the 
European Area who wished to permit an African to occupy it, was required to apply in 
writing for an authorisation permit. Under Section 24, the African Area was defined as an 
area in which the interests of the Africans were paramount, and the restrictions on 
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Europeans owning, leasing or occupying land mirrored those applicable to Africans in the 
European Area.505 
Land segregation was reinforced, and again, people were forcefully moved into the territories 
that were now known as Tribal Trust Lands.506 Under this Act, the land was divided 50:50 
between whites (including Asians, or Coloureds, or people or mixed parentage) and blacks, 
although the latter comprised 95 per cent of the total population.507 Nonetheless, Prime 
Minister Smith insisted: “Different racial groups should be kept separate in the interest of 
peace and harmony508”.   
  Yet peace and harmony seemed a long way away, and land rights remained the most 
contested issue in the liberation struggle. The land issue was central to any initiatives aimed at 
resolving the crisis: it was the major stumbling block in pre-independence talks to negotiate 
peace, such as those held in Geneva (1976) and Malta (1978).509  The social, economic and 
political relevance of land cannot be overemphasised: studies conducted in 1975 revealed 
that 40 per cent of rural men in the south east of the country aged between 16 and 30 were 
landless, even though land was the major source of livelihood.510 It were these grievances that 
pitted ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ against one another, and formed the basis of a protracted 
struggle for land throughout the course of history in Zimbabwe.   
  After 1975, the war was becoming more and more difficult for Smith’s armed forces.511 
In 1976, the ZANU and ZAPU had initiated a collaboration that intensified the militant struggle, 
which in turn gave birth to the Patriotic Front (PF). The urgency for a solution to the war was 
imminent and Smith desperately sought to resolve it internally. In 1979 a referendum asked 
the Europeans to approve a new constitution, which led to the installation of an African Prime 
Minister (Abel Muzorewa), the creation of country called Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.512 And a last act, 
the TTLA instated the chief as the sole ‘tribal authority’ to ‘occupy or use the land for 
agricultural or residential purposes’513. Even though it instituted significant judicial say into land 
allocation and acquisition, it did little to ward off the on-going Chimurenga, which had spread 
throughout the territory. Under pressure from the UK, parties (the loosely aligned ZAPU and 
ZAPU under the PF and Smith-Mozorewa) convened at the 1979 Lancaster House 
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Conference.514  A ceasefire was signed and on the 17 January 1980, settler rule came to an 
end.515 
5.1.6 Subconclusion  
Ever since the Pioneer Column of European adventurers crossed the Limpopo River in 1890 
the disposition of land between Europeans and Africans in Zimbabwe has been a matter of 
unremitting controversy.516 Throughout the period from the First World War to the mid-fifties, 
“extreme settlerist land appropriation” 517  policies were focused on the achievement of 
possessory segregation between whites and other races, a progressive squeeze on African 
cultivators in white areas, and an attempt to canalise the pressure on scarce land resources in 
African areas by creating areas of individual African tenure.518 A clearly demarcated class 
structure crystallised after the depression of the 1930’s519, with land as its primary segregating 
force. Land registration was suspended in the Native Land Husbandry Act in 1951, but by then 
the market as a means of land transfer had irreversibly been imported into the African 
reserves.520 The NLHA was an example of the remedial power of legislative and administrative 
action imposed from above. The Act had little understanding of the human factors involved, 
and the complex problems of social and economic adjustments the implementation of the Act 
required.521  Economic behaviour, for example by expanding land allocations, intensifying 
agriculture to adhere to ecological circumstances, or accept strong individual rights that are 
inheritable and ensure long-term access to plots of land, was constrained by colonial politics. 
After implementation of the NLHA, a constant negotiation between land scarcity and a political 
response to mitigate its effects took place. This led to reactionary land legislation during the 
1960’s and 70s. Throughout the colonial history, Africans were assigned to live in respectively 
Native Reserves, African Reserves and Tribal Trust Lands522, where they were subjected to 
insecurity of tenure and the least attractive soils for agriculture. Futility to negotiate with the 
colonial government led to a wave of African nationalism, the creation of ZANU, ZAPU, PF and 
a decade-long violent struggle for redistribution of land in Zimbabwe – also referred to as the 
Third Chimurenga.523   
5.2. Land rights in postcolonial Zimbabwe, 1980-2013 
After 1980, land reform was shaped by the Lancaster House Agreement. This meant that from 
1980 to 1996, a period that has become known as the Zimbabwean state’s Land Reform and 
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Resettlement Programme Phase I524, policy was focused on redressing past grievances over 
land alienation and promoting equity and property rights.525 Land redistribution had been a 
major obstacle during the negotiations in London, and eventually the British government 
assured, together with the United States, it would finance a post-independence land 
redistribution programme.526 By means of the economic policy statement “Growth with Equity” 
which stipulated that “land is common heritage and no one should enjoy absolute ownership 
of it”527 the first ten years of independence were dominated by macroeconomic growth528 and 
rural development529 policies, which overshadowed structural land reform.  
5.2.1 New nation, new land rights?   
One of the key aspects to achieve an egalitarian society was the redistribution of white-owned 
farming land to black farmers.530  Yet the Lancaster House Constitution was heavily influenced 
by the British delegation during negotiations, and was designed to perpetuate British control 
of land in Zimbabwe. Hence, it did little to tackle the key issue of land ownership, which was 
still predominantly white. Moreover, although absolute white settler rule had come to an end, 
20 per cent of seats in the House of Assembly were still allocated to 4 per cent of the 
European population. The ‘Property Rights Guarantee’ the new Constitution put forward was 
reminiscent of the one in the 1930 Land Apportionment Act: it stipulated a period of 10 years 
wherein no amendments could be made to, amongst others, property (i.e. land). This meant 
land could not be compulsorily acquired by the state. Anyone whose property the government 
wanted to acquire was granted access to the High Court, where the state would have to justify 
its reasons for acquisition – which would always be met with “full compensation... in a 
currency of his choice”531: an extremely costly process for a newly established nation-state. 
Another condition the Lancaster agreement introduced was the ‘willing seller, willing buyer’ 
clause, meaning there would be no expropriation of land by owners who wished to keep their 
farms.532  
  The context of this situation was a territory with clusters of overpopulated land versus 
large vacant plots of (fertile) land; either uncultivated but owned by large corporations, or a 
result of an outflow of settlers who had feared repercussions after independence.533 In other 
words, the dual land regime virtually remained intact. According to the 1981 Communal Land 
Act, the former European Areas were renamed Large Scale Commercial Areas and were held 
as private property. The pre-1980 Reserves or Tribal Trust Lands became known as 
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Communal Areas, where a system of communal tenure prevailed.534 Because the Lancaster 
House Constitution constrained significant redistribution of land, land reform during the 1980s 
was confined to the issue of resettling black families and/or agricultural cooperatives onto 
land willingly sold by whites.535 The government set itself the ambitious target of resettling a 
total of 162.000 households by 1984 yet, five years later by the end of 1989, only a total of 
52.000 households had been resettled: just over 32 per cent of the aspired amount.536   
  During this same period two interrelated trends took place. First, the position of 
commercial farmers was strengthened. Second, peasant production was severely dismantled. 
In order to flee the war people had flocked into towns, forcefully leaving cultivated plots 
unattended. 537  Moreover, international sanctions against the UDI-government reduced 
incentives to produce export crops like tobacco and caused commercial farmers to 
concentrate on the domestic market. This meant an incursion into a market that was 
previously controlled by black peasants: maize. 538  At the beginning of the 80s, white 
commercial farmers produced 90 per cent of the country’s food requirements, while peasant 
production had been deregulated and hampered by war, previous tenure restrictions and 
trade embargoes. Nonetheless, the ‘post-white-settler colonial state’ did give way to an 
aspiring black elite to share power with the established government.539 Through political 
strongholds, a ruling black elite was able to acquire a significant number of farms. 540 
According to Palmer, well over a million hectares fell into the hands of “senior members of the 
government”541.   
The first ten years of independence were guided by a mitigated yet progressively egalitarian 
constitution, which opened up land markets and abolished the physical separation of races. 
But politically reconciliation consisted “not between the races, but with capital”542, giving way 
to the emergence of a ruling black elite. At the same time, privately-owned farms continued to 
dominate the land market and the government lacked the jurisdiction to acquire uncultivated 
yet fertile land for resettlement and redistribution purposes. A white minority of some 6000 
farmers still held 39 per cent (15.5 million hectares) of the prime farmland, while one million 
black households were consigned to 41.4 per cent (16.4 million hectares) of marginal land.543 
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5.2.2 From liberation to liberalisation 
The expiration of the Lancaster House agreement544, intensifying cooperation with the World 
Bank and IMF, the end of the Cold War and the subsequent (global) collapse economic statism 
catalysed the launch of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in Zimbabwe 
in 1990.545 Apart from the uniform programme of cuts in public spending, currency devaluation, 
liberalisation of prices, interest rates and trade, it meant the costs of production for petty-
commodity producers rose, eroding farm incomes and making it very hard for smallholders to 
integrate into the liberalised market.546 The deepening economic crisis pitted three main 
parties against each other in the land reform process after 1990. On the one hand there were 
the commercial farmers, whose property rights were safely guarded by Britain and the 
Supreme Court. On the other hand were landless peasants, including an assertive group of 
‘war veterans’, who challenged these rights “in favour or historical justice”. The government of 
Zimbabwe was in the middle.547    
  The ‘willing seller, willing buyer’ model was upheld and land remained a crucial issue 
to Zimbabweans and was duly used for election purposes in 1989. From 1990 onwards, the 
Zimbabwean governed aspired to buy specific blocks of land to accommodate planned 
resettlement. The government felt the ‘willing seller, willing buyer’ principle had adequately 
protected white farmers’ interests and had caused a skyrocketing of prices,548 which made 
structural acquisition of land for the government impossible. Land redistribution seemed to 
have come to a halt.549 As a result, land invasion by squatters intensified. This process had 
several drivers: a) escalating poverty and landlessness as a result of ongoing erosion of the 
economic basis of smallholders and the peasantry b) grievances over historical experiences 
during colonialism and c) despair in the Zimbabwean government, which was heavily 
influenced by British interests and a black elite unwilling to cut its new ties with capital, was 
not able to change the situation. The latter group did have a valid point, as studies point out 
the slow pace with which land reform had previously been executed: at the Administrative 
Court’s rate of one appeal per day, the redistribution of 4000 farms would take at least 
another 30 years.   
  Still, patterns of population density made resettlement vital for economic recovery. 
Huisman & de Winther researched settler and squatter households in the Insiza District550 
between 1982-92, and found population density vary greatly between the different communal, 
resettlement and commercial land categories found in the district (see table 6). In the large-
scale commercial farming areas the average figure amounts to 3,2 persons per square 
kilometre, in the resettlement areas it is 5.5; whereas the communal areas show an average 
density of 36,1 (with large variations, from 32,9 to 113,1). For the small-scale commercial farming 
areas a figure of 15,5 is reported.551 
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Table 6. Area and population size per land category in the Insiza District (absolute and in %)552 
Land category  Surface area 
(km² )              
Populat ion number  
         
Populat ion 
density  
Communal area  1.143        (14%) 41.294    (55%) 36,12 
Resettlement area  1.263        (15%) 7.007      (9%) 5,55 
Large scale commercial 
farming area 
5.310        (65%) 19.281    (25%)         3,63 
Small scale commercial 
farming area 
531           (6%)     8.214      (11%) 15,47 
Total  8.247       ( 100%)  75.796    (100%)    15,18 
 
This population disbalance was compromised by the Land Acquisition Act (LAA) in 1992. The 
Act provided that:  
(i) Land, including utilized land, buildings and improvements to land, will be capable 
of being acquired for settlement, land reorganization, environmental conservation, 
utilization of natural resources, and the relocation of persons. Previously, only 
underutilized land could be acquired compulsorily for resettlement. Now any 
property could be compulsorily acquired for any purpose that the State requires.  
(ii) The compensation payable for compulsory acquisition will have to be “fair” and be 
paid “within a reasonable time.” Previously it had to be “adequate” and “paid 
promptly.” 
(iii) Parliament be allowed to specify the principles on which the amount of 
compensation for acquisition of land is to be assessed, to fix the amount of 
compensation in accordance with such principles, and to fix the period within 
which compensation is to be paid.553 
The LAA was a compromise because it allowed the government to compulsorily acquire land, 
but still offered compensation. It was also a compromise between the market and the state. 
Moyo and Yeros observe that after the adoption of the LAA “…the market method would 
continue to prevail in the political process, as structural adjustment submerged the land 
question resolutely, but the two methods (state and market) would enter a period of open 
competition”554. The new policy enabled an increase of land acquisition by the black capitalist 
class yet overall land reform remained slow. The combination of the increased interest in land 
purchases, or “indigenisation of the land question”555, and the effects of the ESAP-programme 
the demand for land increased in both rural and urban areas.556 As private and public jobs 
were shed due to liberalisation and budgetary cuts and real wages were reduced the demand 
for land and its natural resources led to new squatting trends in the 1990s. So-called national, 
provincial, and district squatter control committees were installed in 1992 and granted “the 
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land authority or owner” the jurisdiction to evict. Yeros observes describes this trend as 
follows:  
In effect, this meant that the national land problem would be ‘parochialised’ on communal 
land and ‘privatised’ on commercial farms. And on this basis, mass evictions were 
repeatedly implemented under structural adjustment, in some cases involving hundreds of 
squatter families at a time, in a manner reminiscent of the methods of the white-settler 
colonial state.557  
Severe droughts between 1990 and 1995 deepened poverty, and the economic problems 
increased the pressure for resettlement and forced both communal and commercial farmers to 
change strategies.558 Communal farmers were found on commercial land where farmers had 
shifted to intensive agriculture, and land previously used for extensive cropping or grazing 
was left unused. At the same time, communal lands were becoming more ‘privatised’ through 
the penetration of commercial farmers operating under contract farming schemes. Hence, 
land reform was on-going, but often took place outside the official policy process by farmers 
who adjusted their strategies to the economic possibilities and restraints at hand.559 A high 
population growth rate 2,2 per cent annually also had considerable impact on socio-economic 
conditions in the resettlement areas. Since the arable land base of these areas could be 
legally expanded nor subdivided, an increasing number of the new generation are forced to 
stay with their parents’ household, or have to opt for forms of squatting to provide an 
economic basis for their young households. In addition, due to the persistent lack of access to 
arable and grazing land elsewhere, other households have decided to move to resettlement 
areas and to illegally occupy land in an attempt to carve out a living.560As pressure on the land 
base progressed and competition between better-off farmers increases, both farmers and 
squatters were increasingly forced to further diversify their economic activities to increase the 
household cash-income, create employment, and increase food stocks.561   
5.2.3 Amending the past, fast-tracking land reform   
Even though there were signs of grassroots land reform, the state became pivotal in allocating 
land from 1997 onwards. Through mobilisation of grievances held by war veterans, urban-
based trade union movements and large-scale commercial farmers the government was 
pulled into opposite directions.562 The government’s previous inability to tackle the problems 
head-on was severely criticised by all parties, and the legitimacy of the ruling ZANU-PF as the 
“guardian of the nation” was challenged.563 Notably the war veterans, who had never been 
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accommodated in the post-independent state and many of whom were living in poverty, 
favoured revolutionary land reform and were able to influence the ruling party.564 In 1997, 
under the powers of the Land Act, the government announced 1.471 white-owned farms were 
to be acquired on a “compulsory and urgent” basis.565 When the government’s action radius 
was limited through international pressure, “dissident local ruling party politicians, traditional 
leaders, displaced workers, and the war veterans” took it into their own hands to occupy high-
profile plots of land.566 Again, the government was  walking a tightrope: this time between the 
international donors such as the World Bank and the British government, and its peasantry, 
who had been waiting for proper resettlement and land redistribution ever since Lancaster in 
1979.  
  Throughout 1998-2000 farms continued to be invaded. The Land Reform and 
Resettlement Programme – Phase II was implemented, which meant five broad objectives 
were to be met: increasing tenure security to land users; promoting investment in land through 
the development of a (financial) infrastructure; enhancing environmental sustainability; 
retaining the core of large-scale commercial agricultural producers; and transferring 60 per 
cent of land from the commercial sector to the African population.567 These goals were set to 
be reached during a phase of “inception” (1998-2000) and “expansion”(2001-2006). But 
during a 1998 donor conference, the government was unable to reach a coherent solution 
with international donors (especially the UK). The Zimbabwean government’s rationale, under 
increasing pressure to finally “get on” with land expropriation568, was that earlier land reform 
policies were restrained by factors beyond its control, and the popular expressions of land 
hunger spreading throughout the country had to be supported and “programmatised”. By 
2000, white farmers and landowners still owned more than 20 per cent of the country’s fertile 
land.569 With or without support from the internal community, something had to change, and 
land was the fulcrum of change. In that light, the government launched the Fast Track Land 
Resettlement Programme (FTLRP) in 2000. The FTLRP set out to accelerate all aspects of land 
reform, including the identification of 5 million hectares that were to be compulsorily acquired 
in order to satisfy the needs for resettlement.570 The first phase of FTLRP was characterised by 
major and ‘illegal’ occupation of land by squatters, smallholders, and others fleeing the 
detrimental living circumstances of the reserves, and the designation of more than 3.000 
farms for expropriation.571 This ‘revolutionary phase’ lasted until June 2001, when during the 
second phase the government embarked on a period of ‘rationalisation of land reform’, when 
two land audits and a ‘correction’ exercise were held.572   The broader political and 
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economic context in which these developments in land reform played out became 
increasingly dramatic. The spectrum became increasingly polarised between those who 
welcomed a reversal of a dual land system and those who condemned it.573 The dominant 
ZANU-PF suffered losses during elections to the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), 
and the political spectrum not only became increasingly polarised, but increasingly violent. 
The war between factions looking to gain access to the political sphere of influence or 
maintain the status quo was played out on the countryside, enhanced by a severe economic 
crisis.574 Unemployed and landless youth found war veterans and thugs who either shared or 
exploited their grievances and more and more farms were alienated. Violence as a means to 
this end was not eschewed. Since 2000, 7 million hectares have been taken over through the 
FTLRP.575 By 2009, 6.571 farms had been identified by the government for seizure. In the 
same year, only 400 white-owned commercial farms remained in Zimbabwe.576  
As Ikubolajeh Logan notes, land reform transitioned from the economic into the political 
domain. The FTLRP marks the final transition in the evolution of Zimbabwe’s land reform. Its 
radical, transformative agenda located land reform at the heart of the national political 
discourse, “repackaged and resold as the core of Zimbabwean nationalism”.577 In September 
2008, the ZANU-PF and the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) signed a power-sharing 
agreement. The agreement highlighted land was the most important issue and addressed the 
continued inequities of land distribution and low agricultural productivity. The parties agreed 
that the process of land confiscation as conducted in the FTLRP would continue, 
compensation for taken land should primarily come from its former colonial regime, the United 
Kingdom, and further redistributive land reforms are necessary.578  It provides a right to 
property and recognises customary law. By now, a heterodox and complex field of land rights 
had evolved, with a transference of customary tenure in the communal areas to local 
government authorities, back to a traditional authority regime after 1998. Currently, three 
different tenure types exist: freehold ownership; rights of occupancy to land in communal 
areas; and 99-year leaseholds to land granted by the government by means of various 
redistribution schemes.579  The latter either apply to A1 or A2 land – A1 is located in or around 
villages and consists of parcels up to 5 hectares. A2 comes in parcels from 2 to 2000 
hectares, is intended for commercial farming and is only granted to individuals who can 
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demonstrate proper skills and resources.580 Land in communal areas is vested in the President; 
occupancy and use are administered through Rural District Councils, who, in turn, 
communicate with chiefs.   
  Land rights in Zimbabwe are insecure. Commercial farmers continue to fear 
spontaneous occupation, and many who have obtained land after independence have done 
so hastily and often outside the realm of legal process. Since land is to intertwined with 
Zimbabwe’s political as well as economic status, all groups are vulnerable to fickleness by the 
government or the (international) economy, as it can have a profound effect on the source that 
sustains their livelihoods: the land.  
5.3 Subconclusion  
Lancaster was a product of a compromise between coloniser and colonised: a legal 
framework which restricted the reformation of existing institutions and perpetuated existing 
(colonial) property rights, in exchange for independence. During the 80’s reform was focused 
on macroeconomic repair and largely left the land question alone. When the Lancaster 
Constitution expired in 1990, the introduction of ESAP severely hampered the process of land 
redistribution, while a (further) liberalisation of policies and integration of Zimbabwe into the 
global economy widened class relations, now not only between black and white, but between 
those who had access to capital and those who did not. Especially to the latter, the most 
important factor endowment continued to be land. The nineties were a period of ambiguity 
and new contradictions in land policy in Zimbabwe.581 Market and state were to cooperate, but 
rarely found a middle ground. The question of land hovered in between: politics and economy 
both attempted to contain the question of land reform, with the result that neither was truly 
able to grasp it.   
  Yet market led-agrarian reforms have been largely disappointing582, and the desire for 
land became further enhanced. Commercial farmers were focused on export and capital 
accumulation, while smallholders were becoming simultaneously more dependent on land 
(because of rising unemployment) whilst also increasingly landless (because of rising prices 
and protected property rights of large-scale farms). Squatting became a pressing problem. 
Combined with droughts, it fuelled the mobilisation of radical land reclamation movements, 
who were waiting for their government to take action. Post-independence land reform 
intended to redress colonial land dispossession and the related politics of racial domination. 
By broadening access to land and promoting smallholder productivity, reform sought to 
eliminate agrarian inequalities that were promoted by minority-rule.583 But policies, such as the 
FTLRP, were contested, fickle and sometimes even violent. The Zimbabwean state was 
paralysed, this time not only by international stakeholders or the global economy, but also by 
internal power struggles, with an increased role for ethnic competition over resources. Political 
interests became intertwined with the land question, making it an extremely complicated 
arena where land rights continue to be insecure.   
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6. CONCLUSION 
This thesis set out to verify the hypothesis that an area with a dense population will develop a 
system of land rights with stronger, more individual rights to land than an area with a sparse 
population. This has been done by comparing sparsely, densely and moderately populated 
territories with a similar colonial history throughout the course of the institutionalisation of 
formal land rights. It aims to reassess the hypothetical relationship between people and land 
in Sub-Sahara Africa, an area that has mostly featured as a side-track in global economic 
historiography. Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe have proven to be telling cases, providing 
insight into the question whether, in these cases, the density of population matters to the 
construction of property rights to land. In this final chapter, the findings from the previous 
chapters will be compared, similarities and differences will be noted, and an explanation for 
their roots is proposed.    
6.1 Comparing the cases: connections and distinctions  
In order to answer the thesis question how population density affected land rights in Zambia, 
Malawi and Zimbabwe, their resemblances and divergences in development over time and 
under different population pressures must be noted. In this section, the case studies will be 
connected and deductions will be made from the insights that were presented in the previous 
chapters, ordened by relevant topic.  
Land, labour and power  
For all three countries, control over land meant political power; whereas landlessness 
equalled powerlessness.  All three nations were (the one to a lesser extent than the other) 
economically dependent upon agriculture, which made the growth of the agricultural sector, 
and hence control over its key resource, vital.   
  In Zambia two factors restricted agricultural growth throughout the period studied: the 
sparseness of population and the scarcity of fertile land.  The land rights system, which 
ensured private ownership of land, was created by (and for) the European and inevitably led to 
a highly unequal, clearly separated land rights system which gave the small European minority 
access to the most fertile land, while the overwhelming majority of the black African 
population were excluded from the right to own land.  However the widely dispersed 
population made resistance ineffective.  From the time of the arrival of the settlers the 
sparseness of the population had another noteworthy effect on colonial land policy: the 
necessity to compel people to engage in wage labour. This predicament, experienced as such 
by the settlers and colonialist, was solved through the artificial creation of land scarcity 
through the installation of Reserves and the monetisation of the economy, enforced through 
taxation.  
   This process was most vigorously deployed in Zimbabwe, where the African 
population was neither dense nor sparse, and they could therefore exercise considerable 
resistance to resettlement and extraction policies. They did resist (from the beginning onwards; 
illustrated by the First Chimurenga) and means were introduced whereby the population was 
subdued both spatially (through designated land) and judicially (through a division between 
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European/private and African/customary legal systems).584   
  In Malawi, the population density had a different effect on policies regarding land and 
labour. Malawi’s dependency on export crops made labour of crucial importance to planters. 
Since Malawians were not willing to tie themselves to labour and were not as easily displaced 
as their Zambian and Zimbabwean counterparts, a different system arose: they were coerced 
into labour and tenancy relations through the manipulation of the native system of thangata. 
The development of Reserves in Malawi was not at all as pervasive as in Zambia and 
Zimbabwe and population was tied to labour through tenancy relations whereby people 
resided on or near the plantation.  
From the beginning of colonial times onwards and as a direct result of population density 
Malawi developed its labour market differently from Zambia and Zimbabwe: rather than 
through the creation Reserves, labour was ensured through the manipulation of thangata. 
Nonetheless, all systems in all three countries served a similar purpose. From the beginning of 
colonialism, the ties Africans had with their land were broken. This was most directly 
implemented through thangata in Malawi, and least aggressively in Zambia, where people’s 
dependency on land did not pose a direct threat to the expansion of the colonial economy. In 
Malawi, colonial administrators and plantation-holders successfully marginalised traditional 
leaders and smallholders through the system of marketable labour (first thangata and later 
share-cropping and tenancy), breaking all relations people had with the land by making them 
dependent on labour to subsist. In Zimbabwe, the NLHA significantly contributed to the 
detachment of people from their land forcing them to rely on labour. Overcrowding on 
Reserve land led to severe and irreversible ecological degradation, further undermining the 
relationship the people held with the  land. Ecological collapse led to further dependency on 
the labour market and hence increased colonial grip over the population. Breaking peoples’ 
relationship with land meant breaking their ability to resist colonial rule: an assertion that is 
illustrated by the colonial administrations constant battle between dissociating people from 
the land, while also trying to maintain a lucrative economy – a dilemma which had already 
proven fatal to the BSAC. The different systems, although all supplying labour, also served 
different economies: a settler economy in Zimbabwe, a plantation economy in Malawi and an 
extractive mining economy in Zambia.   
 Race, class and dual tenure systems  
From the very beginning of colonial rule in all three countries, British law was guiding, and 
race was instrumental in the allocation of land. In Zambia, freehold tenure was easily available 
for Europeans settlers: land was ample, and a European system of freehold tenure easily 
imported. The availability of land was used to attract more farmers and enhance the budding 
agricultural sector. Yet, from the very beginning, it was hard for Africans to acquire land due to 
a dual system of ownership, which refracted patterns of ownership, with a clear demarcation 
on European and African lines. The dual system, with a division between individual (European) 
versus communal (African) tenure at its core, was further solidified through the installation of 
Native Reserves in 1928 and Native Trust Land in 1947. The emphasis the colonial government 
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placed on ‘protecting’ indigenous systems of communal rights contributed to the legal 
separation of races, and thereby promoted a continuation of the European stronghold on land. 
This appropriation was implemented mostly in Zimbabwe, which, for its fertile land and 
averagely dense population, appeared an agricultural paradise for the settler population. Land 
appropriation here was extensive and had become fully integrated in law by the mid-fifties.  
The legal tenure separation that accompanied the physical separation of land was present in 
all three territories, regardless of population density and it continued to determine land rights 
after independence. In post-independence Zimbabwe, reform was most severely obstructed 
due to the continued British interference and the Lancaster House agreement. Also at this 
time, structural adjustment and a privileged group of Africans, who had been able to associate 
themselves with the capitalist class of owners, hampered post-independent land reform and 
redistribution.  This group had been able to work their way up the ladder by closely aligning 
themselves with colonial/settler-state decision makers (stimulated by the colonial 
governments) and had little incentives to climb back down again, illustrated by, for example, 
Banda’s personal relations with large-scale maize producers. 585  The formation and 
empowerment of this new class of entrepreneurs was comparable in the three countries, and 
hence, the density of population had little effect on its construction. Rather, it was a political 
effect of a colonial government seeking support for maintaining a divisive land policy.  
 Settler economies were buttressed by control over territory. The growth of the colonial 
state in all three territories went hand in hand with restrictions on freehold tenure, and an 
attempted move towards leasehold - a legal way to retain control over land. This is 
exemplified in the paternalistic policies during the fifties, whereby control over land was only 
granted to Africans after a probationary period during which they were to demonstrate their 
‘farming skills’, for example stipulated in the 1956 Zambian Agricultural Lands Bill. Note that 
even if this period was bridged, only leaseholds were granted. Yet leasehold was more 
laborious to administer, something that was not possible especially in Zambia with its wide 
spread population and the lean colonial administration. A move to leasehold was attempted 
by installing Trust Land from 1947 onwards, whereupon leaseholds could be granted to 
European farmers. Yet the strong grip European farmers already had on their land, combined 
with a) the absence of an administration that could accommodate the distribution of long-term 
leasehold and b) a financial credit market favouring individual, freehold tenure, ensured 
European farmers continued to hold freehold title, and the African population continued to be 
deprived of any legal title whatsoever.       
 In none of the countries studied did post-independent land policy (1995 Land Act in Zambia, 
1965 New Land Bill in Malawi, 1981 Communal Land Act in Zimbabwe) break the dual system. 
Resettlement schemes were implemented in all three countries to counter landlessness and 
overpopulation. In Malawi, nationalism and economic socialism dictated post-colonial land 
tenure policy, and during the early years of the Kaunda regime in Zambia, all Crown lands 
were renamed State lands.586 Both these processes gave the state far-reaching instruments to 
control land: freehold became leasehold, and land lost its intrinsic value. It is interesting to 
note in this study that the most sparsely populated country, Zambia, has enjoyed the least 
                                                   
585 W. Moseley, Paradoxical constraints to agricultural intensification in Malawi: The interplay between 
labor, land and policy, The University of Georgia Department of Geography Discussion paper series 
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586 Brown, ‘Contestation, confusion and corruption’, 83. 
99 
 
extent of privatised rights and has mostly enjoyed a continuation of land rights systems that 
were already in place before colonial interference. This was mostly due to the inequality on 
the land market. Even though socialist land reform of the seventies was repealed in the mid-
nineties, reinstating private property rights, it changed little for the 93 per cent of the 
population living under customary tenure.  Zambia’s economy is very lopsided, with 80 per 
cent of the rural population making a living through subsistence farming on customary land. Its 
1.1 million small-scale farm households cultivate on average just one hectare each. Only about 
2000 large-scale farmers cultivate 20 hectares or more.587  
  Moreover, in all countries, class became equivalent with land ownership. A small elite 
emerged backed by the legal prerogative to own land, while the majority of population was 
excluded from the land market, severely impeding their ability to participate in the formal 
economy. Class relations were further widened by the structural adjustment programmes that 
were implemented in all countries in the wake of independence, since the government’s 
authority to tackle colonial inequities was minimised, while the market (which was severely 
influenced by a colonial legacy of preconditions and incentives favouring a ruling class) did 
little to solve landlessness and structural poverty as land prices rose.  
Land markets 
In Malawi, population density ensured that land had always been a valuable 
commodity. Before the first Europeans arrived, rules and regulations guiding the ownership, 
inheritance and occupancy of land were already in place. In the middle and south of the 
country, matrilineal allocation generally meant smaller plot-sizes but equitable distribution, 
while in the north of the country patrilineal inheritance ensured more long-term rights to land. 
Processes of monetisation and the introduction of land markets has severely influenced these 
systems during colonialism, only to be further expanded upon after independence. By then, 
traditional systems were further eroded as land markets invigorated, and, justifying the demise 
of TA’s, the idea that communal land rights were unfit to stimulate agricultural growth 
remained unchallenged.   
  The antithesis between customary and private systems is explicitly present in all cases. 
It is a contradiction that was effectively manipulated by the colonial government to enlarge 
rather than reduce differences between both systems, and therefore between race and class. 
It disregarded land rights as the ‘bundle of sticks’ it represents588, and the fact land itself as 
incapable of ownership, whereby only interests in land can be owned. In densely populated 
areas, ownership is often layered and complex, whereby the chiefs, family-members and TA’s 
or senior chiefs all have a say in the sale or division of a field. Ownership is fractured and 
mostly determined by inheritance, resembling peasant economies in Europe. Access to land 
influences all and is therefore an event that involves the entire community. Land ownership, in 
this sense, is fluid, renegotiable. This fluid relationship between the individual, the community, 
and the rights it generates was never acknowledged by the colonial administrations. Rather, 
the pre-colonial set of informal rules and regulations determining access to resources was, 
with all its ambiguities, incorporated into the colonial framework. It has continuously been 
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588 In this analogy, land ownership is compared to a bundle of sticks, whereby not all are of the same 
length or thickness. All the sticks (i.e. the entire bundle) can be owned by one person or separate sticks 
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emphasised as the answer to contestations over resources, and became a terrain where 
conflicting interests by communities, families, individuals, was played out. The struggle for 
land impacted traditional structures of authority in all countries - a discrepancy that was 
continued during postcolonial times.  
	  	   Land markets, in the cases studied, have always emphasised private property rights as 
the only means to secure land rights, thereby overlooking the safety nets built into systems of 
communal ownership. In Malawi population density had ensured there was always a demand 
for land by the population, something that was remarkably different in Zimbabwe and Zambia.  
In Zambia, labour	  constraints	  were	  a	  constant	  problem	  for	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  agricultural	  sector,	  
and	   during colonialism the pressing demand for labour induced repressive measures to 
manipulate the labour market through interventions on the land market. 589 This meant that 
where there was no intrinsic market for land, like in the Zambian but also in the Zimbabwean 
case, an artificial scarcity was created by the colonial government. In Zambia, market based 
land redistribution became the dominant approach to land reform from the 1980’s onwards.590 
Even though control over land was centralised in 1975, allocation of land rights continued to 
be carried out by chiefs and headman. Access to rural land continued to be linked to the 
negotiation of settlement rights and village allegiances.591 Pre-colonial systems of tenure 
remained more in Zambia than Malawi or Zimbabwe.   
Civil society  
The demand for comprehensive redistribution of land was crucial to African resistance 
movement in Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi alike.  Economic decline sparked the rise of 
African resistance movements, for one illustrated by the post-copper decline in copper prices 
in Zambia. In Zimbabwe, the creation of Native Purchase Areas were an example of 
reactionary policy aiming to accommodate African grievances, and to a certain extent led to a 
new class of “reserve entrepreneurs” who in turn became economically empowered and 
actively involved in shaping resistance, for example through the ANC and the NDP. Population 
density seems crucial here: it was the number of Africans posing a threat to the government in 
Zimbabwe, which eventually led to the publication of two controversial and ominous reports 
by 1960, warning for the effects of on-going marginalisation of Africans. In Malawi, the efforts 
to accommodate African interests were greater than in either Zambia or Zimbabwe. Even 
during colonialism, hardship was faced by the government through the population’s leverage 
in demanding more representation and most of all, more land, culminating in the 1953 Tennet 
uprising. The already tentative move towards granting more grip on land was legally 
enshrined in the 1962 Private Estates Bill, giving Malawians the most agency over land of all 
three cases studies. Hence, Malawi has seen a strong opposition from civil society, rooted in 
the leverage the population had over the government determining land allocation and its 
administration; Zambia knew relatively little land disputes, but a severely unequal land market, 
and Zimbabwe experienced both an unequal land market where a small elite monopolised 
private ownership of land, while also displaying land disputes as a result of the dual system 
installed.  
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6.1.2 Connecting the dots  
In all, there are both similarities as well as differences in the system of land rights to be noted 
between the three countries, which, at a certain point in history, have been governed by the 
same coloniser. Land was a prime factor in all three countries, shaping class interaction, land 
markets and resistance movements, which, in turn, affected land rights. Population proves to 
be a factor of influence, since relative density of population from the very beginning affected 
the way the settler population appropriated land. Settler economies were buttressed by 
control over territory. Answering the thesis question: population density, thus, did influence 
land rights to a certain extent, mostly in the realm of civil society, and the intention and 
direction of colonial policies and their legacy.  The pre-colonial fluid borders and a system of 
land rights whereby ownership was determined by an individual’s adherence to a community 
were impacted by a colonial entity aiming for economic profits with as little investment as 
possible. This desire had disastrous effects on the populations of Zambia, Zimbabwe and 
Malawi; albeit in different ways. The sparse population density in Zambia enabled the colonial 
government to displace populations with ease and compel them to work as labourers in 
mining and agriculture. Land rights were undeniably influenced, and were for a period of time 
in the hands of the postcolonial state altogether. But the impact of the land rights system was 
smallest in Zambia, as the colonial economy and its dual system caused a severely unequal 
economy, deriving its roots from private versus customary land ownership. A small elite 
developed with secured access to the most fertile plots, while the overwhelming majority of 
the population continued to live in a subsistence economy, making a living of small plots 
under the guidance of TA’s.    
  Malawi’s dense population influenced land rights differently. The population was 
forced to grant labour, yet retained a considerable grip on their land. Their numbers were 
harder to contain which posed a greater threat to the colonial government.  Whereby, in this 
thesis, the discrepancy between little agency over land rights by the Zambians contrasted with 
the considerable leverage Malawians held on their land, partly affirms the hypothesis whereby 
denser population leads to more secure land rights: although a move to fully private, individual 
land rights failed to occur, Malawians did influence their land rights systems to a greater 
degree than their Zambian counterparts.   
  Zimbabwe’s land history poses interesting insights as well.  The combination of both 
dynamics above, namely a government attempting to retain the population and a strong 
demand from the population for more rights 
6.2 General conclusions 
The securitisation and privatisation of property rights is not a natural occurrence.592 The 
chapters in this study have shown an intricate relationship between population, its relative 
density, land, and the influences of colonialism. The previous section (6.1) has highlighted the 
differences as well as similarities between Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi, providing insight 
into the effect of population density on the development of land rights. It has concluded that 
population is of influence to the development of land rights in these particular contexts, 
outlined and described by the various themes it has affected. In this final analytical section, 
building on the findings described and analysed in the consecutive chapters of this study, 
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general conclusions are presented following from the aforementioned results, together with a 
concise contextualisation.  
The colonial state imposed political constraints on economic behaviour, curbing the 
development of land rights  
Politics and economy are intrinsically linked in the context of these three countries. Zinyama 
and Whitlow over Zimbabwe argue “In numerical terms, geographical distribution, rate of 
growth and environmental impact, the African population exerts the greatest influence on 
present and future development prospects in the country”. Although small in numerical terms, 
Europeans exercised political and economic control of the system of land rights from the time 
of colonisation to the attainment of independence by the African majority. This control was 
complete in Zambia and Zimbabwe, and more comprised in Malawi. An exceptional legacy of 
the colonial period is the division of land on racial lines, a policy commencing in 1894 in 
Zimbabwe and culminating in the Land Tenure Act of 1970. Zinyama and Whitlow argue over 
Zimbabwe: “The apportionment of land, by determining where each racial group could reside 
and on what terms, is the greatest single factor that has influenced the distribution of 
population in the country”593.  
  Colonial policies, most notably in Malawi, encouraged the removal of labour from the 
subsistence economy, and thereby interfered with the ‘normal process’ of intensification, as 
described by Boserup. Extensive agricultural practices continued because labour was 
continuously removed from the local economy, creating patterns of dependency. Further 
distortion of a ‘natural’ development as a result of population pressures on land was sculpted 
through land apartheid. In other words, population density is not a dominating factor when 
there is a politically and economically level playing field, yet in a severely skewed society 
where economic and political power is held by a minority, population forces are absorbed and 
curbed – with more success in a less than a more densely populated area.   
Individual land title is not always the most optimal way to access land in an economy with 
limited access to credit and no marketing infrastructure  
Individual title is not necessarily a guarantee for agricultural development in an economy 
where there is limited access to credit and no marketing infrastructure. Individual ownership is 
therefore not the most optimal way to access land. Malawians may not have chosen for 
individual rights of ownership of land if they had been given the option to do so; they have 
always had agency in the history of their land division.  An explanation for their reluctance to 
adopt private land rights (in line with the European development, great security, negotiability, 
a more robust land market) is that a simple conversion of titles cannot bring about agricultural 
development; land reform must be accompanied by the availability of credit and improved 
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marketing infrastructures.594 Moreover, there must be sufficient heterogeneity such that at 
single market price where there are both willing sellers and willing buyers.595 
6.3 Suggestions for further research  
Relationships between population and land are of crucial importance to Africa. Understanding 
them continues to present a major intellectual challenge. This study has found that looking at 
population density renders rewarding conclusions: it is a factor that has contributed to the 
current shape and direction of land policy, and all the other aspects of society and economy 
that are, in turn, affected by it. This study could not fathom all those aspects, their nuances 
and interactions, and therefore, some of them will be shortly explored in this section with the 
intention to possibly inspire more research and a deeper understanding of the relationship 
between land ownership and population density.     
  First of all, this thesis focused on the qualitative aspects of land division in three former 
British colonies and the question: how population density affected laws regarding land and 
how this was answered by looking directly at how these laws came into being. Insight into that 
process was provided by archival sources - the subject would however benefit from a 
quantitative approach. A regression analysis could be made with data on population density 
and cadastral data on plot sizes or data on agricultural production, such as profits or 
investments.  Does population density affect the size and profitability of farms in these regions? 
This could contribute to a better understanding of land use, land markets, land security and 
patterns of inheritance, thereby adding to the debate on people and land.  
  Secondly, the colonial state and its legacy have been mentioned as a decisive actor in 
shaping socio-economic conditions for growth: not only in this thesis, but by studies 
throughout this field of research.596 The idea that African states somehow structurally impede 
growth is epitomised in the concept of ‘failed states’; and apart from the fact that European 
colonial forces practically drew the African borders and hence imposed stringent exogenous 
determinants on present-day African states, the nature of the ‘African state’ entity has been 
described as highly predatory. 597  The colonial state engaged in rent seeking and the 
redistribution of resources from the rural poor to the urban elites.598 Yet, the colonial entities 
that came to govern African states were often ruled by economic efficiency as well.  Hence, it 
is the question whether the gatekeeper state is a cause or a result of economic circumstances 
in the colonies. As a multitude of studies show, there is no unequivocal interpretation of the 
form and demeanour of the European state in Africa. Whether the shape and conduct of the 
colonial state were a result of ‘ground’ factors such as demographics and geography, or 
whether the colonial state in turn was able to curb such endowments according to its liking 
remains to be answered.   
  Thirdly, insights can be generated by looking at the interaction between civil society 
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movement and the change of land policy. To ask whether population density matters for land 
rights or any other social construction, is implicitly a question whether people can organise 
themselves when policies or institutions do not work in their favour. How do groups who win, 
and those who loose, interact, in the realm of population density and land rights? In the cases 
studied in this thesis, there were noticeably more resistance to marginalising land policy in 
densely populated area (Malawi) than in an area with few people per square kilometre 
(Zambia). Hence, how did social mobilisation shape state action towards accommodating 
demand concerning land?   
  Lastly, more understanding into the workings of private property in developing 
economies is relevant and valuable. While World Bank and IMF programmes (as described in 
this thesis as well) have mostly focused on privatisation and the promotion of secure rights to 
land, or other property such as real estate, recent studies have criticised this approach, 
outlining the poverty trap. How come a move towards individual tenure did not bring progress, 
as has been proven by the effects of various moves towards individual tenure in Zimbabwe 
and Malawi? It suggests that a lack of individual tenure could be a blessing in disguise, since a 
rural landless class has been established as a result of the vigour of a land market hailing 
private ownership.  
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